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Autonomous agents operating in a dynamic environment must be able to reason about their
actions in pursuit of their goals. An additional consideration for such agents is that their actions
may be constrained by norms that aim at defining an acceptable behaviour for the agents.
The inclusion of normative reasoning into practical reasoning is derived from the necessity
for effective mechanisms that regulate an agent’s behaviour in an open environment without
compromising their autonomy. However, the conflict between agents’ individual goals and
societal goals (i.e. norms) makes deciding what to do a complicated activity. Argumentation
enables reasoning and decision-making in presence of conflict and supports explaining the
reasoning mechanism in terms of a dialogue. The need for explanation of a complex task
undertaken by an autonomous entity lies in the importance of facilitating human understanding
of such entities and consequently increasing their trust in these systems.
Existing argumentation-based approaches to practical reasoning often ignore the role of
norms in practical reasoning and commonly neglect the dialogical aspect of argumentation
to explain the process of practical reasoning. To address these shortcomings, the research
presented in this thesis allows an agent to use argumentation to support deciding what to do
while the agent is able to explain why such a decision is made. To this end, we demonstrate a
model for normative practical reasoning that permits an agent to plan for conflicting goals and
norms. We use argumentation frameworks to reason about these conflicts by weighing up the
importance of goal achievement and norm compliance against the cost of goals being ignored
and norms being violated in each plan. Such a reasoning serves as the basis of identifying
the best plan for the agent to execute, while the reasoning process is explained using natural
language translation of a proof dialogue game.
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Practical reasoning – reasoning about how to act – for an agent pursuing different goals is a
complicated task. Apart from individual goals, agents are often subject to societal norms that
encourage the agents to follow the right behaviour. A normative practical reasoning agent
chooses its actions not only in pursuit of its individual goals, but also according to norms
that specify what the agent is obliged to or prohibited from doing under specific conditions.
Generating plans for multiple goals while considering norms imposed on the agent is a difficult
activity. With the advances made in computational aspects of agent reasoning, autonomous
agents are capable of planning under complex conditions. Users often perceive, however, a
lack of transparency regarding system outcome due to the intrinsic opacity of agents in open
systems. Lack of transparency leads to difficulties in human understanding of the system and its
trustworthiness. The main research question in this thesis is How can we establish transparent
mechanisms for autonomous agents to reason about their actions toward satisfying their goals
and complying with their norms?
In this chapter, we present the motivation behind the research presented in this thesis. We
also discuss our contributions, as well as the structure of this thesis and the relevant publica-
tions.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Research in the field of autonomous software agents and multi-agent systems has been moti-
vated by the following question since 1980:
“How do we build agents that are capable of independent, autonomous action
in order to successfully carry out the tasks that we delegate to them?” [Wooldridge,
2009, p. 5]
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The agents as representatives of individuals and organisations, have proven to be a computa-
tionally efficient mechanism to perform many complex tasks in different areas such as elec-
tronic commerce, supply chain management and decision support systems. Autonomy as the
defining feature of intelligent agents, makes them flexible and enables them to react in differ-
ent situations through their choices of goals and actions [Norman and Long, 1995]. However,
autonomy also poses critical issues about trust, coordination, and reliability unless it is con-
trolled. Controlling and managing the autonomy of intelligent agents has been one of the main
challenges of agent systems since their creation. Early research in this area [Moses and Ten-
nenholtz, 1995; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1992; Walker and Wooldridge, 1995] was mainly
focused on introducing some social rules or conventions that are hard-wired into the agent
and represent a form of internalised control. Being hard-coded into the agents, such conven-
tions are of course the guarantors of reliability and predictability of the agents behaviour. This
approach, however, is largely discarded in more recent applications for two reasons. Firstly,
introducing sociality in this manner comes at the price of restrictive autonomy. Secondly, the
social rules that govern the agents’ behaviour are subject to change in response to changes that
inevitably happen in a dynamic environment. As a result, the conventions are not necessarily
known at design time.
To mitigate the mentioned shortcomings, the research in the area of controlling autonomy
shifted from presenting sociality in the form of conventions to sociality in the form of norms.
The concept of norm in agent societies has its roots in regulative mechanisms in human so-
cieties. Normative concepts in human societies and their impact on individuals have been
studied for decades in social sciences. From late nineties, these concepts inspired the develop-
ment of norm-aware entities in artificial intelligence (AI). Norms are social mechanisms that
aim at regulating agents’ behaviour by explicitly specifying obligations, prohibitions, and per-
missions that apply to the agents under specific circumstances. When implemented as hard
constraints [Esteva et al., 2001; Kollingbaum and Norman, 2003; Sadri et al., 2006] an agent
has no choice but to comply with the norms. Norms are said to be regimented in this case.
However, regimenting norms poses the exact same problems that are raised against hard-wired
conventions, namely the huge restriction of autonomy and not being known in advance. Con-
versely, when implemented as soft constraints, the choice of complying or not complying (i.e.
violating) with a norm is left to the agent. In these approaches, known as enforcement ap-
proaches, norm compliance is encouraged by introducing consequences in terms of sanctions
in case an agent violates the norm [Lo´pez et al., 2005; Pacheco, 2012; Pitt et al., 2013]. These
consequences influence the agent’s practical reasoning directly. The agent therefore, must in-
corporate reasoning about norms and the impact of complying with or violating them, during
its practical reasoning.
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Since enforcing norms hands the choice of norm compliance over to the agent, it does not
restrict the agent’s autonomy, but it certainly requires a more sophisticated reasoning from the
agent’s side. The agent must be able to recognise and reason about any conflict between its
individual goals and consequences of norm compliance or violation. Moreover, during its prac-
tical reasoning the agent has to reason about the conflict between norms themselves. Conflict
between norms is often caused by the agent undertaking different roles that require following
certain norms that may be conflicting. Alternatively, it can be caused due to the agent interact-
ing with different environments, where these environments enforce their own set of normative
objectives. Regardless of the cause of conflict the agent has to consider them in its practical
reasoning and act accordingly. However, the question that remains is that when preserving
autonomy comes at the cost of such sophisticated reasoning, is the agent still predictable and
hence reliable? Is there any solution that conducts practical reasoning, while taking into ac-
count the normative position of the agent, such that it is transparent enough to be trusted by
humans? This thesis presents an answer to this question. The proposed solution is discussed in
the next section.
1.2 Proposed Solution and Contributions
As stated earlier, in contrast to selfish pursuit of individual goals, decision-making about ac-
tions in norm-aware agents is also shaped by norms that define right behaviour. Thus, the
performance of these agents is not only evaluated by the accomplishment of their goals, but
also by respecting the norms of society. As a result these agents’ decision-making is more
intelligent and human-like [Boella et al., 2006], but it is also more difficult to understand and
scrutinise for human users. Explanation plays an important role in making artificial reason-
ing understandable and thus reliable for human users [Lacave and Dı´ez, 2004; Wooley, 1998].
The explanation capability is in particular useful in convincing the user of an intelligent sys-
tem about the correctness of the system’s results. Lacave and Dı´ez [2004] formally define
explaining as:
“... exposing something in such a way that is understandable for the receiver
of the explanation – so that he/she improves his/her knowledge about the object of
the explanation – and satisfactory in that it meets the receivers expectations.”
An explanation that meets the user expectation is very likely to have a positive impact on user
acceptance. Agents with explanation capability are therefore known to be persuasive [Moulin
et al., 2002]. In other words, they have a better chance of persuading another agent or a human
user to agree with them. Despite the importance, the subject of explanation has received no
14
attention in existing approaches to practical and normative reasoning [Atkinson and Bench-
Capon, 2007b; Broersen et al., 2001; Criado et al., 2010; Hulstijn and van der Torre, 2004;
Kollingbaum and Norman, 2003; Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006; Sadri et al., 2006].
Argumentation serves as an effective computational tool for various agent activities in-
cluding agent reasoning [Amgoud, 2003; Bench-Capon et al., 2009; Dung, 1995; Gaertner
and Toni, 2007b; Oren et al., 2007]. As a reasoning tool, argumentation is particularly im-
portant because it allows drawing consistent conclusions from a set of conflicting, inconsistent
and incomplete information [Bench-Capon et al., 2009; Garcı´a et al., 2013]. The process of
argumentation [Amgoud et al., 2004] consists of (i) building a set of arguments; (ii) identify-
ing their conflicts, referred to as attacks; and (iii) recognising the acceptability of arguments
based on their weights, the attacks they receive, and the counter-attack they present. Based
on the acceptability of arguments, certain conclusions can be drawn and used for different pur-
poses including agent’s internal reasoning or multi-agent collaborative reasoning. Dung [1995]
proposed one of the most widely used argumentation framework that is the basis for most of
research in argumentation-based reasoning. An argumentation framework consists of a set of
arguments and a set of attacks between them: AF = 〈Arg , Att〉, Att ⊆ Arg × Arg . Various
acceptability criteria, known as argumentation semantics, were also proposed by Dung [1995]
to identify the status of arguments in an argumentation framework.
In addition to reasoning based on argumentation frameworks, argumentation can also serve
as an effective computational tool for generating explanation [Baroni and Giacomin, 2009;
Caminada et al., 2014c; Fan and Toni, 2015; Garcı´a et al., 2013; Lacave and Dı´ez, 2004].
Intelligent agents equipped with argumentation capabilities can explain the validity of their
recommendation to their users in a form of explanatory dialogues that are similar to human
argumentation activities [Moulin et al., 2002]. These dialogues formalise dialectical explana-
tion support for argumentation-based reasoning based on argumentation semantics. However,
in contrast to semantics that justify the validity of an argument in terms of membership of a
set, these dialogues, through some fictitious proponent and opponent dialogue game [Fan and
Toni, 2015] provide dialectical explanation for valid arguments.
Going back to our main research question posed in the previous section “Is there any
solution that conduct practical reasoning taking into account the normative position of the
agent, such that it is transparent enough to be trusted by humans?” we seek the solution in
argumentation-based approaches to reasoning. Because not only does argumentation deal with
conflicts and inconsistencies as a part of reasoning toward decision-making, it is also explain-
able in the form of a dialogue. Consequently, normative practical reasoning can be conducted
in a transparent way that is likely to be trusted by human users.
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In this thesis we adopt the viewpoint of Pollock [1995] to practical reasoning, where firstly,
plans are generated with respect to what the agent cares about and secondly, the plans are
subject to decision-making based on certain criteria and considerations. Plans for the agent are
defined and generated with respect to the agent’s individual goals and the norms imposed on the
agent. Each of the generated plans are seen as proposals of actions that need to be evaluated
in order for the agent to identify the best plan. We use argumentation schemes and critical
questions [Walton, 1996] to equip the agent with the ability to question, defend and reject the
plan proposals. Schemes are general patterns of arguments expressed in natural language and
there is a set of critical questions associated with each scheme that presents the ways in which
the scheme can be attacked.
The argumentation framework built for each plan proposal is evaluated to identify the jus-
tified plans. The justified plans are further compared based on the set of goals they satisfy/do
not satisfy and the set of norms they comply with/violate. The explanation of the best plan is
demonstrated through the representation of justifiability in terms of argumentation-based di-
alogues. In order to provide an explanation that is natural, clear and easy to understand, the
explanation is translated into natural language.
In summary, the main aim of this thesis is in setting out an end-to-end solution that takes
agents actions as input and equips the agent with the ability to act in the presence of conflicting
goals and norms, while allowing the agent to explain why it acted as it did. In achieving
this aim we propose the first argumentation-based approach to practical reasoning that uses
both the reasoning and explanation capability of argumentation. In so doing, the following
contributions are made:
• Formalising a novel model for normative practical reasoning that defines plans consid-
ering multiple goals and norms, while taking into account their conflicts.
• Implementing the model to automate generating the plans.
• Creating and formalising a set of argument schemes and critical questions that integrate
norms and durative actions into practical reasoning; These schemes are aimed at check-
ing the justifiability of plans with respect to goals satisfied and norms complied with or
violated in the plan.
• Offering a novel decision criterion that identifies the best plan, taking into consideration
the justifiability of plans and preferences over goals satisfied and norms violated across
plans. In absence of sufficient preference information, the number of goals satisfied and
norms violated is the basis of plan comparison.
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• Proposing a concrete application of a recently developed dialogue game [Caminada et
al., 2014b] that dialectically explains why a plan is justified.
• Providing a natural language explanation for why a plan is the best plan, such that the
explanation is easy to understand for experts and non-expert users.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 1: This chapter addresses the motivation behind this research, as well as the contri-
butions that this work makes. It also provides an overview of the work presented in the
remaining chapters.
Chapter 2: Related literature to this work are surveyed in this chapter. We first give an
overview of agent reasoning in general, followed by practical reasoning and the role
of norms in practical reasoning. Subsequently, different approaches to normative practi-
cal reasoning are discussed. In particular, argumentation-based approaches to practical
reasoning are surveyed in detail. It is explained how argumentation can support agent
reasoning and human understanding of such reasoning.
Chapter 3: Proposing a formal model for normative practical reasoning is the focus of this
chapter. This model permits the agent to plan for multiple goals and norms, while consid-
ering their conflicts. Conflict between actions, goals and norms are explicitly presented
and formulated. Plans are consequently defined with respect to these conflicts.
Chapter 4: An implementation of the formal model in the previous chapter is presented in
this chapter. The implementation is aimed at automating the generation of plans de-
fined in the formal model. The computational tool for the implementation is answer set
programming [Baral, 2003]. The absence of a conceptual gap between the formal and
computational model, is one of the primary advantages of the implementation.
Chapter 5: Chapters 3 and 4 constitutes the first step of practical reasoning, namely plan-
ning. The second step of practical reasoning, namely decision-making about which plan
to execute is what we address in this chapter. Argumentation frameworks are used to
assist the agent’s decision-making about plans. A formal model of arguments based
on argumentation schemes and the relationships between arguments based on critical
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questions are presented in this chapter. Preferences are used to reflect the weight of ar-
guments. They are taken into account in determining the acceptability of arguments and
ultimately identifying the best plan.
Chapter 6: The explanation of why a certain plan should be executed is provided in this
chapter. Argumentation-based dialogues are used to give a human-like explanation of
the reasoning process toward identifying the best plan. The dialogue is translated to
natural language, which makes it readily comprehensible.
Chapter 7: Conclusions and contributions of this work are addressed in this chapter. The
limitations of this research are also pointed out, with possible solutions to tackle them.
Also, further research directions are discussed.
1.4 Related Publications
Some part of this thesis is published in the following papers:
• Shams, Z., De Vos, M., Oren, N., Padget, J., Explaining Normative Practical Reason-
ing via Argumentation and Dialogue, Submitted to International Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2016).
This paper contributed toward Chapters 5 and 6.
• Shams, Z., De Vos, M., Oren, N., Padget, J., and Satoh, K., Argumentation-based Nor-
mative Practical Reasoning, accepted for publication in Proceedings of International
Workshop on Theory and Applications of Formal Argument (TAFA 2015).
This paper contributed toward Chapters 5 and 6.
In this paper we proposed a model for normative practical reasoning that allows an
agent to plan for multiple and potentially conflicting goals and norms at the same time.
The best plan for the agent to execute is identified by means of argumentation schemes
and critical questions. The justification of this choice is provided via an argumentation-
based persuasion dialogue for the grounded semantics.
• Shams, Z., De Vos, M., Padget, J., and Vasconcelos, W., Implementation of Normative
Practical Reasoning with Durative Actions, accepted for publication in Proceedings of
International Workshop on Coordination, Organisation, Institutions and Norms in Multi-
Agent Systems (COIN 2015).
This paper contributed toward Chapters 3 and 4.
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This paper proposed a formal model that allows the agents to plan for conflicting goals
and norms in presence of durative actions that can be executed concurrently. Plans
are compared based on decision-theoretic notions (i.e. utility) such that the utility gain
of goals and utility loss of norm violations are the basis of this comparison. The set
of optimal plans consists of plans that maximise the overall utility, each of which can
be chosen by the agent to execute. The formal model is implemented using answer set
programming, which in turns permits the statement of the problem in terms of a logic
program that can be queried for solutions with specific properties. It is demonstrate how
a normative practical reasoning problem can be mapped into an answer set program
such that the optimal plans of the former can be obtained as the answer sets of the latter.
• [Shams, 2015] Shams, Z. (2015), Normative Practical Reasoning: An Argumentation-
Based Approach, In Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth International Joint Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2015), pages 4397–4398.
The extended abstract presented in this paper provides a summary of the thesis.
• [Shams et al., 2013] Shams, Z., De Vos, M., and Satoh, K., ArgPROLEG: A Normative
Framework for the JUF Theory, New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence, Springer, 2013,
pages 183–198.
This paper contributed toward Chapters 2 and 5.
In this paper we proposed ArgPROLEG, an application of argumentation theory in legal
reasoning. This application is based on PROLEG, an implementation of the the Japanese
“theory of presupposed ultimate facts” (JUF). This theory was mainly developed with
the purpose of modelling the process of decision-making by judges in the court. Not
having complete and accurate information about each case, makes uncertainty an un-
avoidable part of decision-making for judges. In the JUF theory each party that puts
forward a claim, due to associated burden of proof to each claim, it needs to prove it as
well. Not being able to provide such a proof for a claim, enables the judges to discard
that claim although they might not be certain about the truth. The framework that we
offered benefits from the use of argumentation theory to allow reasoning with incomplete
and inconsistent information. Furthermore, it brings the reasoning closer to the user by




The aim of this work is to enable an agent operating in a normative environment to identify
and justify the best course of actions to execute. Reasoning involved in deciding what to do is
referred to as practical reasoning. While there are different approaches addressing the prac-
tical reasoning problem in agents, we claim that they often lack transparency when it comes
to explaining and justifying this reasoning process and its results. Argumentation has proven
to be a promising approach in aiding agent’s reasoning and decision-making in a scrutable
and trackable way [Caminada et al., 2014c; Fan and Toni, 2015; Kakas and Moraitis, 2003;
Oren, 2013; Zhong et al., 2014]. To this end, we propose an argumentation-based framework
for practical reasoning based on argument schemes and critical questions [Walton, 1996]. To
put this work into context, in this chapter, we provide a summary of related work address-
ing argumentation-based practical reasoning and planning. Section 2.1 gives an account of
(i) practical reasoning in general, (ii) the role of norms in an agent society, and (iii) practical
reasoning in the presence of norms. In Section 2.2 we focus on the role of argumentation in
agent reasoning and agent dialogue for making and explaining decisions. Section 2.3 discusses
the contributions and limitations of existing approaches that use argumentation as the basis of
practical reasoning. Finally we conclude in Section 2.4 by describing the intuition behind this
research and how it relates to the existing approaches.
2.1 Agent Reasoning
Theoretical or epistemic and practical reasoning are two known elements in rational agents’
reasoning and decision-making. Epistemic or theoretical reasoning is concerned with what to
believe, whereas practical reasoning is reasoning about actions and what to do according to
some motivational attitudes, such as goals, desires or intentions [Bratman, 1987; Wooldridge,
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2000]. The similarities and differences between reasoning about beliefs and actions have been
much discussed in the past [Fox and Parsons, 1998; Pollock, 1995; Wooldridge and Jennings,
1995]. In this section we review works by the three most influential scholars amongst others,
who studied the distinctions between agent epistemic and practical reasoning, namely Pollock,
1995, Walton, 1996 and Searle, 2001.
Pollock [1995], as one of the first scholars who studied agent reasoning, appreciates the
distinction between epistemic and practical reasoning, but also expresses the difficulty of mak-
ing a precise distinction between the two due to their interdependency. In his view, practical
reasoning must be based on the agent’s beliefs of the current situation and beliefs are of course
the result of epistemic reasoning. On the other hand, the whole point of epistemic reasoning is
to address the agent’s practical problems. Reasoning about beliefs does not happen at random,
it has to be triggered by questions that are posed by practical reasoning. As a result of this
viewpoint, he built the well-known agent architecture, OSCAR [Pollock, 1995], that handles
epistemic and practical reasoning simultaneously. Walton [1996] sees the main distinction be-
tween theoretical and practical reasoning in their distinguished aims. The aim in a theoretical
inference is to establish the truth or falsity of a proposition, whereas, in a practical inference
the aim is to get from the agent’s premises in terms of its current situation and goals, to the
imperative conclusions that direct the agent towards a prudent course of action. Searle [2001]
also believes that reasoning about actions differs from epistemic reasoning and needs additional
features compared to the other. He enumerates these three features as follows:
(i) first-personal: reasoning about belief is universal. A proposition being proven true, is a
reason for anybody to believe that is the case. But reasoning about actions is subjective
and depends on the agent’s motivational attitude such as goals and desires.
(ii) future-directed: reasoning about action is tied up to time, which is not the case when
reasoning about beliefs. More precisely, reasons for acting are forward-looking.
(iii) motivational: reasons for action need to have a motivational essence that essentially mo-
tivates taking an action.
In addition, Searle takes the discussion on differences between theoretical and practical rea-
soning further by emphasising that
... “theoretical reason is a special case of practical reason: deciding what
beliefs to accept and reject is a special case of deciding what to do.” [Searle,
2001, p. 136]
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However, Pollock [1995] argues that viewing epistemic reasoning as a special kind of practical
reasoning leads to infinite regress, since he believes that any practical reasoning must be based
on some epistemic reasoning, even if not modelled explicitly.
To summarise, although the viewpoints about distinctions between practical reasoning and
theoretical reasoning are various, they unanimously agree that these two types of reasoning
have to be treated differently. Despite this, many argue that practical reasoning has not been
studied within computer science or philosophy nearly as extensively as reasoning about beliefs
has. Much research in early days of AI mainly focused on theoretical reasoning, however the
growth of software agent technologies demanded agents that can conduct practical reasoning
or in other words agents that are capable of reasoning about actions and deciding what to do
[Atkinson, 2005]. In this thesis we focus on the practical aspects of agent reasoning. The next
section gives an overall view of agent practical reasoning.
2.1.1 Practical Reasoning
In the previous section we explained that practical reasoning is reasoning towards actions; a
type of reasoning that results in deciding what to do. But, solving decision problems using
decision theory [Jeffrey, 1983; Savage, 1954] has been conceptualised and formalised in the
past. Why use practical reasoning to make a decision? This section aims to answer this question
and define practical reasoning in agent systems.
When conducted for the purpose of enabling an agent to decide what to do, the similarity
between decision-making and practical reasoning is clearly in aiming to solve the same prob-
lem: what to do?! However answering the question of what to do, requires the agent to know
what courses of actions (i.e. plans) are available in the first place. Classical decision theory
[Jeffrey, 1983; Savage, 1954], that was originally developed within economics and forms the
foundation of decision-making, does not have much to say in this respect. What decision the-
ory does is comparing a set of alternatives by means of a decision criterion. The alternatives
are assumed to be given and where they come from is not the focus of decision theory at all.
Pollock [1995] is a strong advocate of the inadequacy of decision-theoretic models in complex
decision problems that require planning. One of the examples that Pollock uses to demonstrate
this inadequacy is illustrated in Figure 2-1. Assume that pushing the top four buttons in Fig-
ure 2-1 gives a utility of 10, while pushing the bottom button produces a utility of 5. Evidently,
pushing the top four buttons gives a better utility, so based on decision theory that is what
one ought to do. But, the decision-theoretic model applies to actions and it only allows us to
compare the expected utility of pushing button A and pushing button B. However, the expected






Figure 2-1: Counterexample of Decision-theoretic Model [Pollock, 1995, p. 179]
not generate the utility of 10, unless it is followed by pushing the other three buttons. Calculat-
ing the utility of pushing button A requires us to consider the probability of pushing the rest of
the buttons in that row. Depending on these probabilities, the expected utility of pushing button
A might well be less that pushing button B. Thus, applying the decision-theoretic notions to the
whole plan, paradoxically, prescribes pushing button B rather than pushing button A.
The point that Pollock tries to make through a set of examples such as the one we just dis-
cussed, is that when decision-making requires planning, decision theory does not necessarily
provide us with a rational answer. He therefore argues that what is needed in such problems
is a practical reasoning theory that defines plans and applies decision-theoretic concepts to
plans rather than actions. Furthermore practical reasoning has the added value of being ex-
plainable. Although decision theory provides the best alternative out of a set of alternative, it
does not justify why that is the case. However, conducting practical reasoning in a way that is
explainable and justifiable is the main concern in several recent literature (e.g. [Amgoud et al.,
2008b; Oren, 2013]).
Having explained the distinction between using a combination of practical reasoning and
decision theory as opposed to a solely decision theoretic solution, we now give a more elaborate
account of practical reasoning. Practical reasoning has been defined in several various ways
and from different perspectives. In this thesis we only discuss those definitions that have been
widely used in the AI community. One of the most popular definitions of practical reasoning
that is often referred to in AI is given by Bratman:
“Practical reasoning is a matter of weighing conflicting considerations for and
against competing options, where the relevant considerations are provided by what
the agent desires/values/cares about and what the agent believes.” [Bratman, 1990,
p. 37]
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Later on Bratman’s definition of practical reasoning was extended by Searle [2001] to a
process that not only considers and weighs all possible options but also tries to identify the
best of them. Studying this definition gives a clear picture of how decision-making contributes
to the process of practical reasoning, where the former defines a set of alternatives and the
latter evaluates the alternatives based on some decision criterion. A more recent definition
of practical reasoning by Wooldridge [2000], that is adopted in this thesis, recognises two
distinct activities for a practical reasoning agent, namely deliberation and means-ends reason-
ing. Deliberation is the process of identifying which goals to pursue, followed by means-ends
reasoning, in which the agent searches for plans to satisfy those goals. If there is a plan for
satisfying a goal, that goal is considered feasible. Consequently, in the absence of such a plan,
not all of agent’s goals are feasible. Moreover, the existence of plans for every single goal does
not guarantee satisfying all of them, due to for example, conflicting use of resources between
the plans. Although the idea of modelling practical reasoning in two steps was well received
and implemented in a number of works (e.g. [Hulstijn and van der Torre, 2004; Rahwan and
Amgoud, 2006]), conducting the two steps separately did not prove to be as successful. The
criticism against this separation is given in Amgoud et al. [2008a], where the authors argue that
by this separation the agent might commit to some goals at the deliberation step that are not
feasible, due to (i) lack of a plan to achieve them in the means-ends reasoning step and/or (ii)
existence of conflicting plans. Thus, Amgoud et al. [2008a] debate that when satisfying all of
the agent’s goals is not possible, a practical reasoning agent should seek the subsets of goals
along with their plans that are both feasible and consistent.
A summary of this section is demonstrated in Figure 2-2 that illustrates the link between
practical reasoning theory and decision theory. This figure shows how a set of alternatives
resulting from practical reasoning are evaluated based on decision-theoretic notions. The deci-
sion criterion can be expressed in several ways. In classical decision theory (CDT) the decision
criterion is expressed through notion of utility, whereas, in qualitative decision theory (QDT),
it is expressed in terms of preference information. Dastani et al. [2005] make the following
distinctions between CDT and QDT:
• The underlying concepts in CDT are probability function, utility function and decision
rule, whereas likelihood ordering, preference ordering, and decision criterion are the key
concepts in QDT.
• In CDT a good decision is defined as a decision that maximises the expected utility, while
in QDT a good decision is characterised as a decision that most satisfies the decision
criterion.











Figure 2-2: Practical Reasoning and Decision Theory
erence relation between choices without the measurement of how much one decision is
preferred over the other one. In CDT the difference in utility of options is easily measur-
able.
Fox and Parsons [1998] argue that in the context of practical reasoning, the benefits of CDT
over QDT can be small by comparison with the restrictions imposed by the formalism. Atkin-
son [2005] summarises the main concern raised in Fox and Parsons [1998] as the impracticality
of generating a set of probabilities and utilities that is demanded by CDT. Requiring less quanti-
tative information, Fox and Parsons [1998] recommend QDT as an alternative. Prakken [2006a]
reinforces this argument by stating that often a decision maker, for instance an agent, has only
partial and qualitative information about probability and preference rather than the precise in-
formation required in CDT. In addition to the above arguments, Doyle and Thomason [1999]
mention the following reasons for why CDT is not adequate in realistic cases:
1. CDT does not address making decisions in unforeseen circumstances or when decision-
making involves a broad knowledge of the world.
2. CDT cannot capture generic preferences that are common human expressions in a con-
venient formal manner.
3. CDT offers no means to help decision makers who exhibit discomfort with numeric
trade-offs.
The analysis of comparison of CDT and QDT has led us to choose to use qualitative pref-
erence ordering to express an agent’s priorities over goals and norms. We will return to this
point in Chapter 5.
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2.1.2 Normative Practical Reasoning
Managing the autonomy of intelligent agents has been one of the main challenges of agent
systems since their creation. Many [Jennings, 1993; Moses and Tennenholtz, 1995; Shoham
and Tennenholtz, 1992; Walker and Wooldridge, 1995] have sought the solution in approaches
that influence the agent behaviour externally. Introducing constraints or conventions at design
time in social systems was one of the early solutions to influence agent reasoning [Moses and
Tennenholtz, 1995; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1992; Walker and Wooldridge, 1995]. Walker
and Wooldridge [1995] define conventions as:
“... a behavioural constraint, striking a balance between individual freedom on
the one hand, and the goal of the agent society on the other hand.” [Walker and
Wooldridge, 1995, p. 1]
However such conventions were hard-wired into the agents which hugely restricted the auton-
omy and flexibility that are the central features of autonomous agents. Consequently, more
flexible approaches [Conte et al., 1999; Shoham and Tennenholtz, 1997] were investigated
in which conventions have regulative roles rather than restrictive. Norms are social mecha-
nisms that, depending on the way they are implemented, can regulate agent behaviour without
compromising its autonomy and therefore play a very important role in an agent’s practical rea-
soning. In order to discuss normative practical reasoning, we first need to answer the following
questions.
• What are norms?
• How norms are specified and implemented?
• How do agents reason about norms?
What Are Norms?
Managing the autonomy of agents without compromising their autonomy is a challenging task.
Norms have been introduced and implemented as a solution that can influence the reasoning
and decision-making of agents toward actions in different ways. The definition offered by the
Merriam-Webster dictionary explicitly mentions the regulative aspect of norms in any group or
society:
“Norms are principles of right action binding upon the members of a group and
serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behaviour.”
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Answering the question of how norms express such control or regulation has yielded different
classifications of norm [Boella and van der Torre, 2008]. One of the common classifications
distinguishes between constitutive and regulative/behavioural norms [Boella and van der Torre,
2004]. The former category aims at creation of institutional fact that describe the legal con-
sequences of actions in a normative system, whereas the latter category aim at defining an
ideal behaviour and regulating agents by expressing what is obligatory, forbidden or permit-
ted [Lo´pez and Luck, 2003]. In this thesis we focus on behavioural norms that are externally
imposed on the agent with the aim of regulating its autonomy.
Depending on the type of society modelled, the agent’s behaviour is regulated by different
type of norms. In permissive societies the agent is allowed to perform any action or achieve any
state unless it is explicitly forbidden. While in prohibitive societies the agent is not permitted
to do anything unless specified. Obligations, prohibitions and permissions are the common
norms in permissive societies, whereas Power, permission and obligation are common norms
in prohibitive societies 1. Obligation norms in both cases dictate what the agent is obliged to
do; power norms denote the capability of doing something; prohibition norms express what
is forbidden in permissible societies; conversely, permission norms express what is allowed
in prohibitive societies. However, permission norms have been treated differently in permis-
sive societies. Some work, [Alrawagfeh and Meneguzzi, 2014; Kollingbaum, 2005], consider
them as an explicit statement that allows the agent to execute an action. In Alrawagfeh and
Meneguzzi [2014], permissions are utilised when the agent does not have complete knowledge
about the environment it operates in. In such an environment executing an action that is ex-
plicitly permitted is always safer than an action that is not stated as permitted, because it may
have been forbidden. Some other approaches utilise permission norms to model the exceptions
for obligation and prohibition norms [Oren, 2013; Oren et al., 2010; Pacheco, 2012]. In such
cases, the agent is obliged to or prohibited from executing an action unless there is a permission
norm that permits not executing the obliged action or it permits the execution of a forbidden
action.
How Norms Are Specified and Implemented?
Following the above background on norms, we now turn our attention to their specification
and implementation. In order to be able to influence the agent’s behaviour, norms have to be
explicitly specified and presented to the agent. The agent can then use its normative reasoning
capability to decide how to adapt its behaviour according to the imposed norms. Many nor-
1Obligations, prohibitions, power and permissions can be applied on actions or states. Since action-based norms
are the focus of this thesis, in the rest of this document we only refer to these operators being applied to actions.
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mative languages have been proposed [Dastani et al., 2009; Garcı´a-Camino et al., 2005; Oren
et al., 2008; Uszok et al., 2008; Va´zquez-Salceda et al., 2004] to present and specify norms, a
comprehensive survey of which can be found in [Pacheco, 2012]. Debating the similarities and
differences of properties of these languages is not within the scope of this thesis, therefore, we
just briefly mention five elements that differentiate languages for specifying norms, identified
by Pacheco [2012]:
1. Deontic Operators that define the type of normative proposition, O (obligation), F (pro-
hibition) and P (permission), modelled.
2. Controls that determine whether the deontic propositions operate on actions, states or
both.
3. Enforcement Mechanisms that show whether sanctions and/or rewards are used to en-
force norm compliance.
4. Conditional Expression that indicates whether the norm activation condition is an action
and/or a state.
5. Temporal Constraints that specify constraints on norm activation or termination such as
“before”, “after” or “between”.
We will return to these elements in the next chapter (page 60) and describe how the normative
language we use fits with them.
Regardless of the presentation and specification, the mere explicit representation of norms
is not sufficient to expect an agent to recognise them. Norms should be implemented in a way
that the agent can recognise when they are activated and violated and what the consequences
of a violation are. Figure 2-3 sets out a taxonomy of norm implementation mechanisms. They
are divided into two categories: regimentation and enforcement. In regimentation approaches
[Esteva et al., 2001] norms are modelled as hard constraints and the agent has no choice but
to blindly follow the norms. Conversely, in enforcement approaches norms are modelled as
soft constraints leaving the choice of complying or not complying to the agent. But, in or-
der to encourage norm compliance, there are consequences introduced in terms of sanctions
in case the agent violates the norm [Lo´pez et al., 2005; Pitt et al., 2013]. Moreover, in some
enforcement approaches [Aldewereld et al., 2006] the agent is rewarded for complying with a
norm. The regimentation approaches are further divided into mediation, in which there exists
a reliable entity that prevents the agent from violating the norms ; and hardwiring, in which
the agent’s mental attitude are manipulated in accordance with norms. On the other hand,


















Figure 2-3: Norm Implementation Mechanism [Pacheco, 2012, p. 37]
the agent itself is in charge of sanctions in case it violates a norm, the approach is said to
be self-enforcement. In second-party norm enforcement, each party in the transaction is in
charge of norm enforcement for other parties by applying reward or punishment (retaliation),
or by returning similar interchange to the one presented (reciprocation). In the last approach,
third-party norm enforcement, a judge or an authority external to the agents enforces the norm.
In social enforcement this authority is the society, whereas in institutional enforcement in-
frastructural entities called institutions act as norm enforcer by defining institutional sanctions
against norm violators.
How Do Agents Reason about Norms?
To answer the question of how an agent reasons about norms, we need to look back to what we
discussed earlier about norm implementation methods. If the norms are regimented, the agent
does not need to reason whether it wants to obey them, because it is forced to do so. On the
other hand, in enforcement approaches, which are the focus of this thesis, the agent has the
choice to comply with the norms or not. The question is how the agent decides in favour of or
against obeying a norm? Decision-making on norm compliance has received a lot of attention
in the past ten years or so. Here we provide a survey of those approaches that consider the
question of whether to comply with a norm, in the context of practical reasoning and planning.
The BOID (Belief-Obligation-Intention-Desire) architecture [Broersen et al., 2001] ex-
tends the BDI architecture [Rao and Georgeff, 1995] with the concept of obligation and uses
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agent types such as social, selfish, etc. to handle the conflicts between beliefs, desires, inten-
tions and obligations. For instance if the agent is selfish, it will always considers its desires
prior to any obligation. In contrast, a social agent always puts obligations prior to its desires.
This architecture is considered as a model for norm-governed agent, although it lacks a com-
putational model for implementation.
NoA, proposed by Kollingbaum [2005], is a normative language and agent architecture.
As a language, it specifies the normative concepts of obligation, prohibition and permission
to regulate a specific type of agents interaction called “supervised interaction”. As a practical
reasoning agent architecture, it describes how agents select a plan from a pre-generated plan
library such that the norms imposed on the agent at each point of time are obeyed. The agents
do not have internal motivations such as goals or values that might conflict with norms, which
therefore, enables the agent always to comply with norms. However, there may be a conflict
between norms imposed on the agent and hence the need for conflict resolution mechanisms
such as those proposed in this work.
Lo´pez et al. [2005] propose a normative framework for goal-driven agents in which the
agents are persuaded to obey norms if not complying with a norm hinders an agent’s individual
goals. Compliance therefore, relies on the explicit interaction between goals and norms. If
norm compliance or violation does not hinder any goal, there is no connection and hence no
computational mechanism in place that enforces norms. Figure 2-4 shows how the agent deals
with the dilemma of complying with a norm or not. When there is a conflict between a norm
and the agent’s goals, the agent does not comply unless the goals hindered by punishment
are more important than goals facilitated by compliance. On the other hand, if there is no
such conflict, the agent only complies with a norm if there are goals that are hindered by the
punishment of violation, and violates it otherwise.
Sadri et al. [2006] extend the KGP (Knowledge, Goals and Plans) model of agency [Kakas
et al., 2004] to support agent normative reasoning based on agent roles. They claim that defin-
ing roles for the agents along with obligations and prohibitions that result from playing various
roles, enables KGP agents to generate plans for their goals while reacting to changes in the
dynamic environment in which they are situated. Furthermore, they argue that although their
proposed approach considers norms within an individual social agent, it is scalable to multi-
agent systems that are organised through norm utilisation. One of the advantages of this model
is the conflict detection mechanism between agents’ individual goals and norms, however this
model lacks a conflict resolution mechanism. Essentially, in case of conflict, a KGP agent
follows the norm imposed on it rather than its internal goals.
Oren et al. [2011] take norms into consideration when deciding how to execute a pre-
generated plan with respect to the norms triggered by that plan. Plans in the agent’s plan library
30
Figure 2-4: Pressured Norm Compliance [Lo´pez et al., 2005, p. 10]
are designed to satisfy the agent’s individual goals and cannot possibly take into account all
the environmental variables, such as norms, that may influence the agent’s behaviour at run
time. Thus, pre generated plans need to be adjusted to cater for norms imposed on the actions
in the plan at each point in time. A norm imposed on an action intends to constrain the values
assigned to some variables within that action. The adjustments of values in actions with respect
to norms imposed to the actions, aim to specify how the agent should execute a plan such that
the cost of violated norms is outweighed by the reward obtained from norms complied with.
The most preferred plan is the one that maximises the utility.
In Panagiotidi et al. [2012b], the authors argue that most of the frameworks that accommo-
date norms in practical reasoning are focused on goal or plan selection and there has not been
enough attention paid to incorporating norms into the agent’s plan generation. They therefore,
propose a norm-oriented agent in which norms are taken into account in the agent’s plan gener-
ation phase. To this end, they introduce a “norm-aware planner” that checks the normative state
of the agent after each individual action is taken. The planner then decides if the agent should
comply with a norm or not based on the agent’s utility function over the actions. Although this
mechanism enables the agents to cope with the dynamics of operating in an open environment,
checking the state of agent after each action, depending on the number of actions, imposes a
high computational cost on the plan generation phase.
The approaches reviewed above, explore different strategies to handle normative practical
reasoning when conflict arises between mental attitude of the agent including beliefs, goals,
desires, norms and plans. Some only focus on conflict between goals/desires or conflict be-
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tween norms, while others concentrate on conflict between goals and norms simultaneously.
Generally speaking, in these approaches, there has not been much attention paid to explaining
the agent decision-making process. Argumentation not only allows reasoning in the presence
of conflict, but it also permits the presentation of the reasoning process in terms of a dialogue
that – even for non-expert users – is easy to follow. For this reason, there has been an increas-
ing trend of using argumentation in practical reasoning and practical reasoning in presence
of norms. In the next section we investigate how argumentation can contribute to the agent’s
reasoning and decision-making and the explanation of these processes. Since argumentation-
based normative practical reasoning is the focus of this thesis, these approaches are discussed
in details in section 2.3.
2.2 Argumentation
The theory of argumentation dates back to Greek philosophy and since then it has been cul-
tivated in many research areas such as psychology, law, communication studies, and artificial
intelligence. The study of argumentation as a process primarily emerged in interpersonal com-
munication studies in the seventies, where argumentation was and is mainly studied as a verbal
and social activity. Argumentation as a social activity enables people to argue for all sorts of
reasons including to justify their thinking, to defend their actions or perspectives, to judge and
decide in controversial situations, and so on. Apart from being a social activity, argumentation
is an intellectual and rational activity aimed at establishing the legitimacy of a standpoint by
bringing arguments justifying or refuting the original standpoint [Eemeren et al., 1996]. Ar-
guments themselves are claims supported by reasons, and reasons are supported by evidence
themselves. The defeasible nature of inference from evidence to reasons and from reasons to
claims has made argumentation widely accessible in non-monotonic reasoning [Dung, 1995;
Pollock, 1992; Simari and Loui, 1992; Vreeswijk, 1992]. On the other hand, the dialectical na-
ture of the argumentation process [Bentahar et al., 2004; Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012b;
Hamblin, 1970, 1971] has made it a common choice to model dialogues taking place for dif-
ferent purposes such as making agreement, negotiation, and etc. [Amgoud and Vesic, 2012;
Kraus et al., 1998]. The accessibility of argumentation in modelling defeasible reasoning and
dialogues have both been exploited in the field of agent reasoning and multi-agent systems. In
Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3 we explore the role of argumentation for agent reasoning, agent
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Figure 2-5: The Process of Argumentation [Amgoud et al., 2008c]
2.2.1 Argumentation for Agent (Non-monotonic/defeasible) Reasoning
Argumentation theory, for the purpose of non-monotonic reasoning, aims at forming a set
of arguments that are collectively acceptable, such that from this set coherent and justified
conclusions can be drawn. Figure 2-5 highlights the process of argumentation in five steps:
1. Building a set of arguments from a knowledge base;
2. Identifying the interactions between arguments;
3. Valuating (sic) the weights of arguments;
4. Recognising the position of arguments based on their interactions and weights in terms
of accepted arguments, rejected ones and those that are undecided; and
5. Concluding what are the set(s) of justified arguments.
Using argumentation as the basis of non-monotonic reasoning goes back to Lin and Shoham
[1989] and Pollock [1992]. His work was then cultivated and culminated by Simari and Loui
[1992]; Vreeswijk [1992] and Dung [1995], respectively. The work of Dung [1995] on argu-
mentation frameworks (AF) is the foundation of most of today’s work on argumentation the-
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ory. Dung’s argumentation framework (DAF) is formally defined as a pair: AF = 〈Arg,Att〉,
where Arg is a set of arguments and Att ⊆ Ar×Ar is the attack relation between arguments.
Argument A attacks argument B iff (A,B) ∈ Att. But how does establishing arguments and
their relations in an AF result in identifying a set or sets of coherent arguments? Answering this
question, gave rise to the concept of argumentation semantics, which are criteria to determine a
set of justified and coherent arguments based on argument interactions. If two arguments attack
each other then an entity – which could be an agent for example – cannot accept both of them at
the same time. Therefore, argumentation semantics are there to examine the acceptability of a
set of arguments. We now give the definition of the four main semantics that Dung introduced
[Dung, 1995], namely the complete, grounded, preferred and stable semantics. But first, we
define the concepts of conflict-freeness, acceptability and admissibility for a set of arguments.
Conflict-freeness: A conflict-free set is a set in which none of the arguments attacks another.
This is the minimum criteria for a set of arguments to be considered as coherent.
Acceptability: An argument P is said to be acceptable with respect to set S , iff ∀ A, (A,P ) ∈
Att ⇒ ∃ Q ∈ S s.t.(Q,A) ∈ Att. In other words, an argument is acceptable with
respect to set S if S can defend it. Set S defends an argument if it attacks all the attackers
of the argument.
Admissibility: An admissible set S is a conflict-free set in which all arguments are acceptable
with respect to S.
Complete Extension: A complete extension is an admissible extension, which includes all
the acceptable arguments with respect to itself. That means, for a set S to be a complete
extension, S should encompass all the arguments it can defend.
Grounded Extension: The grounded extension is the minimal (with respect to set inclusion)
complete extension.
Preferred Extension: A preferred extension is the maximal (with respect to set inclusion)
admissible extension.
Stable Extension: A stable extension is a complete extension that attacks all arguments that
do not belong to it. Therefore, it includes all arguments that it can defend but it also
attacks all those ones that is does not defend.
When an argument belongs to an extension, the argument is said to be acceptable with respect
to that extension. Argumentation semantics, in more recent works, are defined based on a




Complete Extensions: {},{A,C}, and {A,D}
Grounded Extensions: {}
Preferred Extensions: {A,C}, and {A,D}
Stable Extensions: {A,C}, and {A,D}
Figure 2-6: Argumentation Semantics
identify the status of arguments with respect to certain semantics. An argument is respectively,
labelled in, out and undec, if it is acceptable, rejected and undecided under a certain semantics.
Figure 2-6 illustrates a graphical representation of a DAF that is essentially a directed graph,
in which arguments are represented by nodes and attacks are represented by arrows. The
complete, grounded, preferred and stable extensions of the DAF displayed, are presented on
the right hand side of the figure.
Dung’s definition of an argumentation framework received a lot of attention and laid the
foundation for many other frameworks such as preference-based argumentation frameworks
[Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002], value-based argumentation frameworks [Dunne and Bench-Capon,
2004], extended argumentation frameworks [Modgil, 2007], bipolar argumentation frame-
works Amgoud et al., 2004 and assumption-based argumentation frameworks [Bondarenko
et al., 1993; Dung et al., 2009]. These frameworks attempt to address some issues that are not
dealt with in DAF. For instance, DAF abstracts away the internal structure of arguments, which
consequently does not allow defining how one argument attacks another one. The assumption
is that the arguments and their interactions are given. Also DAF does not take into account the
strength or weights of the arguments. In what follows, we give an overview of some influential
argumentation frameworks that originated from Dung’s and highlight how they extend DAF.
The preference-based argumentation framework (PAF) extends Dung’s framework by defin-
ing a set of preferences over arguments to reflect the weight or importance of arguments. An
attack from one argument to another one is only successful if the latter is not preferred over
the former. A successful attack is referred to as a defeat. More discussion of PAF follows
in Chapter 5 (page 104). Another development upon Dung’s framework was introduced by
Bench-Capon [2002] in the form of the value-based argumentation framework (VAF). Instead
of preferences over arguments, VAF uses preferences over values to distinguish between attack
and defeat: the attack of one argument to another one counts as defeat if the value of the lat-
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ter is not preferred to the value of the former from a particular audience perspective. In VAF
each argument can be mapped to different values by different audiences. An audience G is
merely a total ordering on values from G’s point of view. If we assume that V1 and V2 are
both elements of V then G might prefer V1 to V2 and therefore ranks it higher than V2, while
audienceH might do the reverse [Dunne and Bench-Capon, 2004]. Acceptability of arguments
in this framework are thus said to be subjective. The same argument may convince audience G
even though it clearly fails to convince audience H . More recently, Extended Argumentation
Frameworks (ExAF) [Modgil, 2007] were introduced as an extension to Dung’s framework.
Unlike other frameworks, the attack relation in ExAF is not limited to an attack between argu-
ments. An argument can attack an existing attack between two arguments as a way to express
preferences and reduce symmetric attacks to asymmetric ones. Bipolar argumentation frame-
works (BAF) [Amgoud et al., 2004] permit two different types of relation between arguments,
namely defeat and support. By positive and negative relations, agents express their support
for or against an argument, respectively. The Assumption-Based Argumentation Frameworks
(ABA) [Dung et al., 2009] are another instance of DAF. However in contrast to DAF, ABA does
not abstract away the internal structure of arguments. In this framework, arguments are deduc-
tions with assumptions as their premises. Since assumptions are open to challenge, an attack to
an argument is an attack on its assumptions. The advantage of considering an internal structure
for arguments lies in finding arguments and also the attack relations between them [Gaertner
and Toni, 2007a] . Except for ABA, in all other frameworks mentioned in this section, this
advantage is denied and arguments and the attack relations between them are presumed to be
given. The internal structure of arguments is in particular important when argumentation is the
tool with which an agent reasons about its beliefs and/or actions. In application-based domains,
such as with agent reasoning, the assumption that arguments and their attacks are given is far
too simplistic. Due to the importance of the internal structure of arguments in agent reasoning,
we dedicate the next section to the internal structure of arguments.
Internal Structure of Arguments
Arguments represent defeasible logical inference and have been presented using logic-based –
such as assumption-based [Bondarenko et al., 1993] – and scheme-based [Walton, 1996] ap-
proaches. When presented using logic, arguments are logical inferences from a set of premises
to a set of conclusions [Amgoud and Prade, 2004a; Kraus et al., 1998; Prakken, 2010]. There
are three types of attacks [Prakken, 2010] recognised between arguments: (i) rebuttal: when
two arguments negate the conclusions of one another; (ii) undermine: when an argument
negates the premises of another argument; and (iii) undercut: when one argument challenges
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the inference step in another argument. Scheme-based arguments, on the other hand, are based
on argument schemes. Argument schemes are reasoning patterns expressed in natural language
and critical questions are situations in which the schemes do not apply and are used to attack the
arguments constructed based on the schemes. Argumentation schemes are especially popular
in computational systems, when arguments need to be structured and formulated diversely so
that they can capture the domain-dependent features of the problem they are modelling [Atkin-
son and Bench-Capon, 2007b; Toniolo, 2013; Walton, 1996]. The past decade has witnessed
an increasing interest in the application of argumentation scheme in practical reasoning, plan-
ning and decision-making [Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007a; Atkinson et al., 2011; Gasque,
2013; Ouerdane et al., 2008; Toniolo et al., 2012]. In the remainder of this section, we dis-
cuss the background and origin of argument schemes as well as their applications in practical
reasoning.
One of the earliest examples of the use of argument schemes is Toulmin’s argument schema
[Toulmin, 1958] that accounts for one of the most influential schemes in the field. This schema,
as displayed in Figure 2-7, consists of six elements:
• Claim: a statement whose merits we are seeking to establish.
• Data: the fact we appeal to as a foundation for the claim.
• Warrant: the inference that takes us from data to the claim.
• Quantifier that indicates the strength of the warrant.
• Rebuttal: a condition under which the conclusion is defeated.
• Backing that represents the authority of the warrant.
Figure 2-8 shows an example of this schema with its six elements. Assume that Harry was born
in Bermuda, on the account of statute “X”, a man born in Bermuda will generally be a British
citizen, so we can presume that Harry is a British citizen unless for example he has become a
naturalised American.
Tolumin’s schema, due to its expressivity and defeasible nature, has been implemented in
a number of systems (e.g. [Bench-Capon and Staniford, 1995; Marshall, 1989]). However,
its lack of certain features led to subsequent schemes, most popular of which are Walton’s
[Walton, 1996]. Atkinson, 2005 mentions the following as the reasons behind the shift from
Toulmin’s schema:(i) the schema does not clearly identify the manner in which an argument can




























Figure 2-8: Toulmin’s Argument Schema Example [Toulmin, 1958, p. 105]
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(attack to the claim) and undercut2 (attack to the support of the claim (i.e. data), or the inference
resulted in the claim (i.e. warrant)); and (iii) there is no difference between arguments about
beliefs and actions, despite the established differences between epistemic reasoning (reasoning
about beliefs) and practical reasoning (reasoning about actions) (see Page 20).
In response to the shortcomings of Toulmin’s schema, Walton introduced 26 argument
schemes 3 [Walton, 1996] for various purposes. We mention few of these schemes by way of
example:
Expert opinion scheme
- Source E is an expert in subject domain S containing proposition A.
- E asserts that proposition A is true (false).
- A is true (false).
Established rules scheme
- If A is the case, then an evaluation E is justified/ conduct C is required.
- A is the case.
- Therefore, evaluation E is justified/ conduct C is required.
Cause to effect scheme
- Generally, if A occurs, then B will (might) occur.
- In this case, A occurs (might occur).
- Therefore, in this case, B will (might) occur.
One of the schemes that Walton emphasises is the scheme for practical reasoning.
“The analysis of argumentation schemes is very much affected by the recogni-
tion of practical reasoning as a distinctive type of reasoning, as distinguished from
what might be called theoretical or discursive reasoning”. [Walton, 1996, p. 11]
Walton’s argument schemes for practical reasoning are based on two basic types of practical in-
ferences, namely the necessary condition scheme and the sufficient condition scheme [Walton,
1996]. Both schemes are based on the idea that practical reasoning is reasoning toward goals
2Earlier in this section, following the reference [Prakken, 2010], we called this type of attack undermine. How-
ever this type of attack was previously called undercut, as is also the case in ABA [Dung et al., 2009].
3A more detailed classification of argument schemes can be found in Walton et al. [2008], where the authors
present 60 categories of schema.
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- G is a goal for a
- Doing A in necessary for a to carry out G
- Therefore, a ought to do A
- G is a goal for a
- Doing A in sufficient for a to carry out G
- Therefore, a ought to do A
CQ1: Are these alternative ways (other than A) of realising G?
CQ2: Is it possible for a to do A?
CQ3: Does a have goals other than G that should be taken into account?
CQ4: Are there other consequences of bringing aboutA that should be taken into account?
Figure 2-9: Walton’s Practical Reasoning Schemes and Critical Questions [Walton, 1996,
pp. 11-12]
conducted by an agent in a particular situation known by the agent. The conclusion of a prac-
tical reasoning scheme gives an agent an account of what to do in a given situation. However
this conclusion can be challenged by four critical questions. The necessary condition scheme
and the sufficient condition scheme along with their associated critical questions are presented
in Figure 2-9. Figure 2-10 presents an example of each scheme.
Argument schemes for practical reasoning have proven to be greatly popular because they
easily lend themselves to the defeasible nature of reasoning about action [Atkinson, 2005].
However, according to Atkinson [2005]; Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2007b], who have ex-
tensively explored the role of these schemes in practical reasoning since 2005, the notion of
goals in Walton’s argument schemes is “overloaded” and hence in need of further elabora-
tion. They pinpoint the issue that goals in Walton’s schemes encompass (i) the direct results of
action; (ii) their consequences; and (iii) the reasons why those consequences are desired . Dis-
ambiguating the notion of goal by separating it into three elements (i), (ii), and (iii) results in
Atkinson [2005] and Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2007b] argument scheme for practical rea-
soning. This scheme and its 16 critical questions are displayed in Figure 2-11. Atkinson shows
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- I want to catch the train to London;
- Getting to the train station is necessary to catch the train;
- Therefore, I should run to the train station.
- I am thirsty;
- Drinking water is sufficient to remedy my thirst;
- Therefore, I should drink water.
Figure 2-10: Examples of Walton’s Practical Reasoning Schemes
the application of this argument scheme in different domains such as eDemocracy, medicine
and law [Atkinson, 2005]. The two examples in Figures 2-12 and 2-13 show the application
of the scheme in eDemocracy and medicine, respectively. These examples and others that
were presented in this section, show how the flexibility of argument schemes allows to define
the internal structure of arguments to fit different purposes. Among other purposes, argument
schemes for practical reasoning, have been exploited extensively. This section aimed mainly at
covering scheme-based approaches to the internal structure of arguments involved in practical
reasoning.
2.2.2 Argumentation for Agent Dialogue
As discussed in the previous section, argumentation has served as a computational mechanism
for agent reasoning, which is often defeasible. To prove a defeasible claim one has to seek for
any evidence to the contrary of the claim. The absence of such evidence is the proof itself. If
such evidence is present, on the other hand, it will be treated as a new claim and therefore any
evidence to contrary of it will be sought for and so on. This process refers to the dialogical
aspect of argumentation and traces back to the work of Hamblin [1970, 1971]. He describes
dialectical systems as regulated dialogues conducted by number of participants that take turn
in making utterances in accordance with a set of rules. Utterances are often known as moves
or locutions and the rules that regulate the moves are known as the dialogue protocol. To
ensure the consistency of the utterances, participants need to keep a store of previous uttered
statements representing their commitments. These stores are called commitment stores and
can be modified according to a set of commitment rules defining the effect of moves on the
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- In the current circumstances R
- We should perform action A
- Which will result in new circumstances S
- Which will realise goal G
- Which will promote value V
CQ1: Are the believed circumstances true?
CQ2: Assuming the circumstances, does the action have the stated consequences?
CQ3: Assuming the circumstances and that the action has the stated consequences, will
the action bring about the desired goal?
CQ4: Does the goal realise the value stated?
CQ5: Are there alternative ways of realising the same consequences?
CQ6: Are there alternative ways of realising the same goal?
CQ7: Are there alternative ways of promoting the same value?
CQ8: Does doing the action have a side effect which demotes the value?
CQ9: Does doing the action have a side effect which demotes some other value?
CQ10: Does doing the action promote some other value?
CQ11: Does doing the action preclude some other action which would promote some
other value?
CQ12: Are the circumstances as described possible?
CQ13: Is the action possible?
CQ14: Are the consequences as described possible?
CQ15: Can the desired goal be realised?
CQ16: Is the value indeed a legitimate value?
Figure 2-11: Atkinson’s Practical Reasoning Scheme and Critical Questions [Atkinson and
Bench-Capon, 2007b]
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- Saddam is running an oppressive regime.
- we should invade Iraq
- to depose Saddam
- which will bring democracy to Iraq
- which will promote human rights.
Figure 2-12: Application of Atkinson’s Scheme in eDemocracy [Atkinson, 2005, p. 144]
- Where there is a history of gastritis and no acid reducing therapy
- we should not prescribe aspirin
- so as not to cause excess acidity
- so as not to risk ulceration
- and so promote the value of safety.
Figure 2-13: Application of Atkinson’s Scheme in Medicine [Atkinson, 2005, p. 158]
commitment store. Hamblin’s work was continued by Mackenzie [1979, 1990] who developed
four dialogue systems in the tradition of Hamblin, that were intended to identify and describe
the properties of real-time argument games. Although intended for real-time and hence closer
to real-life dialogues, Mackenzie makes it clear that none of these dialogues are yet adequate
for any type of real-life argumentative dialogues [Mackenzie, 1990]. But what are real-life
argumentative dialogues? This question was later on discussed by Walton and Krabbe [1995],
who, according to the purpose of the dialogue, identified six classes of dialogues used in human
communication:
Persuasion Dialogue: In this type of dialogue one agent tries to convince another agent to
accept a viewpoint that the former holds, while the latter does not. Persuasion dialogue
has been mainly used in the context of epistemic reasoning, examples of which can be
found in Bentahar et al. [2004]; Caminada and Podlaszewski [2012b]; Devereux and
Reed [2009]; Prakken [2006b].
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Negotiation Dialogue: This type of dialogue is used when agents engage in a dialogue to find
a way to allocate some scarce resource in a way that it is acceptable to all agents involved
in the dialogue. Examples of negotiation dialogue in multi-agent systems appear in
Amgoud and Vesic [2012]; Kraus et al. [1998]; McBurney et al. [2003]; Rahwan et al.
[2003].
Eristic Dialogue: In this type of dialogue participants quarrel verbally with the aim of win-
ning the exchange going on at any cost. This type of dialogue is not studied in agents
and multi-agents systems as such.
Inquiry Dialogue: Agents involved in this type of dialogue collaborate to establish the truth
value of a proposition whose value is not apparent to any of the parties. There are only a
few examples of this type of dialogue present in the literature, e.g. Fan and Toni [2012];
Riley et al. [2011].
Deliberation Dialogue: During a deliberation dialogue, agents collaborate in order to decide
what actions to take in a specific situation. This dialogue has been widely studied in
multi-agent systems [Gasque, 2013; Kok et al., 2012; Tang and Parsons, 2005; Toniolo,
2013].
Information-Seeking Dialogue: In information-seeking dialogue an agent tries to discover
the answer to a question from another agent that is believed by the first agent to know
the answer. An example for this type of dialogue in the context of multi-agent systems
is available in Fan and Toni [2012].
The six type of argumentative dialogues mentioned above make the assumption that the
dialogue takes place between at least two agents for the purpose of reaching an agreement, or
establishing the truth of a statement, etc. Moreover and however, a dialogue can be thought
of taking place “in the mind” of a single agent in Gaertner’s words [Gaertner, 2008, p. 13], in
which case it is an internal dialogue contributing to the agent’s reasoning process. Engaging in
an internal dialogue to reason and act based on the outcome of reasoning was first introduced
by Pollock [1995]. The development of this type of dialogue is greatly motivated by appli-
cations of argumentation in agent reasoning and decision-making [Vreeswijk and Prakken,
2000]. Next section includes more details on this type of dialogue and their applications in the
mentioned areas.
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2.2.3 Argumentation for Explanation
Explanation plays an important role in making artificial reasoning understandable and thus re-
liable for human users [Lacave and Dı´ez, 2004; Wooley, 1998]. In the previous two sections we
discussed the role of argumentation in agents reasoning and multi-agent dialogue. In addition
to these roles, argumentation can serve as a tool for generating explanation [Baroni and Gia-
comin, 2009; Caminada et al., 2014c; Fan and Toni, 2015; Garcı´a et al., 2013; Lacave and Dı´ez,
2004; Schulz and Toni, 2014]. Intelligent agents equipped with argumentation capabilities can
explain the validity of their recommendation to their users in a form of explanatory dialogues
that are similar to human argumentation activities [Moulin et al., 2002]. These dialogues are
referred to as dialogue games – also referred to as “argument games” or “proof theories”. The
dialectical explanation formalised through dialogue games relies on argumentation semantics.
However, in contrast to semantics that justify the validity of an argument in terms of member-
ship of a set, these dialogues provide dialectical explanation for arguments. Essentially, the
aim of proof dialogue games is to create a link between argumentation as the basis of non-
monotonic inference and argumentation in dialogue theory [Caminada, 2008; Caminada and
Podlaszewski, 2012b].
The concept of argumentation frameworks and the role of argumentation semantics in serv-
ing as the basis of non-monotonic reasoning were discussed in Section 2.2.1. We recall here
that argumentation as a mean for non-monotonic reasoning aids agents to (i) build arguments;
(ii) identify their relationships; and (iii) evaluate the constructed argumentation framework
based on argumentation semantics. The result of this evaluation creates a standpoint, based
on which the agent can decide what arguments are acceptable. The idea in making a connec-
tion between argumentation as a mean for non-monotonic reasoning and argumentation as a
dialectical process, is to establish whether an argument is accepted under certain semantics if
it can be defended in a particular type of proof dialogue. Cayrol et al. [2001] define a proof
dialogue as the combination of a dialogue type and a winning criterion that determines the
winner of the dialogue. These proof dialogues are in the form of a dialectical argument game
between a defender/proponent and a challenger/opponent. The game starts with an argument
from proponent that needs to be tested. After that each of the players take turns in attacking
other parties arguments with a counterargument. The initial argument in the game is acceptable
if the proponent has a wining strategy and not acceptable otherwise. The winning strategy and
rules of the argument game are defined based on the semantics for which the game is designed.
Consequently, proof dialogues for different semantics are essentially dialogue games that tests
if an argument put forward by a proponent is in extensions of that semantics.
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In general, the preferred and grounded semantics among other semantics have received the
most attention for being modelled as dialogues. Prakken [2006a] relates this observation with
the fact that these two semantics are the only two semantics with “elegant proof-procedures”
in argument game form. In what follows we briefly survey dialogue games.
Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000] were the first to present dialectical proof theories for ar-
guments accepted under the preferred semantics. A slightly different version of their proof
theory for the preferred semantics was proposed by Cayrol et al. [2001]. Cayrol et al. claim
that using their proof theories, a proof given for an argument is usually shorter than when using
the proof theories by Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000]. Modgil and Caminada [2009] specify ar-
gument games for preferred semantics based on Caminada’s labellings [Caminada, 2006] that
were mentioned earlier (page 34). Their argument games are similar to the ones defined in
Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000], but as mentioned, differ from [Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000],
because the games are based on Caminada’s labellings [Caminada, 2006]. Caminada [2010]
makes a connection between the preferred semantics and the Socratic discussion. He believes
that semantics that were originally defined by Dung [1995] are merely technical and mathe-
matical definitions, making it difficult to grasp the reasoning concept behind the semantics.
So modelling the preferred semantics as Socratic discussion is an attempt to bridge the gap
between the mathematical formulation and the philosophical intuition behind the semantics.
More on the connection between preferred semantics and the Socratic discussion follows in
Chapter 6. Similarly, in [Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012b], Caminada has formulated the
grounded semantics in terms of a persuasion dialogue. Furthermore, Prakken [2006a] has pro-
posed a dialectical proof theory that is a combination of dialogue games for the grounded and
preferred semantics.
As mentioned earlier, the development of dialogue games is greatly motivated by appli-
cations of argumentation in agent systems [Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000]. Dialogue games
although formal, are known to be natural enough to be applicable in agent-to-agent and agent-
to-human settings [Barbini et al., 2009; Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012b; Caminada et al.,
2014c; Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000]. However, despite the main motivation behind the de-
velopment of these types of dialogue games, they have rarely been used in agent-to-agent or
agent-to-human settings. Two existing applications of dialogue games are [Zhong et al., 2014]
and [Caminada et al., 2014c] that use the admissible and grounded semantics, respectively. In
the former the authors use admissible dispute trees developed for Assumption-based Argumen-
tation [Dung et al., 2009] to provide natural language explanation for why a certain decision is
better than another one in a legal scenario. In Caminada et al. [2014c] a dialogical proof pro-
cedure based on the grounded semantics dialogue game [Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012b]
is created to justify the actions executed in a plan. The justification is mainly focused on the
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preconditions and effects of actions with regards to the goal state.
As pinpointed earlier in Section 2.1, our research is concentrated on practical reasoning.
Despite the importance, the subject of explanation has received little attention in existing ap-
proaches to practical reasoning [Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007b; Broersen et al., 2001;
Criado et al., 2010; Hulstijn and van der Torre, 2004; Kollingbaum and Norman, 2003; Rah-
wan and Amgoud, 2006; Sadri et al., 2006]. We have therefore used the advances made in
dialogue games for the preferred semantics to propose a novel argumentation-based model that
not only allows the agent to decide what plans to act upon, but also to benefit from the use
of a structured dialogue to explain this decision. Why preferred extension should serve as the
basis of practical reasoning is a question that we answer elaborately in Chapter 5 (page 113).
The next section brings together the current section and the first section (Agent Reasoning)
of this chapter to discuss the role of argumentation in practical reasoning and to survey the
argumentation-based approaches to practical reasoning.
2.3 Argumentation-Based Practical Reasoning
In this section we provide a survey of approaches that use argumentation techniques for prac-
tical reasoning purposes. These approaches are either based on the Belief-Desire-Intention
(BDI) architecture [Rao and Georgeff, 1995] or Action-based Alternating Transition System
(AATS) [Hoek et al., 2007]. When modelling single agent practical reasoning process, BDI
has been the most commonly used architecture to represent agents. In this architecture, be-
liefs represent the information that the agent has about the world, desires represent the agent’s
objectives and intentions represent the course of actions that given the current situation of the
agent, can be taken to achieve particular desires. On the other hand, AATSs are widely used to
represent all possible evolutions of a system due to the joint actions of multiple agents within
it. Each action in this model has a set of preconditions that has to hold for the agent to be
able to execute the action in that state. The result of executing these actions then causes the
transition in the system. Section 2.3.1 reviews the approaches based on BDI, followed by a
survey of approaches using AATSs in Section 2.3.2. Section 2.4 highlights the advantages and
shortcomings of both categories.
2.3.1 BDI-based Approaches
Amgoud [2003] uses argumentation frameworks to detect the conflict between a set of incon-
sistent desires. Resolving the detected conflict results in obtaining consistent sets of intentions
from a conflicting set of desires. Later on, Rahwan and Amgoud [2006] extend this approach
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by generating the desires in the first place. In this approach, Amgoud and Rahwan consider
three different Dung-style argumentation frameworks for arguing about beliefs, desires and in-
tentions. Arguments about beliefs include judging their truth value or checking them against
observations, whereas arguing about desires addresses the justification of their adoption in the
first place. Arguing about intention, on the other hand is concerned with what is the best
course of actions to achieve desires, based on the worth of those desires and resources required
to achieve them. So decision-theoretic notions determine what intentions the agent should pur-
sue. Continuing the work of Rahwan and Amgoud [2006], Amgoud et al. [2008a] spotted that
reasoning about desires and intentions in two argumentation frameworks raises the problem of
committing to some desires that may not be feasible at all (an issue touched upon earlier in
Section 2.1.1). To remedy this problem, Amgoud et al. [2008a] propose a constrained argu-
mentation system for practical reasoning that restricts the desires to those that are both justified
and feasible. Such a set of desires hold in the current state of the environment and there exists
at least one plan that achieves each individual desire. Unlike Rahwan and Amgoud [2006], in
this work there is no mechanism to compare various sets of justified and feasible desires.
Hulstijn and van der Torre [2004] agree with Amgoud [2003]; Rahwan and Amgoud
[2006] on the fundamental difference in conflicts between beliefs and conflicts between plans.
However, they are not in favour of using different argumentation frameworks to capture these
differences. Instead, they extract goals by reasoning forward from desires, followed by deriv-
ing plans for goals, using planning rules. Goals that have a plan associated with them, can
be modelled as an argument consisting of a claim and its necessary support. Goal arguments
form an argumentation framework for planning in which there is an attack between conflicting
plans. Conflict between plans is restricted to conflict between actions in the plans, where the
conflict between actions is encoded as integrity constraints. They then look for an extension
of this framework that maximises the number of achieved desires as opposed to Rahwan and
Amgoud [2006] which focuses on the utility of goals/desires, rather than their quantity.
Different from above approaches, Gaertner [2008] permits norms to be a part of the agent’s
deliberation process. He proposes a norm-oriented BDI architecture in which norms of the so-
ciety are internalised and blindly followed by the agent. Norms in this work act as bridge rules
that dictate the relationship between the agent’s mental attitudes, namely beliefs, desires and
intentions. The conflict between norms is addressed using a hybrid argumentation framework
based on Dung’s and assumption-based argumentation framework. The addressed conflicts are
resolved using preference information. The hybrid argumentation framework is implemented
as a platform-independent system named CaSAPI [Gaertner and Toni, 2007a].
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2.3.2 AATS-based Approaches
Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2007b] consider practical reasoning as a type of presumptive
argumentation process to reason about what actions to perform. However, this presumption
can be challenged by an argument scheme and associated critical questions (see Figure 2-11,
page 42, for Atkinson’s argument scheme and critical questions). In order to decide what to
do, the agent’s initial situation, alternative available actions from that situation and values pro-
moted by those actions are instantiated within an AATS [Hoek et al., 2007]. Using this AATS,
a set of arguments are generated for each available action. These arguments are then organised
in a value-based argumentation framework (see Section 2.2.1), where the preference between
arguments is defined according to the values they promote and the goals they contribute to.
That said, value promotion here is treated qualitatively because there is no measurement of
how much a value is promoted. The first limitation of the approach proposed in Atkinson and
Bench-Capon [2007b], namely, inexpressive representation of goals is resolved in Atkinson
and Bench-Capon [2014a]. The second limitation, which is the restricted consideration of an
action’s consequence for the immediate next state, is dealt with in Atkinson and Bench-Capon
[2014b].
Oren [2013] proposes a normative practical reasoning framework based on AATS and
Atkinson’s argumentation scheme for practical reasoning [Atkinson, 2005]. This framework
adopts several ideas from Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2007b], however, unlike Atkinson and
Bench-Capon [2007b], it permits practical reasoning in the presence of norms. Moreover, dif-
ferent from Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2007b], Oren [2013] builds arguments for sequences
of actions (i.e. paths) rather than individual actions. As a result, his schemes (see Figure 2-14)
are much simpler than Atkinson’s. Based on his scheme paths are mutually exclusive and the
most preferred one is the one that has to be executed. The preferences between paths are de-
fined based on considering all possible interactions between norms and goals instead of values
and goals as it is in Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2007b]. The arguments, built based on the
schemes and their interactions based on the critical questions, instantiate an extended argumen-
tation framework (see Section 2.2.1) that is evaluated by applying the preferred semantics (see
page 34).
Another work to note is Toniolo et al. [2012]. This approach uses argument schemes for
collaborative planning in a normative environment. However the planning problem is not mod-
elled in AATS, it is modelled in Situation Calculus (SC) [Reiter, 1991]. The argument scheme
for norms deals with violation of norms as presented in Figure 2-15. As it is evident in the
scheme, unlike Oren [2013], norms in Toniolo et al. [2012] are simply regimented, limiting
the agent’s normative reasoning capability to complying always with the imposed norms, with-
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out considering the possibility of violation. Permitting violation, allows the agent to weigh up
outcomes of disregarding or adhering to a norm prior to committing to compliance or violation.
A summary of approaches discussed in this section and the previous section is provided
in Table 2.1. The column labelled “Foundation” denotes the underlying architecture in each
approach. The “Social” column shows the consideration of social aspects of agents, which is
not available in the first two groups of approaches. In the third group the social aspects are
AS1: In situation S, the sequence of joint actions A1, · · · , An should be executed.
CQ1-1 Does some other sequence of actions exist that can be executed?
CQ1-2 Is there a more preferred sequence of actions to this one?
AS2: The sequence of joint actions A1, · · ·An is preferred over A′1, · · ·A′n as the former
achieves a goal which the latter does not.
CQ2-1 Is there some other sequence of actions which achieves a more preferred
goal than the one achieved by this action sequence?
CQ2-2 Does the sequence of actions lead to the violation of a norm?
AS3: The sequence of actions A1, · · · , An should be less preferred than sequence
A′1, · · ·A′n as, in the absence of permissions, the former violates a norm while the
latter does not.
CQ3-1 Is the goal resulting from the sequence of actions more preferred than the
violation?
CQ3-2 Does the violation resulting from this norm result in some other, more im-
portant violation not occurring?
CQ3-3 Is there a permission that derogates the violation?
AS4: There is a permission that derogates the violation of an obligation.
AS5: Agent α prefers goal g over goal g′.
AS6: Agent α prefers achieving goal g to not violating n.
AS7: Agent α prefers not achieving goal g to violating n.
AS8: Agent α prefers violating n to violating n′.
AS9: Agent α prefers situation A to B.
Figure 2-14: Oren’s Argument Schemes for Normative Practical Reasoning [Oren, 2013]
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AS: If a norm premise holds and the norm forbids/obliges performing an action or bring-
ing about a state between some period, then the agent should not/must perform that
action or bring about that state.
CQ Is there any norm that regulates actions or states of the world?
Figure 2-15: Tonolio’s Argument Scheme for Norms
Foundation Sociality AF
Amgoud, 2003, Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006,
Amgoud et al., 2008a
BDI N/A DAF
Hulstijn and van der Torre, 2004 BDI N/A DAF
Gaertner, 2008 BDI Norm ABA
Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007b
Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2014b
Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2014a
AATS Value VAF
Oren, 2013 AATS Norm ExAF
Toniolo et al., 2012 SC Norm BAF
Table 2.1: Argumentation-based Frameworks for Practical Reasoning
taken into account in terms of what an agent values and cares about. For instance, the two
values in the examples displayed in Figures 2-12 and 2-13, are “human rights” and “safety”.
To allow the representation of the values of the environment the agent operates in, the last two
approaches integrates norms into agent’s practical reasoning process. Note that values are what
the agent internally cares about, whereas norms in [Oren, 2013] are environmental values and
therefore external regulations imposed to the agent. Finally the last column illustrates what
argumentation framework is used in each approach.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter we looked at the literature addressing practical reasoning for agents. We dis-
cussed how important the role of norm is in practical reasoning and what values and com-
plexities it adds to an agent’s practical reasoning. A number of solutions and approaches to
normative practical reasoning are surveyed in Section 2.1.1, namely BOID [Broersen et al.,
2001], NoA [Kollingbaum, 2005], Lo´pez et al., 2005 framework, normative KGP [Sadri et
al., 2006], Oren et al. [2011] and Panagiotidi et al. [2012b] approaches. Apart from these ap-
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proaches, an extensive review of the argumentation-based approaches to practical reasoning
is provided in Section 2.3. The reasons justifying the increasing popularity of argumentation
techniques in practical reasoning are highlighted in Section 2.2 as (i) being able to deal with
defeasible reasoning; and (ii) presentable in the form of a dialogue.
In short, we investigate the two main argumentation-based approaches to practical reason-
ing: logic-based approaches based on BDI and scheme-based approaches based on AATS. The
majority of approaches using BDI [Amgoud, 2003; Amgoud et al., 2008a; Hulstijn and van
der Torre, 2004; Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006] are mainly focused on identifying a subset of
consistent desires and their plans. However, it is not clear how, i.e. when and in which or-
der, the agent should execute those plans, let alone the concurrency and interleaving aspects of
planning. Bench-Capon and Atkinson [2009] point out that in these approaches, the focus is all
on states and it is often difficult to distinguish between states and actions. A plan to achieve a
desire is simply a start state and an end state in which the mentioned desire is achieved, without
explicit representation of the actions that transformed the start state to the end state. As a result
the intrinsic worth of actions, as the main component in any practical reasoning problem, is
neglected. Another point that is also mentioned by Bench-Capon and Atkinson, is the absence
of temporal aspects of practical reasoning in BDI-based approaches. In the second group of
approaches, in order to develop a pattern of arguments to reason about action, a set of argument
schemes and critical questions are employed. The flexibility of the schemes have made them
popular in different domains of multi-agent systems such as practical reasoning [Atkinson and
Bench-Capon, 2007b], planning [Gasque, 2013; Toniolo et al., 2012], normative reasoning
[Oren, 2013], reasoning about trust [Parsons et al., 2014a]. For practical reasoning purposes,
Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2007b] uses an argument scheme as presented in Figure 2-11,
to justify actions. Unlike BDI approaches, in this approach, due to use of AATS, there is an
explicit representation of actions as transitions between states, but states retain their primacy.
Time representation, although present, is restricted to the single next step, and not capable of
being explicitly expanded into a whole sequence of actions. Value promotion or demotion that
is the central element in evaluating which actions to take, are also limited to the immediate
consequence of action in the next state. Despite the more mature handling of state, action and
time, we believe Pollock’s criticism (see page 23) to approaches that apply decision theoretic
concepts to actions rather than plans, stands for this approach too. Values in this approach, in
essence, act as a measurement just like utilities. Therefore, according to Pollock, one has to
check how a value is promoted or demoted throughout the whole course of action rather than a
step-by-step treatment of value promotion or demotion for each single action.
In this thesis we propose an argumentation-based approach to practical reasoning that ex-
ploits both features of argumentation in handling defeasible reasoning and presenting the pro-
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cess in a form of a dialogue. In contrast to existing approaches, the approach we propose:
1. Does not abstract away the planning aspect of practical reasoning problem and hence
limit the plans to a start and an end state.
2. Develops a formal model for normative practical reasoning that:
• Clearly distinguishes between actions and states;
• Handles time explicitly; and
• Allows durative actions to be executed concurrently.
3. Applies argumentation techniques to plans, in deciding which plan to pursue, rather than
to actions in a plan.
4. Uses an internal dialogue game to create transparency and explain why a certain plan
should be executed, given an agent with some goals and norms.
5. Provides a translation of the dialogue game into natural language for ease of use for
human users.
In the next chapter we present a model that defines the plans. The implementation of the
model in Chapter 4 generates the plan. Plans are reasoned about in Chapter 5, using argumen-
tation frameworks. The evaluation of argumentation frameworks aims at recognising the best
plan(s) for the agent to execute. The explanation of the best plan in natural language using
dialogue games is provided in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 3
A Model for Normative Practical
Reasoning
This chapter introduces a formal model and its semantics for normative practical reasoning.
There are many different planning and action languages available, such as STRIPS [Fikes and
Nilsson, 1971], event calculus [Kowalski and Sergot, 1986], Planning Domain Definition Lan-
guage (PDDL) and its extensions [Fox and Long, 2003; Mcdermott et al., 1998], Temporal Ac-
tion Logics (TAL) [Doherty et al., 1998] and Action Description Language (ADL) [Pednault,
1994]. STRIPS is the most well-established planning domain language that is the foundation
of many automated planning languages such as PDDL and ADL. In this work, we need and
action language that allows representing agent’s actions with pre and postconditions. These
actions are shaped by agent’s goals and norms and the interactions between goals and norms.
Also the agent should be capable of reasoning about temporal aspect of actions. We selected
STRIPS as the foundation of our normative practical reasoning model, since although it is not
the most expressive action language, it is expressive enough to represent temporal actions with
pre and postconditions. In addition, it is flexible enough to be extended such that it caters for
norms as well as goals.
In STRIPS a planning problem is defined in terms of an initial state, a goal state and
a set of operators (e.g. actions). Each operator has a set of preconditions that denote the
conditions under which the operator can be executed, and a set of postconditions that result
from applying the operator. Any sequence of actions that satisfies the goal is a solution to the
planning problem. In order to capture the features of the normative practical reasoning problem
we are going to model, in section 3.1 we extend the classical planning problem by:
(i) replacing atomic actions with durative actions: often the nature of the actions is non-
atomic, which means that although executed atomically in a state, the system state in
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which they finish executing is not necessarily the same in which they started [Nunes et
al., 1997]. Refinement of atomic actions to durative actions reflects the real time that a
machine takes to execute certain actions, which is also known as “real-time duration” of
actions [Bo¨rger and Sta¨rk, 2003].
(ii) Allowing a set of potentially inconsistent goals instead of the conventional single goal:
the issue of planning for multiple goals distributed across multiple agents, when the
agents share resources or when they need to collaborate to satisfy a common goal, is
addressed in collaborative planning. However, the issue of a single agent trying to plan
for multiple goals that are not necessarily consistent has not received much attention from
a planning perspective. That said, multiple desires that are not consistent are common in
BDI agents, but such agents are often provided with a plan library from which they can
choose multiple plans that can satisfy multiple goals. However, the agent is assumed
to be executing those plans in sequence and the interleaving of plans is not discussed.
We will address the issue of plan interleaving for a single agent when handling multiple
conflicting goals.
(iii) Adding a set of norms: having made a case for the importance of norms in practical
reasoning in the previous chapter, we will now integrate normative and practical reason-
ing. Just like goals, a set of norms is not necessarily consistent, making it potentially
impossible for the agent to comply with all norms imposed on it.
In addition to inconsistency within the goal set and the norm set, the set of goals and norms
can also exhibit inconsistency. Therefore, defining a solution for such a planning problem
requires considering all variations of conflict that may arise between these entities. In general,
a solution for a planning problem that features (i), (ii) and (iii) above is any sequence of actions
that satisfies at least one goal, while remaining conflict free. A sequence of action is conflict
free if it does not include conflicting actions, does not satisfy conflicting goals, does not comply
with conflicting norms, and does not satisfy and comply with conflicting goals and norms. The
model allows the sequence of actions to be executed concurrently. The agent has the choice
of violating or complying with norms triggered by execution of a sequence of actions, while
satisfying its goals. However, there may be consequences either way that the agent has to
foresee. The syntax and semantics of the model are explained in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, followed
by the summary of this chapter in Section 3.3.
55
3.1 Syntax
As mentioned earlier, the foundation of the model we propose in this section is standard
STRIPS-style planning. We therefore start this section by describing the syntax for STRIPS
planning and then extend it, such that it can accommodate the following features (i) durative
actions; (ii) multiple goals and (iii) multiple norms.
Definition 1 (STRIPS Planning [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971]). A STRIPS planning problem is a
tuple of form P = (∆, g, A), where
• ∆ is the initial state, which is a set of well-formed formulas.
• g is the goal state expressed as a well-formed formula.
• A is a set of actions that are each defined by an action description consisting of two main
parts: the conditions under which the action is applicable and the effects of the action
defined by a list of literals that must be added to the state and a list of literals that are
no longer true and therefore must be deleted.
Definition 2 (Normative Planning Problem). A normative planning problem is a tuple P =
(FL,∆, A,G,N) where
• FL is a set of fluents;
• ∆ is the initial state;
• A is a finite, non-empty set of durative STRIPS-like [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971] actions
for the agent;
• G denotes the set of agent goals;
• N denotes a set of norms imposed on the agent that define what an agent is obliged or
forbidden to do under certain conditions.
We now describe each of these items in more detail. The last three items, namely actions,
goals and norms are each given a separate section due to their importance.
Fluents
FL is a set of domain fluents that accounts for the description of the domain the agent operates
in. A literal l is a fluent or its negation i.e. l = fl or l = ¬fl for some fl ∈ FL. For a set of
literals L, we define L+ = {fl|fl ∈ L} and L− = {fl|¬fl ∈ L} to denote the set of positive
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and negative fluents in L, respectively. L is well-defined if there exists no fluent fl ∈ FL such
that fl ∈ L and ¬fl ∈ L, i.e. if L+ ∩ L− = ∅.
The semantics of the normative planning problem are defined over a set of states Σ. A
state s ⊆ FL is determined by set of fluents that hold true at a given time, while the other
fluents (those that are not present) are considered to be false. A state s ∈ Σ satisfies fluent
fl ∈ FL, denoted s |= fl, if fl ∈ s. It satisfies its negation s |= ¬fl if fl 6∈ s. This notation
can be extended to a set of literals as follows, set X is satisfied in state s, s |= X , when
∀x ∈ X · s |= x.
Initial State
The set of fluents that hold at the initial state is denoted by ∆ ⊆ FL.
3.1.1 Actions
A is a set of durative STRIPS-like actions, that is actions with preconditions and postconditions
that take a non-zero duration of time to have their effects in terms of their postconditions.
Definition 3 (Durative Action). A durative action a = 〈pr, ps, d〉 is composed of well-defined
sets of literals pr(a), ps(a) that represent a’s preconditions and postconditions and a positive
number d(a) ∈ N for its duration. Postconditions are further divided into a set of add postcon-
ditions ps(a)+ (positive literals in ps(a) ) and a set of delete postconditions ps(a)− (negative
literals in ps(a) ).
An action a can be executed in a state s if its preconditions hold in that state (i.e. s |=
pr(a)). When modelling atomic actions, the system state in which the action execution starts
and the state in which the action ends are the same. In contrast, when modelling durative
actions, there might be several states between the start and end state of the action, during
which the action is said to be in progress. Some approaches take the view that it is sufficient
for the preconditions of the action to hold at the start state and it does not matter whether they
hold while the action is in progress [Knoblock, 1994]. Whereas, some others hold that the
preconditions of action should be preserved while the action is in progress [Blum and Furst,
1997]. Moreover, some planning languages, such as Planning Domain Description Language
(PDDL) [Fox and Long, 2003; Garrido et al., 2002], distinguish between preconditions and
those conditions that have to hold while the action is in progress. The latter conditions are
referred to as invariant conditions. Having invariant conditions different from preconditions,
undoubtedly, brings more expressiveness to the planning language, however it comes at the
price of higher implementation complexity. In this research, we take the position that the
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invariant conditions are the same as preconditions, which implies that the preconditions have
to be preserved throughout the execution of the action.
The postconditions of a durative action are applied in the state s at which the action ends,
by adding the positive postconditions belonging to ps(a)+ to s and deleting the negative post-
conditions belonging to ps(a)− from s. As a result we have: s |= ps(a)+ and s 6|= ps(a)−.
Additionally, actions can be executed concurrently iff:
(i) They do not start at the same time: This is because the planning problem is defined for a
single agent and a single agent is not typically assumed to be able to start two actions at
the exact same instant.
(ii) They do not have concurrency conflicts, where concurrency conflict is caused if the pre
or postconditions of an action is logically inconsistent with the pre or postconditions of
another action (see next section for the formal definition of concurrency conflict).
Example 3.1. Assume that “attend interview” is one of the actions available to the agent
that takes 4 units of time. To attend the interview the agent has to have an invitation letter
and to be present at the venue, which results in the agent being admitted to interview and
consequently “interviewed”. Once the interview is done, the invitation cannot be used for a









Actions can experience different types of conflict including constant and temporary. When two
actions are in constant conflict, the agent cannot possibly execute both of them. On the other
hand, a temporary conflict prevents the agent from executing two conflicting actions under
specific constraints, the most common one of which is time. Conflict caused by time, known as
a concurrency conflict between actions, prevents them from being executed in an overlapping
period of time. Blum and Furst [1997] define that two actions ai and aj cannot be executed
concurrently, if at least one of the following holds:
1. The preconditions of ai and aj contradict each other:
∃r ∈ pr(ai) s.t. ¬r ∈ pr(aj) or
∃¬r ∈ pr(ai) s.t. r ∈ pr(aj)
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2. The postconditions of ai and aj contradict each other:
∃r ∈ ps(ai)+ s.t. ¬r ∈ ps(aj)− or
∃¬r ∈ ps(ai)− s.t. r ∈ ps(aj)+
3. The postconditions of ai contradict the preconditions of aj :
∃r ∈ ps(ai)+ s.t. ¬r ∈ pr(aj) or
∃¬r ∈ ps(ai)− s.t. r ∈ pr(aj)
4. The preconditions of ai are contradicted by the postconditions of aj :
∃r ∈ pr(ai) s.t. ¬r ∈ ps(aj)− or
∃¬r ∈ pr(ai) s.t. r ∈ ps(aj)+
We summarise the four conditions above in Definition 4, where we define what are referred to
as conflicting actions in the remainder of this work.
Definition 4 (Conflicting Actions). Actions ai and aj have a concurrency conflict iff the pre-
conditions or postconditions of ai contradict the preconditions or postconditions of aj . The set
of conflicting actions is denoted as cf action:
cf action = {(ai, aj) s.t. ∃r ∈ pr(ai) ∪ ps(ai)+,¬r ∈ pr(aj) ∪ ps(aj)− or
∃¬r ∈ pr(ai) ∪ ps(ai)−, r ∈ pr(aj) ∪ ps(aj)+} (3.1)
Example 3.2. Assume that the agent wants to take the action of attending a course to get some
certificate. Once the fee for the course is paid, the precondition for this action is met and the
agent is able to attend the course which results in the course being attended and a certificate of
attendance being received: attend course = 〈{fee paid}, {course attended, certificate},
3〉. But if the agent does not have the money to pay for the course, (s)he can rely on the
company’s funding to pay the fee: comp funding = 〈{¬fee paid,¬money}, {fee paid}, 4〉.
The preconditions of these two actions are inconsistent which prevent them from being exe-
cuted concurrently, however action comp funding effectively provides the precondition for
attend course which means they can indeed be executed consequently.
3.1.2 Goals
Goals are the central issue in any planning or practical reasoning problem. They identify the
state of affairs in the world that an agent wants to satisfy. Different types of goals and their
characteristics have been identified in the literature [Riemsdijk et al., 2008]. Figure 3-1 dis-
plays a classification of goals in which goals are divided into two broad categories of declar-











Figure 3-1: Goal Taxonomy [Riemsdijk et al., 2008]
actions, whereas the latter category is concerned with the actions themselves. Declarative or
state-based goals are further divided into goals that need to achieve a certain state of affair
(achievement goals) and goals that need to maintain a certain state of affairs (maintenance
goals). Query goals, also referred to as test goals, are used to query the state of the agent about
certain piece of information. Achievement goals are the most common type of goals modelled
in the agent literature and have therefore received the most attention [Boer et al., 2002; Nigam
and Leite, 2006; Riemsdijk et al., 2002, 2008].
Going back to our planing problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N), we now define G. Similar
to [Boer et al., 2002; Nigam and Leite, 2006; Riemsdijk et al., 2002, 2008], goals for the
purpose of this research are achievement goals. Thus,G denotes a set of (possibly inconsistent)
achievement goals, each of which g ∈ G is defined as a well-defined set of literals, known as
goal requirements (denoted ri), that should hold in order to satisfy the goal.
Definition 5 (Goal). Goal g = {r1, · · · , rn}, where ri is a literal, is satisfied in state s when
s |= g.
Example 3.3. Let us assume an agent wants to join in a planned strike to support some union.
In doing so, the agent has to be a member of the union, not go to the office and not attend any
meeting on behalf of its company elsewhere. So we have:
strike = {union member,¬office,¬meeting attended}
3.1.3 Norms
In Section 2.1.2 we explained what norms are and why they play an important role in agent
practical reasoning. In this section we specify what we refer to as a norm in this thesis. In order
to provide a context for the norm specification we propose, firstly, it is important to recall from
the previous chapter (page 27) the five elements identified by Pacheco [2012] that distinguish
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norm specification languages. Secondly, we explain how our norm specification corresponds
to those elements. The properties are:
1. Deontic Operators: in this work, we model a permissive society in which the agent has
complete knowledge of the domain of actions available to it. Everything is permitted un-
less it is explicitly prohibited. The role of obligation is to motivate the agent to execute
a specific action and the role of prohibition is to inhibit the agent from executing a par-
ticular action. The approach of modelling permission norms as exceptions to obligation
and prohibition norms (see Chapter 2, page 26) is considered as part of future work.
2. Controls: controls determine whether the deontic propositions operate on actions, states
or both. Existing approaches are divided into three categories depending on whether
deontic operators control (i) states [Cliffe et al., 2005; Dastani et al., 2009; Fornara and
Colombetti, 2007; Oren et al., 2008]; (ii) actions/events [Dignum, 2004; Garcı´a-Camino
et al., 2005; Hu¨bner et al., 2007; Uszok et al., 2008]; (iii) states and actions [De Vos
et al., 2013; Va´zquez-Salceda et al., 2004] . So far in this thesis we have focused on
action-based norms.
3. Enforcement Mechanisms: the enforcement mechanism we use is adopted from Lo´pez
et al. [2005], which is called “pressured norm compliance” and was explained in the
previous chapter (page 31). In this method, what determines compliance is the conflict
between goals and norms such that if there is a conflict between a norm and the agent’s
goals, the agent does not comply unless the goals hindered by punishment are more
important than the goals facilitated by compliance. On the other hand, if there is no such
conflict, the agent only complies with a norm if there are goals that are hindered through
the punishment for a violation, and violates the norms otherwise. Similarly, we use the
concept of conflict to persuade the agent to comply with a norm, however in contrast,
• the conflict and hence the compliance mechanism is extended to cater for not
only goal-norm conflict, but also norm-norm conflict. Therefore, when deciding
whether to follow a norm that hinders a goal or another norm, the importance of
the norm has to be weighed up against the hindered goal or norm; and
• if there is no conflict between a norm and another norm or agent’s goals, the norm
has to be complied with.
4. Conditional Expressions: similar to the control element, we use actions as conditional
expressions. In other words, the norm condition is an action that once executed, the
agent is obliged to or prohibited from executing the action that is subject to control.
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5. Temporal Constraints: temporal constraints can be used to express norm activation, ter-
mination, deadline, etc. The temporal constraint we specify here is concerned with the
deadline. The agent is expected to comply with an obligation (i.e. execute a certain ac-
tion) or a prohibition (refrain from executing a specific action) before some deadline. As
well as temporal constraints, a deadline can be expressed as a state 1 [Pacheco, 2012].
However, it is straightforward to represent the norm deadline as a future time instant,
rather than a state to be brought about. Associating a deadline with temporal proper-
ties is considered to be more realistic and more dynamic, in particular when the norms
capture the requirements of real-world scenarios [Chesani et al., 2013; Gasparini et al.,
2015; Kafali et al., 2014].
Having explained the properties of our norm specification language, we now define the
element N of the planning problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N). N denotes a set of conditional
norms to which the agent is subject:
Definition 6 (Norm). A norm is a tuple of the form n = 〈d o, acon, asub, dl〉, where
• d o ∈ {o, f}2 is the deontic operator determining the type of norm, which can be an
obligation or a prohibition;
• acon ∈ A is the action that activates the norm;
• asub ∈ A is the action that is the subject of the obligation or prohibition; and
• dl ∈ N is the norm deadline relative to the activation condition, which is the completion
of the execution of the action acon.
An obligation norm expresses that taking action acon obliges the agent to take action asub
within dl time units of the end of execution of acon. Such an obligation is complied with if the
agent starts executing asub before the deadline and is violated otherwise. A prohibition norm
expresses that taking action acon prohibits the agent from taking action asub within dl time
units of the end of execution of acon. Such a prohibition is complied with if the agent does not
start executing asub before the deadline and is violated otherwise.
Example 3.4. Assume that as an employee of a company, an agent is entitled to use company
funding to attend some training, however, that obliges the agent to attend some meeting on
behalf of the company before deadline 2: n = 〈o, comp funding , attend meeting, 2〉.
1When defined as state, deadlines are also referred to as a termination or expiration condition.
2o and f are normally denoted O and F in deontic literature. However we have used small letters to make it




l = k + d(comp funding)
sm
m = l + 2
comp funding compliance period
Example 3.5. Compulsory maternity leave prevents female employees to get back to work
within two weeks of giving birth. This situation can be modelled as a prohibition norm that
enforces the regulation: n = 〈f,giving birth,work, 2〉.
sk sl
l = k + d(giving birth)
sm
m = l + 2
giving birth compliance period
3.2 Semantics
Having explained the syntax of the model, we now focus on the semantics. To this end, we first
need to describe given a planning problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N):
(i) what the possible courses of action for the agent are and what properties each course of
action has. Properties are defined in terms of the goals that a sequence of action satisfies,
the norms it complies with and the norms it violates. This item is further discussed in
Section 3.2.1.
(ii) What different type of conflicts the agent can experience while trying to satisfy its goals
and comply with the norms to which it is subject. See Section 3.2.2 for more information
on this item.
(iii) What identifies a sequence of actions as a solution/plan for problem P . Plans are defined
in Section 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Sequences of Actions and their Properties
Let P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) be a normative planning problem. Also let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · ,
(an, tan)〉 with ai ∈ A and tai ∈ Z+ be a sequence of actions ai executed at time tai . The
pair (ai, tai) reads as action ai is executed at time tai ∈ Z+ s.t. ∀i < j, tai < taj . The total
duration of a sequence of actions, Makespan(pi), is given by Equation 3.2.
Makespan(pi) = max(tai + d(ai)) (3.2)
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Definition 7 (Sequence of States). Let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 be a sequence of actions
such that 6 ∃(ai, tai), (aj , taj ) ∈ pi s.t. tai ≤ taj < tai + d(ai), (ai, aj) ∈ cf action and let
m = Makespan(pi). The execution of a sequence of actions pi from a given starting state
s0 = ∆ brings about a sequence of states S(pi) = 〈s0, · · · sm〉 for every discrete time interval
from 0 to m.
The transition relation between two states is given by Definition 8. If an action ai ends at
time k, state sk results from removing all delete postconditions and adding all add postcondi-
tions of action ai to state sk−1. If there is no action ending at sk, the state sk remains the same
as sk−1. We first define Ak as the set of action, time pairs such that the actions are ending at
some specific state k:
Ak = {(ai, tai) ∈ pi s.t. k = tai + d(ai)} (3.3)
Note that sk is always well-defined since two actions with inconsistent postconditions, ac-
cording to Definition 4 belong to cf action and therefore cannot be executed concurrently and
consequently cannot end at the same state: 6 ∃(ai, tai), (aj , taj ) ∈ pi s.t. (ai, aj) ∈ cf action.
Definition 8 (State Transition). Let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 and let S(pi) = 〈s0, · · · sm〉
be the sequence of states brought about by pi:








+ Ak 6= ∅
sk−1 Ak = ∅
(3.4)
Definition 9 (Goal Satisfaction). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉: satisfies
goal g iff there is at least one state sk ∈ S(pi) that satisfies the goal:
pi |= g iff ∃ sk ∈ S(pi) s.t. sk |= g (3.5)
The set of goals satisfied by pi is denoted as Gpi:
Gpi = {g s.t. pi |= g} (3.6)
Definition 10 (Obligation Compliance). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉
complies with obligation n = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉 iff the action that is the norm activation con-
dition, acon, has occurred and the action that is the subject of the obligation, asub, occurs
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between when the condition holds and when the deadline expires.
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon), (asub, tasub) ∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), dl + tacon + d(acon)) (3.7)
Definition 11 (Obligation Violation). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 vi-
olates obligation n = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉 iff the action that is the norm activation condition,
acon, has occurred, but asub does not occur in the period between when the condition holds
and when the deadline expires, the obligation is violated.
pi 6|= n iff (acon, tacon) ∈ pi, 6 ∃(asub, tasub) ∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), dl + tacon + d(acon)) (3.8)
Definition 12 (Prohibition Compliance). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉
complies with prohibition n = 〈f, acon, asub, dl〉 if the action that is the norm activation con-
dition, acon, has occurred and the action that is the subject of the prohibition, asub, does not
occur in the period between when the condition holds and when the deadline expires.
pi |= n iff (acon, tacon) ∈ pi, 6 ∃(asub, tasub) ∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), dl + tacon + d(acon)) (3.9)
Definition 13 (Prohibition Violation). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 vi-
olates prohibition n = 〈f, acon, asub, dl〉 if the action that is the norm activation condition,
acon, has occurred and asub occurs in the period between when the condition holds and when
the deadline expires, the prohibition norm is violated.
pi 6|= n iff (acon, tacon), (asub, tasub) ∈ pi s.t.
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), dl + tacon + d(acon)) (3.10)
Definition 14 (Activated Norms). A norm n = 〈o|f, acon, asub, dl〉 is activated in a a sequence
of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 if its activation condition acon belongs to the sequence
of actions. Let Npi be the set of activated norms in pi:
Npi = {n = 〈o|f, acon, asub, dl〉 ∈ N s.t. acon ∈ pi} (3.11)
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The set of norms complied with and violated in pi are denoted as Ncmp(pi) and Nvol(pi):
Ncmp(pi) = {n ∈ Npi s.t. pi |= n} (3.12)
Nvol(pi) = {n ∈ Npi s.t. pi 6|= n} (3.13)
To make sure there are no norms pending at m = makespan(pi), we assume that the norm
deadlines are smaller than m. Therefore, all the activated norms in pi are either complied with
or violated by time m:
Npi = Ncmp(pi) ∪Nvol(pi) (3.14)
3.2.2 Conflict
In this section we look at three types of conflict, namely, conflict between goals, conflict be-
tween norms and conflict between goals and norms. Conflict between goals and between goals
and norms is a static property and does not depend on the sequence of actions. Conversely,
conflict between actions is temporal and differs from one sequence of actions to another. Since
norms are action-based, the same applies to conflict between norms. We explain static and
temporal conflicts in more detail in the remainder of this section. There are examples of each
type of conflict to demonstrate the concept in each case.
Goal-goal Conflict
An agent may pursue multiple goals or desires at the same time and it is very possible that
some of these goals conflict [Nigam and Leite, 2006; Pokahr et al., 2005; Riemsdijk et al.,
2002, 2009; Thangarajah et al., 2003]. Conflict between the agent’s goals or desires, especially
for BDI agents, has been addressed in several works. Hulstijn and van der Torre [2004] de-
scribe two goals as conflicting if achieving them requires taking two conflicting actions, where
conflicting actions are encoded using integrity constraints. Rahwan and Amgoud [2006] on the
other hand, define two desires as conflicting if the sets of beliefs that supports the achievement
of desires are contradictory. Like Rahwan and Amgoud [2006], Broersen et al. [2002] argue
that for a set of goals to not to be conflicting, a consistent mental attitude (e.g. beliefs and
norms) is required. Some (e.g. Toniolo [2013]) have adopted a static view on goal conflict, in
which conflicting goals are mutually-exclusive, hence impossible to satisfy in the same plan re-
gardless of the order or choice of actions in the plan. Limited and bounded resources (e.g. time,
money, etc.) are debated as another cause of conflict between goals [Thangarajah et al., 2002].
Regardless of the cause of conflict, Riemsdijk et al. [2009] rightly pinpoint that to prevent the
agent from pursuing conflicting goals, goals and their mutual conflicts must be represented in
66
the first place. They broadly distinguish three approaches for representing conflicting goals:
(i) providing the agent with an explicit representation of conflicting goals (e.g. [Pokahr et al.,
2005]); (ii) equipping the agent with the capability to reason about the plans to satisfy the
goals and consequently inferring the conflict between goals (e.g. [Thangarajah et al., 2003]);
and (iii) representing goals using logic and considering them conflicting if they are logically
speaking inconsistent (e.g. [Boer et al., 2002, 2007; Broersen et al., 2002; Riemsdijk et al.,
2002; Toniolo, 2013]). Goals in this research are represented, using logic, as conjunctions of
literals. We, therefore, use the widely acceptable approach in (iii) to represent conflicting goals
as follows:
Definition 15 (Conflicting Goals). Goal gi and gj are in conflict iff satisfying one requires
bringing about a state of affairs that is in conflict with the state of affairs required for satisfying
the other. The set of conflicting goals is defined as:
cf goal = {(gi, gj) s.t. ∃r ∈ gi,¬r ∈ gj or ∃¬r ∈ gi, r ∈ gj} (3.15)
Example 3.6. Continuing Example 3.3, in which strike was one of the agent’s goals, we
define another goal for the agent that is called submission. This goal requires the agent to go
to office and finalise a project report to be submitted. So we have:
strike = {union member,¬office,¬meeting attended}
submission = {office, report finalised}
Goals strike and submission are clearly in conflict since the former requires the agent not to
go to office, while being present in the office in one of the requirements of the latter.
Goal-norm Conflict
Similar to the conflict between goals, conflict between goals and norms can either (i) be ex-
plicitly represented, for example in terms of integrity constraints, in which case there is not
much computational formalism involved; or (ii) be inferred from plans that aim at satisfying
goals and complying with norms. In this case, if there is no plan that satisfies goal g while not
violating norm n, the agent establishes that there is a conflict between g and n; or (iii) be rep-
resented using logic. Despite much discussion in the literature, this type of conflict has rarely
been computationally formulated. For example, Lo´pez et al. [2005] talk about conflict between
goals and norms in terms of goals being hindered by norms or vice versa, however, it is not
clear what it means for a norm to hinder a goal (e.g. in what ways does compliance prevent
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goal achievement?). The same applies to the approach offered by Modgil and Luck [2008],
who suggest a mechanism to resolve the conflicts between desires and normative goals. In this
approach, norms are represented as system goals that may conflict with an agent’s goals or de-
sires. Social goals and individual goals do not need to conflict directly. Instead, conflict arises
from the reward or punishment from complying with or violating a norm that may facilitate
or hinder some of the agent’s individual goals. Oren [2013] approach to normative practical
reasoning, although it considers the conflict between goals and norms, does not formulate con-
flict, neither conceptually nor computationally. Conflict is instead inferred from paths or plans.
Goal-norm incompatibility indeed only arises due to the fact that certain actions may satisfy
one but not the other. Similar to the approach in Toniolo et al. [2011], we use logic to represent
and formulate the conflict between goals and norms, but we differ in that we do not expect the
agent to resolve the conflict by sacrificing its goals in favour of norms. Instead, similar to Oren
[2013], preferences are used to determine whether the agent should comply with the norm or
satisfy its goal.
Definition 16 (Conflicting Goal and Obligation). An obligation norm n = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉
and a goal g are in conflict, if executing action asub that is the subject of the obligation, brings
about postconditions that are in conflict with the requirements of goal g. The set of conflicting
goals and obligations is formulated as:
cf goalobl = {(g, n), (n, g) s.t. ∃r ∈ g,¬r ∈ ps(asub)− or ∃ ¬r ∈ g, r ∈ ps(asub)+} (3.16)
Example 3.7. Recall goal strike = {union member,¬office,¬meeting attended} from
Example 3.3 and obligation n = 〈o, comp funding , attend meeting, 2〉 from Example 3.4.
The postconditions of action attend meeting, that is the subject of obligation, are as follows:
ps(attend meeting) = {meeting attended, summary documented}. Complying with the
obligation brings aboutmeeting attended that prevents fulfilling¬meeting attended as one
the requirements of goal strike. Goal strike and norm n are therefore in conflict.
Definition 17 (Conflicting Goal and Prohibition). A prohibition norm n = 〈f, acon, asub, dl〉
and a goal g are in conflict, if the postconditions of asub contribute to satisfying g, but executing
action asub is prohibited by norm n. The set of conflicting goals and prohibitions is formulated
as:
cf goalpro = {(g, n), (n, g) s.t. ∃r ∈ g, r ∈ ps(asub)+ or ∃ ¬r ∈ g,¬r ∈ ps(asub)−} (3.17)
Example 3.8. Recall goal submission = {office, report finalised} from Example 3.6 and
prohibition n = 〈f,giving birth,work, 2〉 from Example 3.5. The postconditions of action
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work, that is the subject of prohibition, are as follows: ps(work) = {office,meeting att
ended}. Since this action is prohibited, office cannot be brought about. However, office is one
of the requirements of goal submission, and hence the conflict between goal submission and
prohibition n.
Definition 18 (Conflicting Goal and Norm). The entire set of conflicting goals and norms is
the union of conflicting goals and obligations, cf goalobl, and conflicting goals and prohibitions,
cf goalpro, which gives cf goalnorm:
cf goalnorm = cf goalobl ∪ cf goalpro (3.18)
Norm-norm Conflict
Similar to other types of conflict defined in this work, conflict between norms is also formulated
using logic. Before proposing our formulation in Definitions 19, 20, and 21, we briefly survey
the approaches that discuss normative conflicts in a practical reasoning context.
Oren et al. [2008] introduce a set of mutually exclusive norms that may not be complied
with simultaneously. Norms do not have an internal structure in [Oren et al., 2008] and the
conflict between them is detected externally and explicitly presented to the agent. Vasconcelos
et al. [2009] offer a method for conflict detection and resolution between norms. A conflict is
detected when an action is simultaneously prohibited and permitted/obliged and its variables
have overlapping values, where variables specify the scope of influence of the norm. A de-
tected conflict is resolved by manipulating the constraints associated with the norm variables
to remove any overlap between their values. The aim of conflict resolution is to enable the
agent to comply with the overall set of norms imposed on it. In [Criado et al., 2015], authors
appreciate the importance of detecting the normative conflict dynamically. They propose a
mechanism based on coherence theory [Criado et al., 2015], in which an agent dynamically
computes a preference order over subsets of its competing norms by considering their coher-
ence and inconsistencies. Also, in contrast to Vasconcelos et al. [2009], conflict in Thagard
[2002] is not limited to conflict between a prohibition and an obligation or a permission. Eight
variations of conflict are explored in total that cover all possible interactions of norms of type
obligation, prohibition and permission. Giannikis and Daskalopulu [2011] are concerned with
normative conflicts that arises for agents engaging in electronic contracts. They identify a set
of six primitive patterns of normative conflicts, four of which arise as a result of the deontic
qualification employed in the respective norms. The other two conflict patterns are caused
by the relation between the actions that are qualified deontically in the respective norms (e.g.
obligations to execute actionX and ¬actionX). Existing approaches, with the exception of
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[Criado et al., 2015], treat conflict between norms statically by using a predefined preference
order that determines which norm should be followed in case two norms are inconsistent. How-
ever, in dynamic environments, it can be quite challenging to specify all inconsistencies that
may occur. We therefore define the conflict between norms as dynamic, such that it depends
upon the context of the plan in which the norms are activated. Given that norms modelled in
this research are action-based and that we only model obligation and prohibition norms, we
address two types of conflict: (i) two obligations are in conflict in plan pi, iff they oblige the
agent to execute two conflicting actions (see page 58) in an overlapping interval; and (ii) an
obligation and prohibition are in conflict in plan pi iff they oblige and prohibit the agent to and
from executing the same action in an overlapping interval.
Definition 19 (Conflicting Obligations). Two obligation norms ni = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉 and
nj = 〈o, bcon, bsub, dl′〉 are in conflict in the context of sequence of actions pi iff:
(i) their activation conditions hold: (acon, tacon), (bcon, tbcon) ∈ pi;
(ii) the obliged actions in ni, i.e. asub, and n2, i.e. bsub have a concurrency conflict:
(asub, bsub) ∈ cf action;
(iii) action asub is executed between the period that the activation condition of norm ni holds
and the deadline expires: tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), tacon + d(acon) + dl); and
(iv) action asub is in progress during the entire period over which the agent is obliged to
execute action bsub: [tbcon + d(bcon), tbcon + d(bcon) + dl
′) ⊆ [tasub , tasub + d(asub))
Figure 3-2 offers a graphical representation of this type of conflict. The set of conflicting
obligations is denoted as cf pioblobl and formulated as:
cfpioblobl = {(ni, nj) s.t. (acon, tacon), (bcon, tbcon) ∈ pi; (asub, asub) ∈ cf action;
tasub ∈ [tacon + d(acon), tacon + d(acon) + dl);
[tbcon + d(bcon), tbcon + d(bcon) + dl












































































































Definition 20 (Conflicting Obligation and Prohibition). An obligation ni = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉
and a prohibition nj = 〈f, bcon, asub, dl′〉 are in conflict in the context of sequence of actions
pi iff:
(i) their activation conditions hold: (acon, tacon), (bcon, tbcon) ∈ pi; and
(ii) prohibition n2 forbids the agent to execute action asub during the entire period over which
obligation n1 obliges the agent to take asub: [tacon + d(acon), tacon + d(acon) + dl) ⊆
[tbcon + d(bcon), tbcon + d(bcon) + dl
′)
Figure 3-3 displays a graphical representation of this type of conflict. The set cf pioblpro denotes
the set of conflicting obligations and prohibitions as below:
cf pioblpro = {(ni, nj), (nj , ni) s.t. (acon, tacon), (bcon, tbcon) ∈ pi;
[tacon + d(acon), tacon + d(acon) + dl) ⊆ [tbcon + d(bcon), tbcon + d(bcon) + dl′)} (3.20)
Definition 21 (Conflicting Norms). All together, two sets cf pioblobl and cf
pi
oblpro constitute the
set of conflicting norms:
cf pinorm = cf
pi
oblobl ∪ cf pioblpro (3.21)
As noted earlier, the conflict between norms is only detectable in the context of a sequence
of actions. Thus, the examples for this type of conflict are provided in Chapter 5, where there
is a comprehensive example that illustrates all different types of conflict.
3.2.3 Plans
Having defined sequences of actions and the properties and conflicts they can experience, we
can now define which sequences of action can be identified as plans. In classical STRIPS-style
planning a sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tn)〉 is a plan for P = (∆, g, A), if all
the fluents in ∆ hold at time 0 and for each i, the preconditions of action ai hold at time tai , and
goal g is satisfied in timem, wherem = Makespan(pi). However, extending the conventional
planning problem by multiple potentially conflicting goals and norms requires defining extra
conditions in order to make a sequence of actions a plan and a solution for P . In what follows,

































































































Definition 22 (Plan). A sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 that brings about
the sequence of states S(pi) = 〈s0, · · · sm〉, is a plan and solution for the normative planning
problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N) iff the following six conditions hold:
1. all the fluents and only those fluents in ∆ hold in the initial state:
s0 = ∆ (3.22)
2. the preconditions of action ai holds at time tai and throughout the execution of ai:
∀k ∈ [tai , tai + d(ai)), sk |= pr(ai) (3.23)
3. the set of goals satisfied by plan pi is a non-empty consistent subset of goals:
Gpi ⊆ G and Gpi 6= ∅ and 6 ∃gi, gj ∈ Gpi s.t. (gi, gj) ∈ cf goal (3.24)
4. there is no concurrency conflict between actions that are executed concurrently:
6 ∃(ai, tai), (aj , taj ) ∈ pi s.t. tai ≤ taj < tai + d(ai), (ai, aj) ∈ cf action (3.25)
5. there is no conflict between norms complied with.
6 ∃ni, nj ∈ Ncmp(pi) s.t. (ni, nj) ∈ cf pinorm (3.26)
6. there is no conflict between goals satisfied and norms complied with:
6 ∃g ∈ Gpi and n ∈ Ncmp(pi) s.t. (g, n) ∈ cf goalnorm (3.27)
The set of plans for planning problem P such that they each meet all the six conditions
above are denoted using Π.
3.3 Summary
In this chapter we formulated a formal model for normative practical reasoning that enables
the agent to plan for multiple conflicting goals and norms simultaneously. Actions are durative
and executable concurrently subject to the absence of concurrency conflict between them. In
addition to concurrency conflict, three more types of conflict are explored in Section 3.2.2:
74
(i) conflict between goals; (ii) conflict between norms; and (iii) conflict between goals and
norms. Finally in Section 3.2.3, we set out six conditions that identify a sequence of actions
as a plan for the defined planning problem. The formal model defines all available plans for




Identifying Plans via Answer Set
Programming
Answer Set Programming (ASP) [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991] is a declarative programming
paradigm, most commonly using logic programs under answer set semantics, which previously
was referred to as stable semantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988]. In this paradigm, the user
provides the description of a problem and ASP works out how to solve it by returning answer
sets that correspond to problem solutions. A variety of programming languages for ASP ex-
ists, the most commonly used one of which is called AnsProlog (Programming in Logic with
Answer sets) [Baral, 2003]. The existence of efficient algorithms, called solvers, to generate
the answer sets to the provided problems has increased the number of applications1 of ASP in
different domains of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems such as planning (e.g. [Aker
et al., 2013; Eiter et al., 2011; Lifschitz, 2002]), normative reasoning (e.g. [Balke et al., 2011;
Cliffe, 2007; Li, 2014; Panagiotidi et al., 2012a]), model checking [Tang and Ternovska, 2005,
2007], agent reasoning [Blount and Gelfond, 2012; Gelfond, 2004]. The most widely used
solvers at the moment are Clingo [Gebser et al., 2011] and DLV [Eiter et al., 1999]. In this
work, we discuss the use of ASP to model and reason about the normative practical reasoning
agents modelled in the previous chapter. First, we justify ASP as a suitable choice for this pur-
pose. We then give an overview of AnsProlog syntax and semantics in Section 4.1, followed
by the implementation of the model in Section 4.2.
In general, ASP and other non-monotonic logic programming systems such as Prolog
[Colmerauer and Roussel, 1993] that use negation as failure (not p) to model negation, make
an assumption that is referred to as the “closed world assumption” [Reiter and Kleer, 1987].
1We only mention the applications of ASP that are relevant to this thesis. The applications mentioned are
therefore by no means comprehensive.
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Based on this assumption not p is true if p cannot be proven true in the current program. This
assumption makes it possible to model incomplete knowledge and reason about uncertainty
which is an unavoidable part of modelling and reasoning about real world problems. While
there are frameworks that formulate the agent reasoning problem using logic programming
(e.g. [Alrawagfeh and Meneguzzi, 2014; Artikis et al., 2009]), there are a number of reasons
why one should use ASP instead of other non-monotonic logic programming system such as
Prolog. ASP is fully declarative and arguably more intuitive in contrast to the procedural na-
ture of Prolog. The query-based nature of Prolog, that focuses on one issue at a time, makes
it cumbersome to reason about different compositions of features that might hold or not in a
logic program. Particularly, the practical reasoning problem in question makes ASP a better
choice than Prolog, since it requires reasoning about all plans and their different qualities such
as the goals they satisfy and the norms they obey or disobey. The semantics of ASP naturally
provides all the alternative views of the world that are consistent with the logic program speci-
fied. In addition, there is evidence of ASP replacing Prolog implementations of formalisms for
reasoning about actions, as a result of the existence of powerful solvers for ASP. The situation
calculus [Reiter, 2001] is one of the most common formalisms for reasoning about actions and
Prolog was first used to implement the situation calculus. However Lee and Palla [2010] later
proposed a formulation of situation calculus in terms of the first-order stable model semantics
which was then retransformed into ASP. More recently, the same authors, Lee and Palla [2014],
proposed the formulation of the event calculus [Kowalski and Sergot, 1986] in the general the-
ory of stable models which they then translated into ASP. Thus, as with the situation calculus,
ASP solvers are used to compute the event calculus. The experiment conducted in [Lee and
Palla, 2014] indicated that the ASP-based event calculus reasoner is significantly faster than
other existing SAT-based [Gu et al., 1997] implementations [Mueller, 2004; Shanahan and
Witkowski, 2004]. Apart from the situation and event calculus, action language A [Gelfond
and Lifschitz, 1998] and its descendants (e.g. B, C [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1998]) are based on
ASP. Temporal Action Logics (TAL) [Doherty et al., 1998] is another language for reasoning
about actions that is implemented in ASP by Lee and Palla [2012]. All these implementations
provide the indication that ASP is an appropriate tool for reasoning about actions. We there-
fore, in this chapter, propose an implementation of STRIPS [Fikes and Nilsson, 1971] as an
action language in ASP. We then extend the implementation of STRIPS actions to implement
the practical reasoning model described in the previous chapter. Given the above discussion,
encoding a practical reasoning problem as a declarative logic program makes it possible to
reason computationally about agent actions, goals and norms. This enables the agent to keep
track of actions taken, goals satisfied and norms complied with or violated at each state of its
evolution. More importantly, it provides the possibility of querying traces that fulfil certain
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requirements such as satisfying some specific goals. Consequently, instead of generating all
possible traces and looking for those ones that satisfy a certain property (e.g. satisfy at least
one goal), only those that do satisfy the property are generated.
4.1 AnsProlog Syntax and Semantics
As mentioned previously, a number of syntactic language representations for ASP exist. In this
thesis we use AnsProlog which is one of the most common classes of these languages. and it
has the following elements [Baral, 2003]:
Term: A term is a constant or a variable or a n-ary function f(t1, · · · , tn), where f is the func-
tion symbol and t1, · · · , tn are terms. Constants start with a lower-case letter, whereas
variables start with an upper-case level. A term is ground if no variable occurs in it.
Atom: Atoms are the basic components of the language that can be assigned a truth value
as true or false. An atom is a statement of form A(t1, · · · , tn), where A is a predicate
symbol and t1, · · · , tn are terms.
Literal: Literals are atoms or negated atoms. Atoms are negated using negation as failure
(not). not a is true if there is no evidence proving the truth of a. An atom preceded by
not is referred to as a naf-literal.
Herbrand universe of language L denoted as HUL is the set of all ground terms which can
be formed with the functions and constants in L. The set of all ground atoms which can be
formed with the functions, constants and predicates in L is called Herbrand base of language
L and is denoted using HBL.
An AnsProlog program (e.g. Π) consist of a finite set of rules formed from atoms. The
general rule syntax in AnsProlog is: h0 : − l1, · · · , lm, not lm+1, · · · , not ln., in which h0
and lis are atoms. h0 is the rule head and l1, · · · , lm, not lm+1, · · · , not ln are the body of
the rule. The above rule is read as: h0 is known/true, if l1, · · · , lm are known/true and none of
lm+1, ln are known. If a rule body is empty, that rule is called a fact and if the head is empty it
is called a constraint, indicating that the body of the the rule should not be satisfied. Another
type of rules are called choice rules and are denoted as l{h0, · · · , hk}u : − l1, · · · , lm, not
lm+1, · · · , not ln., in which his and lis are atoms. l and u are integers and the default values
for them is 0 and 1, respectively. A choice rule is satisfied if the number of atoms belonging to
{h0, · · · , hk} that are true/known is between the lower bound l and upper bound u. In order




mortal(X) : − human(X).
Figure 4-1: Program Π
human(alice).
human(adam).
mortal(alice) : − human(alice).
mortal(adam) : − human(adam).
Figure 4-2: Ground Version of Program Π
rule r in Π is then the set of all rules obtained from substitutions of elements of HUΠ for the
variables in the rule r. By grounding all r ∈ Π, we obtain ground(Π).
Example 4.1. Take the example in Figure 4-1. alice is a human, so is adam and all humans
are mortal. The Herbrand Universe of this program consists of the terms alice and adam.
Replacing the variable X in the third rule we obtain two more atoms: mortal(alice) and
mortal(adam). The grounded version of the program presented in Figure 4-1 is displayed in
Figure 4-2.
The semantics of AnsProlog is defined in terms of answer sets. The answer sets of program
Π, are defined in terms of the answer sets of the ground program ground(Π). An AnsProlog
program without any naf-literal is denoted as Ansprolog−not. In other words, program Π is
an Ansprolog−not if for all rules in the program m = n. An answer set of an AnsProlog−not
program Π is a minimal subset (with respect to subset ordering) S of HB that is closed un-
der ground(Π). The approach to define the answer sets of an AnsProlog program Π is to
take a candidate answer set S of the program and transform Π with respect to S to obtain an
Ansprolog−not denoted by ΠS . S is an answer set of Π if S is the answer set of AnsProlog−not
program ΠS . This transformation is referred to as Gelfond-Lifschitz [Gelfond and Lifschitz,
1988] transformation.
Given an AnsProlog program Π and a set S of atoms from HBΠ, the Gelfond-Lifschitz
[Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988] transformation ΠS is obtained by deleting:
1. each rule that has a not L in its body with L ∈ S, and
2. literals of form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules.
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guilty : − evidence.
evidence : − trusted witness.
trusted witness : − not lying, witness.
witness.
believe : − not disbelieve.
disbelieve : − not believe.
lying : − disbelieve.
Figure 4-3: Program for Jury Example
The transformation (reduct) of choice rules was not a part of original Gelfond-Lifschitz trans-
formation and was introduced later in [Lee et al., 2008]. Recently a simplified reduct for pro-
grams including choice rules is proposed by [Mark Law and Broda, 2015] as follows. Given an
AnsProlog program Π - with choice rules- and a set S of atoms from HBΠ, the transformation
ΠS is constructed in the following 4 steps:
1. Delete each rule that has a not L in its body with L ∈ S.
2. Delete literals of form not L in the bodies of the remaining rules.
3. for any choice rule r, l{h0, · · · , hk}u : − body(r), such that l ≤ |S ∩ {h0, · · · , hk}| ≤
u, replace r with the set of rules {hi : − body+(r)|hi ∈ S ∩ {h0, · · · , hk}}.
4. for any remaining choice rules r, l{h0, · · · , hk}u : − body(r), replace r with the con-
straint : − body+(r).
After these transformation, the AnsProlog program Π is a program without any naf-literals
and choice rules and it is therefore, an AnsProlog−not, for which the answers are already
defined. Informally, an answer set is a set of grounded atoms that satisfy the rules specifying
the problem in a minimal and consistent fashion. Each answer set of the program corresponds
to a solution for the problem encoded. If a program does not have any answer set, it said to be
not satisfiable.
Example 4.2. Consider the following example taken from [Cliffe, 2007] in which a jury wants
to decide if the accused is guilty. The accused is guilty if there is evidence to support it.
Evidence is a trusted witness. A witness is trusted if s/he is not lying. If the jury does not
disbelieve the witness, it believes it and the other way around. Finally, a disbelieved witness is
assumed to be lying. The situation is formulated in Figure 4-3.
Using answer set semantics, the program in Figure 4-3 has two answer sets:
Answer1 : {guilty, evidence, trusted witness, witness, believe}
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Answer2 : {witness, lying, disbelieve}
In Answer1, because the witness is not disbelieved, s/he is believed and because there is no
evidence that is lying, s/he is trustworthy. Therefore, there exists evidence that the accused
is guilty. In Answer2 however, the witness is disbelieved and therefore assumed to be lying,
which does not qualify her/him as trustworthy and thus leaves no evidence for the accused to
be guilty. In the next section we see how AnsProlog syntax and semantics are exploited for the
purpose of modelling the practical reasoning problem discussed in the previous chapter.
4.2 Translating the Normative Practical Reasoning Model into ASP
In this section, we demonstrate how a planning problem P = (FL,∆, A,G,N), defined in the
previous chapter (page 56), can be mapped into an answer set program such that there is a one
to one correspondence between solutions for the planning problem and the answer sets of the
program. Each part of the translation is accompanied by examples. To distinguish between the
original code and the code for examples, we do not number the lines for the latter.
4.2.1 States
In the previous chapter (page 63) we described the semantics of the planning problem P =
(FL,∆, A,G,N) over a set of states. The execution of a sequence of actions from a given
starting state s0 = ∆ brings about a sequence of states 〈s0, · · · sm〉 for every discrete time
interval from 0 to m, where m = Makespan(pi). Assuming that there is a plan that uses all
available actions such that none of them can be executed concurrently, the maximum number
of states, q, results from sum of duration of all actions: q =
∑n
i=1 d(ai). The facts produced
by Line 1 in Figure 4-4 provide the program with all available states. Atom holdsat(x, s)
is used to express that fluent x holds in state s; Line 2 encodes the fluents that hold at initial
state holdsat(x, 0). All the fluents that hold in a state, hold in the next state unless they
are terminated (Line 3 to 4) using terminated(X,S1). In other words fluents are inertial
(see Figure 4-5). state(S1;S2) in Line 4 is a standard replacement for the duplication of
state(S1) and state(S2).
4.2.2 Actions
In the previous chapter (Page 57), we described an action a as a tuple composed of well-
defined sets of literals pr(a), ps(a) to represents a’s preconditions and postconditions and a
positive number d(a) ∈ N for its duration. Postconditions are further divided into a set of add
postconditions, ps(a)+, and a set of delete postconditions, ps(a)−. The encoding for actions
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∀ k ∈ [0, q]
1 state(k).
∀ x ∈ ∆
2 holdsat(x, 0).
Figure 4-4: Rules for State
3 holdsat(X,S2) :- holdsat(X,S1), not terminated(X,S1),
4 state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
Figure 4-5: Inertial Fluents
is provided in Figure 4-6. Each durative action is encoded as action(a, d) (Line 5), where
a is the name of the action and d is the duration. Recalling the previous chapter (page 57),
the preconditions pr(a) of action a hold in state s if s |= pr(a). This is expressed in Line 6
using atom pre(a,S), where pr(a)+ and pr(a)− are positive and negative literals in pr(a).
In order to make the coding more readable we introduce the shorthand EX(X,S), where X
is a set of fluents that should hold at state S. For all x ∈ X, EX(X,S) is translated into
holdsat(x,S) and for all ¬x ∈ X, EX(¬X,S) is translated into not EX(x,S) using
negation as failure. The agent has the choice to execute any of its actions in any state. This
is expressed in choice rule presented in Line 7. As discussed in Section 4.1 (page 78), since
there is no lower and upper bound expressed for {executed(A,S)}, the default value of
0{executed(A,S)}1 is implied, meaning that the agent has the choice whether to execute
an action. Following the approach in [Blum and Furst, 1997] (see the previous chapter, page 57)
we assume that the preconditions of a durative action should be preserved when it is in progress.
We first encode the description of an action in progress, followed by ruling out the possibility of
an action being in progress in the absence of its preconditions. A durative action is in progress,
inprog(A,S), from the state in which it begins to the state in which it ends (Line 8 to
9). Line 10, rules out the execution of an action, when the preconditions of the action do
not hold during its execution. Another assumption made in Section 3.1.1, page 57, is that the
agent cannot start two actions at the exact same time (Line 11 to 12). Once an action starts
in one state, the result of its execution is reflected in the state where the action ends. This is
expressed through (i) Line 13 that allows the add postconditions of the action to hold when
the action ends, and (ii) Line 14 to 15 that allow the termination of the delete postconditions.
The termination happens in the state before the end state of the action. The reason for this is
the inertia of fluents that was expressed in Lines 3 and 4. Delete postconditions of an action
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∀a ∈ A s.t. d(a)
5 action(a, d).
6 pre(a,S) :- EX(pr(a)+,S), not EX(pr(a)−,S), state(S).
7 {executed(A,S)} :- action(A,D), state(S).
8 inprog(A,S2) :- executed(A,S1), action(A,D), state(S1;S2),
9 S1<=S2, S2<S1+D.
10 :- inprog(A,S), action(A,D), state(S), not pre(A,S).
11 :- executed(A1,S), executed(A2,S), A1!=A2,
12 action(A1,D1), action(A2,D2), state(S).
ps(a)+ = X ⇔ ∀x ∈ X·
13 holdsat(x,S2) :- executed(a,S1), action(a, d), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+d.
ps(a)− = X ⇔ ∀x ∈ X·
14 terminated(x,S2) :- executed(a,S1), action(a, d), state(S1;S2),
15 S2=S1+d-1.
Figure 4-6: Rules for Translating Actions
action(attend interview, 4).
pre(attend interview,S) :- holdsat(invitation,S), holdsat(venue,S),
state(S).
holdsat(interviewed,S2) :- executed(attend interview,S1),
action(attend interview, 4), state(S1;S2),
S2=S1+4.
terminated(invitation,S2) :- executed(attend interview,S1),
action(attend interview, 4), state(S1;S2),
S2=S1+4− 1.
Figure 4-7: Implementation of Action attend interview
are terminated in the state before the end state of the action, so that they will not hold in the
following state, in which the action ends (i.e. they are deleted from the state). Please note that
the add postconditions can similarly be initiated in the state before the end state of the action.
A fluent that is initiated in a state will then hold in the following state. However, currently, to
reduce the grounding costs of the program, the add postconditions automatically appear at the
end state without being initiated previously.
Example 4.3. Figure 4-7 shows the implementation of action in Example 3.1, page 58:
attend interview = 〈{invitation, venue}, {interviewed,¬invitation}, 4〉.
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∀g ∈ G
16 satisfied(g,S) :- EX(g+,S), not EX(g−,S), state(S).
Figure 4-8: Rules for Translating Goals
satisfied(strike,S) :- holdsat(union member,S), not holdsat(office,S),
not holdsat(meeting attended,S), state(S).
Figure 4-9: Implementation of Goal strike
4.2.3 Goals
From Chapter 3 (page 59), we have goal g is satisfied in state s if s |= g. This is expressed in
Figure 4-8, Line 16, where g+ and g− are the positive and negative literals in set g. Positive
literals should belong to the state, EX(g+,S), and the negative ones, EX(g−,S), should be
absent so that atom satisfied(g,S) holds in state S.
Example 4.4. Figure 4-9 shows the implementation of the goal in Example 3.3, page 60:
strike = {union member,¬office,¬meeting attended}.
4.2.4 Norms
The conditional action-based norms that are the focus of this research were discussed in the
previous chapter, page 60. The encoding for norms is presented in Figure 4-10. Lines 17–31
deal with obligations and prohibitions of form2: n = 〈o|f, acon, asub, dl〉. In order to im-
plement the concepts of norm compliance and violation described in Chapter 3, page 63, we
introduce a normative fluent, o|f(n, asub, dl′), that holds over the compliance period. Com-
pliance period begins from the state in which action acon’s execution ends. The compliance
period then ends within dl time units of end of action acon, which is denoted as dl′ in the nor-
mative fluent. An obligation fluent o(n1, asub, dl′) denotes that action asub’s execution should
begin before deadline dl′ or be subject to violation, while prohibition fluent f(n2, asub, dl′)
denotes that action asub should not begin before deadline dl′ or be subject to violation. Lines
17–18 and 24–25 establish the obligation and prohibition fluents that hold for the duration of
the compliance period.
In terms of compliance, if the obliged action begins during the compliance period in which
the obligation fluent o(n1, asub, dl′) holds, the obligation is complied with (Line 19 to 20).
The atom cmp(o(n1, a,DL),S) is used to indicate the compliance to norm n1 in state S3.
2Since ASP syntax does not allow subscripts, acon and asub appear as a con and a sub in the code.
3DL is a variable representing dl + S2.
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∀n = 〈o|f, acon, asub, dl〉 ∈ N
17 holdsat(o(n1, a sub, dl+S2),S2) :- executed(a con,S1), action(a con, d1),
18 S2=S1+d1,state(S1;S2).
19 cmp(o(n1, a,DL),S) :- holdsat(o(n1, a,DL),S), executed(a,S),
20 action(a, d),state(S), S!=DL.
21 terminated(o(n1, a,DL),S) :- cmp(o(n1, a,DL),S), state(S).
22 vol(o(n1, a,DL),S) :- holdsat(o(n1, a,DL),S), DL=S, state(S).
23 terminated(o(n1, a,DL),S) :- vol(o(n1, a,DL),S), state(S).
24 holdsat(f(n2, a sub, dl+S2),S2) :- executed(a con,S1), action(a con, d1),
25 S2=S1+d1, state(S1;S2).
26 cmp(f(n2, a,DL),S) :- holdsat(f(n2, a,DL),S), action(a, d),
27 DL=S, state(S).
28 terminated(f(n2, a,DL),S) :- cmp(f(n2, a,DL),S), state(S).
29 vol(f(n2, a,DL),S) :- holdsat(f(n2, a,DL),S), executed(a,S),
30 state(S), S!=DL.
31 terminated(f(n2, a,DL),S) :- vol(f(n2, a,DL),S), state(S).
Figure 4-10: Rules for Translating Norms
The obligation fluent is terminated in the same state that compliance is detected (Lines 21). If
the deadline expires and the obligation fluent still holds, it means that the compliance never
occurred during the compliance period and norm n is therefore violated (Line 22). Atom
vol(o(n1, a,DL),S) denotes the violation. The obligation fluent is terminated when the
deadline expires and the norm is violated (Line 23). On the other hand, a prohibition norm is
violated if the forbidden action begins during the compliance period in which the prohibition
fluent f(n2, asub, dl′) holds (Line 29 to 30). As with the obligation norms, after being violated,
the prohibition fluent is terminated (Line 31). If the deadline expires and the prohibition fluent
still holds, that means the prohibited action did not begin during the compliance period and
norm n2 is therefore complied with (Line 26 to 27). The obligation fluent is terminated in the
same state that the compliance is detected (Line 28).
Example 4.5. Figure 4-11 shows the implementation of the obligation in Example 3.4, page 62:
n1 = 〈o, comp funding , attend meeting, 2〉.
Example 4.6. Figure 4-12 shows the implementation of the prohibition in Example 3.5, page 62:
n2 = 〈f, giving birth, work, 2〉.
4.3 Mapping of Answer Sets to Plans
Having implemented the components of P = (FL,∆, A,G,N), in this section we encode the
criteria for a sequence of actions to be identified as a plan and solution for P . These criteria
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holdsat(o(n1, attend meeting, 2+S2),S2) :- executed(comp funding,S1),
action(comp funding , 3), S2=S1+3, state(S1;S2).
cmp(o(n1, attend meeting,DL),S) :- holdsat(o(n1, attend meeting,DL),S),
executed(attend meeting,S),action(attend meeting, 3),
state(S), S!=DL.
terminated(o(n1, attend meeting,DL),S) :- cmp(o(n1, attend meeting,DL),S),
state(S).
vol(o(n1, attend meeting,DL),S) :- holdsat(o(n1, attend meeting,DL),S),
DL=S, state(S).
terminated(o(n1, attend meeting,DL),S) :- vol(o(n1, attend meeting,DL),S),
state(S).
Figure 4-11: Implementation of Obligation n1
holdsat(f(n2, work, 2+S2),S2) :- executed(giving birth,S1), S2=S1+4,
action(giving birth, 4), state(S1;S2).
cmp(f(n2, work,DL),S) :- holdsat(f(n2, work,DL),S), action(work, 1),
DL=S, state(S).
terminated(f(n2, work,DL),S) :- cmp(f(n2, work,DL),S), state(S).
vol(f(n2, work,DL),S) :- holdsat(f(n2, work,DL),S), executed(work,S),
state(S), S!=DL.
terminated(f(n2, work,DL),S) :- vol(f(n2, work,DL),S), state(S).
Figure 4-12: Implementation of Prohibition n2
(defined in the previous chapter (page 72)) are encoded in Figure 4-13. The rule in Line 33 is
responsible for constraining the answer sets to those that fulfil at least one goal by excluding
answers that do not satisfy any goal. The input for this rule is provided in Line 32, where goals
are marked as satisfied if they are satisfied in at least one state. Line 34 prevents satisfying
two conflicting goals, hence guaranteeing the consistency of satisfied goals in a plan (see Ex-
ample 4.7). Preventing the concurrency of conflicting actions, is implemented in Line 35, by
expressing that such two actions cannot be in progress together (see Example 4.8). Lines 36 and
37 provides the input for Lines 38, which excludes the possibility of satisfying a goal and com-
plying with a norm that are conflicting (see Examples 4.9 and 4.10). Note that since norms are
action-based, the implementation prevents complying with conflicting norms automatically:
(i) if two obligations oblige the agent to execute two conflicting actions concurrently, one of
them has to be violated since the concurrency of conflicting actions was already prevented in
Line 35; and (ii) regarding conflicting obligation and prohibition, by definition, executing the
obliged action and hence complying with the obligation causes the violation of the prohibition
that prevents the execution of the very same action. Conversely, not executing the prohibited
action and hence complying with the prohibition, results in the violation of the obligation.
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32 satisfied(g) :- satisfied(g,S), state(S).
33 :- not satisfied(g1), ... , not satisfied(gm).
∀ (g1, g2) ∈ cf goal
34 :- satisfied(g1),satisfied(g2).
∀ (a1, a2) ∈ cf action
35 :- inprog(a1,S), inprog(a2,S), action(a1, d1), action(a2, d2), state(S).
36 complied(n1) :- cmp(o(n1, a,DL),S), state(S).
37 complied(n2) :- cmp(f(n2, a,DL),S), state(S).
∀ (g, n) ∈ cf goalnorm
38 :- satisfied(g), complied(n).
Figure 4-13: Solutions for Problem P
satisfied(strike) :- satisfied(strike,S), state(S).
satisfied(submission) :- satisfied(submission,S), state(S).
:- satisfied(strike),satisfied(submission).
Figure 4-14: Implementation of Prevention of Conflicting Goals
Example 4.7. Figure 4-14 shows the implementation of the conflicting goals from Example 3.6,
page 67: strike = {union member,¬office,¬meeting attended} and submission =
{office, report finalised}.
Example 4.8. Figure 4-15 shows the implementation of the conflicting actions from Exam-
ple 3.2, page 59: attend course = 〈{fee paid}, {course attended, certificate}, 3〉 and
comp funding = 〈{¬fee paid,¬money}, {fee paid}, 4〉.
Example 4.9. Figure 4-16 shows the implementation of the conflicting goal and obligation of
Example 3.7, page 68: strike = {union member,¬office,¬meeting attended} and n =
〈o, comp funding , attend meeting, 2〉. The postconditions of action attend meeting, that
is the subject of the obligation, are as follows: ps(attend meeting) = {meeting attended,
summary documented}. Complying with the obligation brings about meeting attended
that prevents fulfilling ¬meeting attended as one the requirements of goal strike.
Example 4.10. Figure 4-17 shows the implementation of conflicting goal: submission =
{office, report finalised} and prohibition: n = 〈f, giving birth, work, 2〉 of Example 3.8,
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:- inprog(attend course,S), inprog(comp funding,S), action(attend course, 5),
action(comp funding, 3), state(S).
Figure 4-15: Implementation of Prevention of Conflicting Actions
satisfied(strike) :- satisfied(strike,S), state(S).
complied(n) :- cmp(o(n, attend meeting,DL),S), state(S).
:- satisfied(strike), complied(n).
Figure 4-16: Implementation of Prevention of Conflicting Goals and Obligations
satisfied(submission) :- satisfied(submission,S), state(S).
complied(n) :- cmp(f(n,work,DL),S), state(S).
:- satisfied(submission), complied(n).
Figure 4-17: Implementation of Prevention of Conflicting Goals and Prohibitions
page 68. The postconditions of action work, that is the subject of prohibition, are as fol-
lows: ps(work) = {office, attend meeting}. Since this action is prohibited, office cannot
be brought about. However, office is one of the requirements of goal submission, and hence
the conflict between goal submission and prohibition n.
Having encoded the criteria of a plan, we are now in a position to map the answers of
the encoded program to the solutions of our planning problem. Let program Πbase consist
of Lines 1–38. The following theorems state the correspondence between the solutions for
problem P and answer sets of program Πbase.
Theorem 4.1. Given a planning problem P = (FL, I, A,G,N), for each answer set Ans
of Πbase the set of atoms of the form executed(ai, tai) in Ans encodes a solution to the
planning problem P .
Proof. We first recall the definition of a plan from the previous chapter, Section 3.2.3 and then
prove that program Πbase generates all sequences of actions that meet the criteria that identifies
a sequence of actions as a plan. This implies that the sequence of actions that is a part of the
answer set satisfies all the criteria to be a solution to the encoded planning program.
Actions and more precisely the postconditions of actions are what cause the change from
one state to another one. Line 7 generates all sequences of actions. Line 13 changes a state
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in which some actions end by adding the add postconditions of those actions to the state. In
contrast, Lines 14 and 15 terminate the delete postconditions of actions ending in the next
state such that those postconditions do not hold in the following state. If there is no action
ending in a state the state remains the same as the previous state, because all the fluents are
inertial and they hold in the next state unless they are terminated (Line 4). A sequence of
actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 is a plan and solution for normative planning problem
P = (FL, I,A,G,N) iff:
1. All the fluents in ∆ hold in the initial state:
s0 = ∆
Line 2 ensures that all fluents in ∆ are added to the initial state s0.
2. The preconditions of action ai holds at time tai and throughout the execution of ai:
∀k ∈ [tai , tai + d(ai)), sk |= pr(ai)
Lines 10 guarantees that the preconditions of an action hold all through its execution.
3. Set of goals satisfied by plan pi is a non-empty consistent subset of goals:
Gpi ⊆ G and Gpi 6= ∅ and 6 ∃gi, gj ∈ Gpi s.t. (gi, gj) ∈ cf goal
Line 33 indicates that a non-empty subset of goals has to be satisfied in a plan, while
Line 34 ensures the consistency of the goals satisfied.
4. There is no concurrency conflict between actions that are executed concurrently:
6 ∃(ai, tai), (aj , taj ) ∈ pi s.t. tai ≤ taj < tai + d(ai) and (ai, aj) ∈ cf action
Preventing the concurrency conflict is encoded in Line 35.
5. There is no conflict between the norms complied with.
6 ∃ni, nj ∈ Ncmp(pi) s.t. (ni, nj) ∈ cf pinorm
As mentioned earlier, the implementation automatically prevents complying with con-
flicting norms.
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6. There is no conflict between goals satisfied and norms complied with:
6 ∃g ∈ Gpi and n ∈ Ncmp(pi) s.t. (g, n) ∈ cf goalnorm
Line 38 eliminates the possibility of conflict between goals satisfied and norms complied
with.
Theorem 4.2. Let pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 be a plan for P = (FL, I,A,G,N), such that
m = Makespan(pi). Then, there exists an answer set of Πbase containing atoms executed(ai, tai)
with 0 ≤ tai < m that corresponds to pi.
Proof. Let the execution of sequence of actions in pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉 bring about
the sequence of states 〈s0, · · · sq〉. Let Mt be the set of following atoms (and nothing else):
∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q ·Mt |= state(k) (4.1)
∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q · x ∈ sk ⇒Mt |= holdsat(x, k) (4.2)
∀k, 0 ≤ k < q · x ∈ (sk \ sk+1)⇒Mt |= terminated(x, k) (4.3)
∀a ∈ A ·Mt |= action(a, d) (4.4)
∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q · a ∈ A, pr(a)+ ⊆ sk, pr(a)− 6∈ sk ⇒Mt |= pre(a, k) (4.5)
∀k, 0 ≤ k < q · (a, k) ∈ pi ⇒Mt |= executed(a, k) (4.6)
∀a.Mt |= executed(a, k), ∀k, ta ≤ k < ta + d(a) ·Mt |= inprog(a, k) (4.7)
∀a.Mt |= executed(a, k), ∀x ∈ ps(a)+ ·Mt |= holdsat(x, k + d(a)) (4.8)
∀a.Mt |= executed(a, k), ∀x ∈ ps(a)− ·Mt |= terminated(x, k + d(a)− 1) (4.9)
∀k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q · g ∈ G, g+ ⊆ sk, g− 6∈ sk ⇒Mt |= satisfied(g, k) (4.10)
∀n = 〈o, acon, asub, dl〉 ∈ N.Mt |= executed(a con, ta con),
∀k, tacon + d(acon) ≤ k ≤ tacon + d(acon) + dl·
Mt |= holdsat(o(n, a sub, ta con + d(a con) + dl), k) (4.11)
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∃k, 0 ≤ k < q ·Mt |= holdsat(o(n, a, dl′), k),Mt |= executed(a, k), k! = dl′ ⇒
Mt |= cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k) (4.12)
∃k, 0 ≤ k < q,Mt |= cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k)⇒Mt |= terminated(o(n, a, dl′), k) (4.13)
∃k, k = dl′,Mt |= holdsat(o(n, a, dl′), k)⇒Mt |= vol(o(n, a, dl′), k) (4.14)
∃k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q,Mt |= vol(o(n, a, dl′), k)⇒Mt |= terminated(o(n, a, dl′), k) (4.15)
∀n = 〈f, acon, asub, dl′〉 ∈ N.Mt |= executed(a con, ta con),
∀k, tacon + d(acon) ≤ k ≤ tacon + d(acon) + dl′·
Mt |= holdsat(f(n, a sub, ta con + d(a con) + dl′), k) (4.16)
∃k, k = dl′,Mt |= holdsat(f(n, a, dl′), k)⇒Mt |= cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k) (4.17)
∃k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q,Mt |= cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k)⇒Mt |= terminated(f(n, a, dl′), k) (4.18)
∀k, 0 ≤ k < q ·Mt |= holdsat(f(n, a, dl′), k),Mt |= executed(a, k)⇒
Mt |= vol(f(n, a, dl′), k) (4.19)
∃k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q,Mt |= vol(f(n, a, dl′), k)⇒Mt |= terminated(f(n, a, dl′), k) (4.20)
∃k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q,Mt |= satisfied(g, k)⇒Mt |= satisfied(g) (4.21)
∃k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q,Mt |= cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k)⇒Mt |= complied(n) (4.22)
∃k, 0 ≤ k ≤ q,Mt |= cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k)⇒Mt |= complied(n) (4.23)
We need to prove that Mt is an answer set of Πbase. Therefore, we need to demonstrate
that Mt is a minimal model for ΠMtbase. Let r ∈ ΠMtbase be an applicable rule. In order for Mt
to be a model of ΠMtbase, we need to show that r is applied (i.e. Mt |= Head(r)). We will go
through each rule in the same order in Lines 1–38.
• r is of type rule in Line 1: fact and automatically applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 2: fact and automatically applied.
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• r is of type rule in Lines 3–4: because of Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, we know
that not terminated(x, s) is removed from this rule. combination of 4.2 and 4.3 for x
at k gives Mt |= holdsat(x, k + 1).
• r is of type rule in Line 5: fact and automatically applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 6: after Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, from the body and
description of this rule we have a ∈ A and pr(a)+ ∈ sk and pr(a)− 6∈ sk, which
with 4.5 implies that Mt |= pre(a, k).
• r is of type rule in Line 7: any action a ∈ A can be executed in a state. After the transfor-
mation for choice rules, we obtain ∀(a, k) ∈ pi we have executed(a, k) : − action(a, d),
state(k). and ∀(a, k) s.t. (a, k) 6∈ pi we have : − action(a, d), state(k). With 4.6, we
know that Mt |= executed(a, k).
• r is of type rule in Lines 8–9: inprog atoms originate from execution of actions. From 4.6
we know that ∀(a, k) ∈ pi,Mt |= executed(a, k). Since a is executed with 4.7 we have
∀k, ta ≤ k < ta + d(a),Mt |= inprog(a, k).
• r is of type rule in Line 10: the head of this rule is empty. Since pi is a plan and we have
assumed the preconditions of actions in a plan are hold while the actions are in progress,
this rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Lines 11–12: the head of this rule is empty. Because pi is a plan and
we have assumed that two actions in a plan cannot have the exact same start state, this
rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 13: the body of this rule implies that the add postconditions of
an executed action a hold in the state in which the action ends. Since ∀(a, k) ∈ pi,Mt |=
executed(a, k), with 4.8 we have ∀x ∈ ps(a)+ ·Mt |= holdsat(x, k + d(a)).
• r is of type rule in Lines 14–15: the body of this rule implies that the delete postcon-
ditions of an executed action a are terminated in the state before the end state of the
action. Since ∀(a, k) ∈ pi,Mt |= executed(a, k), with 4.9 we have ∀x ∈ ps(a)− ·Mt |=
terminated(x, k + d(a)− 1).
• r is of type rule in Line 16: after Gelfond-Lifschitz transformation, from the body and
description of this rule we have g+ ∈ sk and g− 6∈ sk, which with 4.10 implies that
Mt |= satisfied(g, k).
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• r is of type rule in Lines 17–18: the body of the rule implies that normative fluents for
obligations are hold over the compliance period if the action that is the condition of the
norm is executed. If acon for an obligation norm belongs to pi, then based on 4.6 we
know that Mt |= executed(a con, ta con). From 4.6 and 4.11 we know that Mt |=
holdsat(o(n, a sub, ta con + d(a con) + dl
′), k) over the period tacon + d(acon) ≤ k ≤
tacon + d(acon) + dl
′.
• r is of type rule in Lines 19–20: this rule expresses that if the obliged action is executed
while the normative fluent holds, the norm is complied with. If asub is executed in pi
(Mt |= executed(a con, ta con)) while the normative fluent in 4.11 holds, with 4.12 we
know that Mt models the compliance atom.
• r is of type rule in Line 21: complied obligations are terminated in the compliance state.
With 4.12 we know that Mt models compliance atoms, and 4.13 implies that they are
terminated in the same state.
• r is of type rule in Line 22: if the obligation fluent still holds when the deadline occurs,
the obligation is violated. 4.14 implies this is modelled by Mt.
• r is of type rule in Line 23: violated obligations are terminated in the violation state.
With 4.14 we know that Mt models violation atoms, and 4.15 implies that they are
terminated.
• r is of type rule in Lines 24–25: the body of the rule implies that normative fluents for
prohibition norms are hold over the compliance period if the action that is the condition
of the norm is executed. If acon for a prohibition belongs to pi, then based on 4.6 we
know that Mt |= executed(a con, ta con). From 4.6 and 4.16 we know that Mt |=
holdsat(f(n, a sub, ta con + d(a con) + dl
′), k) over the period tacon + d(acon) ≤ k ≤
tacon + d(acon) + dl
′.
• r is of type rule in Lines 26–27: this rule expresses that if the normative fluent still holds
at the end of compliance period, the prohibition is complied with. 4.17 implies that Mt
models the head of this rule.
• r is of type rule in Line 28: complied prohibitions are terminated in the compliance state.
With 4.17 we know that Mt models compliance atoms, and 4.18 implies that they are
terminated and this rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Lines 29–30: this rule expresses that if the prohibited action is executed
while the normative fluent holds, the norm is violated. If asub is executed in pi (Mt |=
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executed(a sub, ta sub)) while the normative fluent in 4.16 holds, with 4.19 we know
that Mt models the violation atom.
• r is of type rule in Line 31: violated prohibitions are terminated in violation state.
With 4.19 we know that Mt models violation atoms, and 4.20 implies that they are
terminated.
• r is of type rule in Line 32: this rule is applicable whenever a goal is satisfied in a state.
With 4.10 and 4.21 we can obtain this (Mt |= satisfied(g)).
• r is of type rule in Line 33: the head of this rule is empty. Because pi is a plan it has to
satisfy at least one goal so, this rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Lines 34: the head of this rule is empty. Because pi is a plan and a
plan cannot satisfy conflicting goals, this rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 35: the head of this rule is empty. Because pi is a plan and a plan
cannot cannot contain concurrent execution of actions, this rule is applied.
• r is of type rule in Line 36: this rule is applicable whenever an obligation norm is satisfied
in a state. With 4.12 and 4.22 we can obtain this (Mt |= complied(n)).
• r is of type rule in Line 37: similar reasoning as above, but withWith 4.17 and 4.3 for a
prohibition norm.
• r is of type rule in Lines 38: the head of this rule is empty. Because pi is a plan and a
plan cannot satisfy conflicting goals and norms, this rule is applied.
By showing that every rule is applied, we have shown that Mt is a model for ΠMtbase.
Now, we need to show that Mt is minimal, which means that there exist no other model of
ΠMtbase that is a subset of Mt.
Let M ⊂Mt be a model for ΠMtbase, then there must exist an atom s ∈ (Mt \M). If s is an
atom that is generated because it is a fact, it must belong to M too and if that is not the case,
then M cannot be a model. We now proceed with the rest of atoms that do not appear as facts:
• s = executed(a, k): Mt |= s implies that r : executed(a, k) : − action(a, d), state(k).,
r ∈ ΠMtbase. If M 6|= executed(a, k), then r was applicable but not applied, therefore, M
is not a model.
• s = holdsat(x, k): Mt |= s implies that one of the following four condition must have
occurred:
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– 4.2: if this is the case then s was true in sk−1 (not terminated is removed from the
body of this rule because of the Gelfond-Lifschitz). In this case the construction
of Mt guarantees Mt |= holdsat(x, k − 1). If M 6|= holdsat(a, k) then rule in
Lines 3–4 are applicable but not applied, so M cannot be a model.
– 4.8: if this is the case then we know that Mt |= executed(a, k). Earlier on we
showed that if Mt |= executed(a, k), then M |= executed(a, k) too. Thus, if
M 6|= holdsat(x, k + d(a)) for all x ∈ ps(a)+, then rule in Line 13 is applicable
but not applied, so M cannot be a model.
– 4.11: if this is the case then x = o(n, a sub, ta con + d(a con) + dl). Because Mt
is a model then Mt |= executed(a con, ta con). So M |= executed(a con, ta con)
too. Therefore, rule in Lines 17–18 is applicable and if M 6|= s then this rule is not
applied and M cannot be a model.
– 4.16: if this is the case then x = f(n, a sub, ta con + d(a con) + dl). Similar to
reasoning above but instead of rule in Lines 17–18, rule in Lines 24–25 is applica-
ble.
• s = pre(a, k): Mt |= s implies that ∀x ∈ pr(a)+, x ∈ sk and ∀x ∈ pr(a)−, x 6∈ sk. If
M is a model then according to the transformed version of rule 6 M |= pre(a, k) and if
that is not the case then M is not a model.
• s = inprog(a, k): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= executed(a, ta). Therefore, M |=
executed(a, ta). That means the rule in Lines 8–9 is applicable and if ∀ta ≤ k <
ta + d(a),M 6|= inprog(a, k) then this applicable rule is not applied and therefore M
cannot be a model.
• s = cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= holdsat(o(n, a, dl′), k) and
also Mt |= executed(a, k). Consequently, M |= holdsat(o(n, a, dl′), k) and M |=
executed(a, k). As a result, rule in Lines 19–20 is applicable and if M 6|= s, the rule is
not applied and M is not a model.
• s = vol(o(n, a, dl′), k): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= holdsat(o(n, a, dl′), k) and also
k = dl′. Because M is a model we know that M |= holdsat(o(n, a, dl′), k). As a result
rule in Line 22 is applicable and if M 6|= vol(o(n, a, dl′), k), the rule is not applied and
M is not a model.
• s = cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= holdsat(f(n, a, dl′), k) and also
k = dl′. Because M is a model we know that M |= holdsat(f(n, a, dl′), k) too. As a
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result rule in Lines 26–27 is applicable and if M 6|= cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k), the rule is not
applied and M is not a model.
• s = complied(n): Mt |= s because Mt |= cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k) or because Mt |=
cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k). If Mt |= cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k), M |= cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k) too,
therefore rule 36 is applicable and M |= complied(n) or it is not a model. If Mt |=
cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k), M |= cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k) too, therefore rule in Line 37 is appli-
cable and M |= complied(n) or it is not a model.
• s = vol(f(n, a, dl′), k): Mt |= s implies that Mt |= holdsat(f(n, a, dl′), k) and also
Mt |= executed(a, k). Consequently, we know that M |= holdsat(f(n, a, dl′), k)
and M |= executed(a, k). As a result rule in Lines 29–30 is applicable and if M 6|=
vol(f(n, a, dl′), k), the rule is not applied and M is not a model.
• s = terminated(x, k): Mt |= s implies that one of the following five situations:
– 4.9: if this is the case then Mt |= executed(a, k − d(a) + 1). If M is a model
M |= executed(a, k − d(a) + 1). Thus, the rule in Lines 14–15 is applicable and
if M 6|= terminated(s, k) then the rule is applicable but not applied, which means
that M is not a model.
– 4.13 and 4.15: if this is the case x = o(n, a, dl′) ∈ sk, andMt |= cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k)
orMt |= vol(o(n, a, dl′), k). SinceM is a model, then ifMt |= cmp(o(n, a, dl′), k)
the same applies to M and if Mt |= vol(o(n, a, dl′), k) again the same applies to
M . In either cases according to rules 21 and 23 M |= terminated(o(n, a, dl′), k)
or M is not a model.
– 4.18 and 4.20: if this is the case x = f(n, a, dl′) ∈ sk, andMt |= cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k)
or Mt |= vol(f(n, a, dl′), k). Since M is a model, if Mt |= cmp(f(n, a, dl′), k)
the same applies to M and if Mt |= vol(f(n, a, dl′), k) again the same applies to
M . In either cases according to rules 28 and31 M |= terminated(f(n, a, dl′), k)
or M is not a model.
• s = satisfied(g, k): Mt |= s implies that ∀x ∈ g+, x ∈ sk and ∀x ∈ g−, x 6∈ sk. If M
is a model then according to the transformed version of rule 16 M |= satisfied(g, k)
and if that is not the case then M is not a model.
• s = satisfied(g): Mt |= s becauseMt |= satisfied(g, k). SinceMt |= satisfied(g, k),
according to previous itemM |= satisfied(g, k) too, therefore rule 32 is applicable and
M |= satisfied(g) or it is not a model.
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The combination of these items demonstrates that M cannot be a model for ΠMtbase if it differs
from Mt. Mt is therefore a minimal model for ΠMtbase and an answer set for Πbase.
4.3.1 Optimal Plans
Planning is a search problem that tries to find a sequence of actions that satisfy certain proper-
ties. The bigger the state space of the search, the more difficult it becomes to find a solution for
such a search problem. Therefore, over the time different techniques such as defining heuristic
functions, and decomposing the search space are introduced to mitigate the computational cost
of such a search and seek optimal plans. Optimal solutions for a planning problem can be
defined differently for example with respect to the cost of the plan, timespan of the plan or the
number of actions involved in the plan. They can also be defined to capture certain features
of the problem modelled. For instance, some planning problems require repetition of the same
actions (e.g. bomb clearing scenario), while in others the actions are unique and are not to be
repeated. Thanks to ASP’s built-in optimisation functions, the capability of ASP to plan with
the possibility of guaranteed optimality with respect to some criteria is widely exploited [Aker
et al., 2013; Eiter et al., 2011; Erdem et al., 2013; Lifschitz, 2002]. So far the implementa-
tion proposed in this chapter provides the agent with all possible sequences of actions that are
identified as a plan. What we are trying to do in this section is to define some restrictions that
filters out some plans and hence leaves fewer plans for the agent to reason about.
Similar to Erdem et al. [2013], we define optimised plans as plans in which the agent does
not repeat any action and it is not idle at any point in time. Both these criteria are merely
based on the problems we are interested in modelling. For the first criterion, we simply use a
constraint that is encoded in Lines 39–40 in figure 4-18. For the latter criterion, our strategy
is first to identify the final state in each plan and then express that, before reaching the final
state, there has to be at least one action in progress in every single state. But how to recognise
the final state of a plan? Classical planning problems deal with a single goal. The final state
in a solution corresponding to a classical planning problem is the state in which the goal is
satisfied. However, in the planning problem introduced in this research, the agent needs to
plan for a set of potentially inconsistent goals. Therefore, each solution may satisfy more than
one goal. The final state of a solution satisfying more than one goal, is the state that holds at
the latest time in which a goal is satisfied. To identify the final state, we first mark the state
in which a goal is satisfied for the first time by a flag (Lines 41) using aggregate min. This
aggregate is an operation on a set of weighted literals that evaluates to some value that is the
minimum with respect to the rest of weights in the set: #min[L1 = w1, · · · , Ln = wn].
We assign S to the weight of literal satisfied(g,S): [satisfied(g,S)=S], and use
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39 :- executed(A,S1), executed(A,S2), action(A,D),
40 S1!=S2, state(S1;S2).
∀g ∈ G
41 flag(M) :- M = #min[satisfied(g,S)=S], satisfied(g).
42 final(F) :- F = #max[flag(S) = S].
43 alpha(S) :- inprog(A,S), action(A,L), state(S).
44 :- final(S2), not alpha(S1), state(S1;S2), S1<S2.
45 :- final(S1), alpha(S2), state(S1;S2), S2>=S1.
Figure 4-18: Optimisation rules
#min[satisfied(g,S))=S] to find the minimum weight for this literal, which in fact
is the first state in which the goal is satisfied. Note that the extra atom satisfied(g) is
to ensure that the state in which a goal is satisfied for the first time is sought after, only if
the goal is satisfied at least once. Then, in Line 42 we identify the state when the last flag is
observed by using aggregate max. This aggregate, similar to min, is an operation on a set
of weighted literals, however, it evaluates to some value that is the maximum with respect to
the rest of wights in the set: #max[L1 = w1, · · · , Ln = wn]. We assign S to the weight
of literal flag(S): [flag(S)=S], and use #max[flag(S)=S] to find the maximum
weight for this literal, which in fact is the latest state in which a flag holds. This state is the
final state final(S). We do not want the agent to be idle at any point of time. We therefore
need to exclude the possibility of the existence of states in which there is no action in progress.
alpha(S) in line 43 marks those states in which an action is in progress. Line 44 makes
use of alpha(S) to prevent the agent from being idle before reaching the final state. Finally,
Line 45 ensures that no action is in progress after the final state is reached in a plan.
Now, assume that program Π = Πbase ∪ Π∗, where Π∗ consists of lines 39–45. The
following theorem states the correspondence between the optimised solutions for problem P
and answer sets of program Π.
Theorem 4.3. Given a planning problem P = (FL, I,A,G,N), for each answer setAns of Π
the set of atoms of the form executed(ai, tai) in S encodes an optimal solution to the planning
problem P . Conversely, each solution to the problem P corresponds to a single answer set of
Π.
Proof. Follows immediately from the structure of program Π∗.
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we set out an implementation of the model described in the previous chap-
ter. The computational tool is ASP. We first explained why ASP is an appropriate tool for
our purpose, and then explained the syntax and semantics of ASP language, AnsProlog. The
implementation itself is composed of the encoding for the different components of the model,
the criteria that identify a sequence of actions as a plan, and the constraints on plans to ensure
optimal plans.
The proposal of actions and planning problem in the previous chapter is based on STRIPS
[Fikes and Nilsson, 1971]. Thus, this chapter effectively proposes an implementation of
STRIPS as an action language in ASP, including the extensions made to STRIPS, namely
multiple goals, durative actions and norms. These extensions were made to capture the fea-
tures of normative practical reasoning problem modelled. Also the formulation of extensions
was done with respect to the computational tool, thus there are no conceptual gaps between the
formal model and its implementation to bridge. The most important distinction of this transla-
tion to the other translation of actions languages in ASP such as [Lee and Palla, 2012, 2014] is
the fact that following the formal model, the translation accommodates multiple goals, norms
and reasoning about the norms. Although implementing agents that are capable of reasoning
about norms was previously considered in ASP [Panagiotidi et al., 2012a,b], to the best of our
knowledge, our implementation is the first one that takes the duration of actions into account
when reasoning about norm compliance and violation.
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Chapter 5
Identifying the Best Plan
In Chapters 3 and 4 we provided a formal model and its implementation for an agent that is ca-
pable of planning for multiple goals and norms. However, the conflict between these goals and
norms often makes it impossible for the agent to satisfy all its goals in a plan while complying
with all the norms triggered in that plan. The agent therefore needs to reason about all these
conflicts and where available the preferences between the conflicting entities, in order to decide
on the best plan to execute. Given the complications of decision-making in such an environ-
ment it is very difficult for humans to understand such frameworks and their outcomes. Ideally,
what the agent requires is a mechanism that allows decision-making with respect to existing
inconsistencies in its attitude, while making the decision is understandable and explainable to
others.
Reasoning about inconsistency and decision-making have both been studied in AI at length,
however they have often been treated separately. Argumentation as a discipline deals distinctly
with issues of handling inconsistency [Amgoud and Vesic, 2010; Dung, 1995; Prakken and
Sartor, 1997] and decision-making [Amgoud and Prade, 2004b; Bonet and Geffner, 1996].
However, more recently, it has been argued [Amgoud, 2012; Amgoud and Prade, 2009] that
inference about consistency is a part of decision-making. This line of reasoning results in the
development of argumentation-based approaches that capture the issues of inconsistency and
decision-making in the same framework [Amgoud, 2012; Amgoud and Prade, 2009], such that
the decisions made are justified with respect to the inconsistencies. In addition, the dialogical
aspect of argumentation makes it possible to explain the justifiability of a decision.
In the same manner, we propose an argumentation framework based on argumentation
schemes and critical questions that enables the agent to argue over plan proposals with respect
to (i) the conflicts between and within goals and norms; and (ii) the preferences between these

















Figure 5-1: The Process of Identifying the Best Plan
agent to question the justifiability of the plan proposal by investigating why a certain goal
is not satisfied in the proposed plan, or why a certain norm is violated. The evaluation of
argumentation frameworks for the plan proposals results in identifying justified plans. The
justified plans are further refined in a search for the best plan, by comparing the quality (i.e.
preferences) and quantity (i.e. numbers) of goals satisfied and norms violated in these plans.
In comparison of two plans, we refer to the plan that satisfies more important goals or more
number of goals as goal-dominant. Conversely, a plan that violates more important norms
or more number of norms is referred to as norm-dominant. Figure 5-1 displays a graphical
representation of the process of identifying the best plan.
This chapter is organised as follows. In Section 5.1 we discuss the construction of an
argumentation framework for each plan proposal. The evaluation of this framework toward
identifying justified plans is discussed in Section 5.1.2, followed by investigating the properties
of justified plans in Section 5.1.3. Section 5.2 focuses on identifying the best plan, followed by
an illustrative example in Section 5.3. A discussion and summary of the chapter is provided in
Sections 5.4 and 5.5.
5.1 Justified Plans
In this section, we show how to construct an argumentation framework that allows checking the
justifiability of plans with respect to conflicts and preferences, as a step toward identifying the
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best plan(s). What arguments are justified in an argumentation framework is a subjective matter
and can be defined differently depending on the argumentation semantics used for evaluating
the arguments. We use the preferred semantics to determine the justifiability of plans. The
rationale behind this choice is discussed in detail in Section 5.1.2, where plans are defined
as justified only if they sacrifice the satisfaction of a goal or a norm for an equally or more
important goal or norm. The plan is otherwise unjustified.
5.1.1 Argumentation Framework
In chapter 2 (page 35) we provided a survey of argumentation frameworks originating from
Dung’s argumentation framework [Dung, 1995]. With all their differences, they are similar
in defining an argumentation framework as a set of arguments and a set of attacks between
them [Dung, 1995]: AF = 〈Arg , Att〉, Att ⊆ Arg × Arg . In this section we discuss the
choice of an argumentation framework that is appropriate to model the arguments and attacks
built to evaluate plan proposals. Another factor we want to consider in such an argumenta-
tion framework is the preferences between these arguments. Preferences are introduced and
frequently used in non-monotonic logics to model human modes of reasoning where explicit
expression of preferences is an inevitable part of the process. Since argumentation seeks to be
another non-monotonic formalism, to have equivalent representational power, preferences must
be considered [Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002; Modgil and Prakken, 2013]. Traditionally, prefer-
ences between arguments are used to distinguish an attack from a defeat that is known to be a
successful attack. The attack from an argument to another one is identified as a defeat if the lat-
ter argument is not preferred over the former. In terms of an argumentation graph, the existing
literature [Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002; Bench-Capon, 2003; Modgil, 2009; Simari and Loui,
1992] uses this notion to remove unsuccessful attacks from the graph and apply argumentation
semantics to the reduced graph. However not all types of attacks are preference-dependent.
The most debated issue in defining preferences between arguments is the distinction be-
tween preference-dependent and preference-independent attacks [Caminada et al., 2014a; Mod-
gil and Prakken, 2013; Prakken, 2012]. Establishing the preference-dependence or indepen-
dence of attacks requires the explicit representation of the structure of arguments and the na-
ture of attacks between them [Prakken, 2012]. Following [Caminada et al., 2014a; Modgil and
Prakken, 2013; Prakken, 2012], we state which types of attacks (i.e. rebuttal, undercut and
undermine) require preferences to succeed as defeats.
• Rebuttal: Rebuttal attacks arise from conflicting reasons for and against a conclusion.
Therefore, there is no debate that rebuttals are preference-dependent and resolving such
attacks needs preferences.
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• Undercut: There is consensus on preference-independence of undercuts. A very famous
example of undercut attack is Pollock’s classic example of an object under the red light
[Pollock, 1987]: If an object looks red then it is red. But what if the object is illuminated
by red light? Can one still come to the conclusion that the object that looks red is indeed
red? Not anymore, since all objects, regardless of their colour, look red under the red
light. In this case a red light is shining undercuts if an object looks red then it is red,
as it stops the inference that takes us from an object looks red to the conclusion that the
object is red. The undercut attack here essentially expresses that it is preferred not to
draw the inference (e.g. not to come to the conclusion that the object is red) to draw the
inference (e.g. to decide that the object is red). This type of preference clearly cannot
be captured by defining preferences over arguments [Modgil and Prakken, 2013]. Thus,
undercuts are preference-independent.
• Undermine: As for undermine attacks that are attacks to the premise(s) of an argument,
preferences are needed with the exception of a premise that makes some assumption in
the absence of evidence (e.g. negation as failure in logic programming). Using nega-
tion as failure as a premise in an argument (e.g. not α) makes the argument prone to
preference-independent attack from a second arguments that has α as a conclusion, since
the former argument relies on α not being provable.
An abstract argumentation framework that explicitly takes argument preferences into ac-
count is the Preference-based Argumentation Framework (PAF) that was previously introduced
in Chapter 2 (page 35)1. Another framework that is capable of representing preferences is Ex-
tended Argumentation Framework (EAF) (See Chapter 2, page 36). However, expressing pref-
erences in EAFs requires the preference information to be captured as separate arguments. The
preference arguments, when available, determine if an attack is valid by attacking the attack
from a less preferred entity to a more preferred one.
In this research we use PAF that allows an explicit representation of preferences. However,
there is evidence [Amgoud and Vesic, 2014; Caminada et al., 2014a; Modgil and Prakken,
2013; Prakken, 2012] that PAFs are prone to inconsistency in two situations. We first explain
what the situations and resulting inconsistencies are and then explain why these inconsistencies
do not occur in our case. The two situations are as follows:
1. When preferences are defined at an abstract level without considering the internal struc-
ture of the arguments. The reason for this is that distinguishing between preference-
dependent and preference-independent attacks without making the structure of argu-
1 Value-based Argumentation Framework (VAF) [Bench-Capon, 2002] uses preferences over values instead of
arguments (see Chapter 2, Page 35 for more detail).
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ments explicit is not possible. For instance, assume that argument a attacks argument
b, however it is expressed that argument b is preferred to argument a. At an abstract
level, the expressed preference prevents this attack from being identified as a defeat.
Now let us see what happens if the the internal structure of arguments were apparent and
we knew that a undercuts b. In this case the preference information is irrelevant, since
undercuts are not preference-dependent at all. But if we knew a rebuts b, the expressed
preference would stop this attack from being identified as defeat. Thus, it is only by the
explicit representation of internal structure of arguments that possible inconsistencies
can be prevented.
2. When the attack between arguments is not symmetric and preferences are applied, the
conflict between arguments may be lost [Modgil and Prakken, 2011], which results in
conflicting extensions and violating rationality postulates proposed in [Caminada and
Amgoud, 2007]. For instance, assume argument a attacks argument b, however b is
preferred to a. In such a case this attack maybe removed and hence the possibility of a
and b appearing in the same extension. That said, it is perfectly safe to use preferences in
symmetric attacks [Amgoud and Vesic, 2014], since even if one attack is removed from
the argumentation graph, there is still one left that ensures capturing the conflict between
the two arguments and preventing them from appearing in the same extension.
Regarding the first situation, in the next two sections we make the internal structure of
the arguments and the types of attacks (i.e. preference-dependent and preference-independent)
between arguments explicit, thus we are not running the risk of encountering inconsistency. As
for the second situation, we only define preferences over arguments that symmetrically attack
each other. Thus, the use of preferences may reduce a symmetric attack to an asymmetric one,
but it cannot lead to complete loss of conflict in any case. Therefore, the second condition
cannot be a source of inconsistency in our framework either.
Having established the appropriateness of PAF to argue over plan proposals, we now first
give a formal account of PAF, followed by its instantiation with arguments, attacks and prefer-
ences required for evaluation of the plan proposals.
Definition 23 (Preference-Based Argumentation Framework (PAF) [Amgoud and Cayrol, 2002;
Amgoud and Vesic, 2009, 2014]). A PAF is a tuple of form 〈Arg , Att,〉. Arg is a set of ar-
guments, Att and  are attack relations and preference relations between arguments, respec-
tively. A preference relation is a preorder2 on Arg . The preference relation between arguments
Argα, Argβ ∈ Arg is therefore denoted as (Argα, Argβ) ∈. Symbol  denotes the strict3
2A binary relation is a preorder iff it is reflexive and transitive.
3Strict relation is irreflexive and transitive.
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relation corresponding to : (Argα, Argβ) ∈  iff (Argα, Argβ) ∈  and (Argβ, Argα) 6∈
. Finally, (Argα, Argβ) ∈ ∼ iff (Argα, Argβ) ∈  and (Argβ, Argα) ∈ .
As discussed earlier, preference information plays a key role in distinguishing attacks from
defeats, where the latter is a successful attack. According to Dung [1995] the existence of an
attack equals a defeat because all arguments have the same strength and no preferences are
defined. Dung therefore maintains that if a attacks b, b is defeated by a. However, in the
presence of preferences, an attack is successful if and only if the preference degree or strength
of the attacked argument is not greater than the attacker’s. An argument a can therefore always
attack argument b but it will defeat b if and only if b is not preferred over a [Amgoud and
Cayrol, 2002; Delgrande et al., 2004].
Definition 24 (Defeat Relation). The defeat relation between two arguments Def ⊆ Arg ×
Arg , in a PAF = 〈Arg , Att,〉 is defined as: ∀a, b ∈ Arg , (a, b) ∈ Def iff (a, b) ∈
Att and (b, a) 6∈.
To examine what arguments are justified in an argumentation framework various argu-
mentation semantics have been formulated including the complete, grounded, preferred, and
stable [Dung, 1995] (See Chapter 2,page 34). These semantics are formulated to exam-
ine the justifiability and acceptability of arguments in Dung-style argumentation frameworks
[Dung, 1995]. When the preference-based argumentation framework does not suffer from the
problems pointed out in page 103 (i.e. when preferences are not applied to asymmetric or
preference-independent attacks), mapping a PAF to a Dung’s style argumentation framework
makes all these semantics available to the former. The following definition proposes such a
mapping.
Definition 25 (Mapping of PAF to DAF [Modgil and Bench-Capon, 2011]). A PAF = 〈Arg ,
Att,〉 defined in Definition 23 can be mapped to anDAF = 〈Arg ,Def 〉 using Definition 24.
For s ∈ {admissible, complete, preferred, stable, grounded}, E is an s extension of PAF =
〈Arg , Att,〉 iff E is an s extension of the Dung framework DAF = 〈Arg , Def〉.
In order to construct a preference-based argumentation framework that enables the agent to
reason about a plan proposal, we need to define the arguments and the way they interact, and
the preferences between them. In Chapter 2 (page 36) we surveyed two methods of presenting
the internal structure of arguments in an argumentation framework, namely logic-based and
scheme-based structures. We also explained that scheme-based argumentation is especially
common in computational systems, when arguments need to be structured and formulated
diversely to capture the domain-dependent features of the problem that they are modelling
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[Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007b; Toniolo, 2013; Walton, 1996]. In particular, argumenta-
tion schemes have been very popular in practical reasoning since they easily lend themselves to
the defeasible nature of reasoning about actions [Atkinson, 2005; Gasque, 2013; Oren, 2013;
Toniolo et al., 2012]. Therefore, in this thesis we use argumentation schemes to present the
internal structure of arguments. Each scheme consists of a set of premises, a set of conclusions
and a set of critical questions associated with it. Critical questions enable challenging an ar-
gument built by instantiating the scheme and they can be used for several purposes [Gasque,
2013] including (i) creating or strengthening an argument proposal; (ii) creating arguments and
attacks; (iii) challenging an argument put forward by a party; or (iv) rejecting an argument put
forward by a party.
We now explain how we are using argumentation schemes and critical questions to reason
about a plan proposal. Having all the plans available, the agent reasons about plans by assuming
what happens if, for instance, plan pi is put forward for investigation. There might be goals that
this plan does not satisfy or norms that it violates. Reasoning about plans requires the agent
to engage in an internal dialogue and ask itself the following questions: are the goals that are
satisfied more important than the goals not satisfied or more important than the norms violated?
What about norms that are violated? Are they violated because satisfying a more important
goal or complying with a more important norm requires violating the former norm? Such a
dialogue thus involves exchanging arguments for plans, goals and norms that are constructed
by instantiating three argumentation schemes:
Plan Argument Argpi: The plan arguments are constructed based on Oren’s scheme for a
sequence of actions (See AS1 in Figure 2-14, page 50). We construct arguments for any
sequence of actions that is identified as a plan.
Goal Argument Argg: The scheme based on which the goal arguments are constructed is the
Established rules scheme, which was explained in Chapter 2 (page 39). This scheme
demands that each of the agent’s goals that are feasible should be satisfied in the plan
put forward. However, the agent itself may argue against satisfying a goal in a plan if the
goal is in conflict with another goal and thus hinders it. Similarly, the agent can argue
against satisfying a goal in a plan if the goal achievement hinders complying with a more
important norm.
Norm Argument Argn: Like goal arguments, norm arguments are built based on the Estab-
lished rules scheme. Norms are external regulation that are imposed on the agent as
the consequences of executing certain actions. Thus, the norms imposed on the agent,
depending on the actions executed in a plan, differ from one plan to another. This ar-
gument scheme requires the agent to comply with the norms imposed on the agent in a
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given plan. However, the agent may argue that complying with a certain norm prevents
the agent from adhering to a more important norm or satisfying a more important goal
in a plan.
To allow questioning arguments that are built based on the schemes, we introduce a set of
critical questions for each scheme. These critical questions provide ways to create attacks that
challenge and/or reject an argument put forward previously. Figure 5-2 illustrates the inter-
actions between arguments, where nodes represent arguments built based on the schemes and
arrows represent the attack relations between arguments defined through the critical questions:
CQ1: Is there any attack from a goal argument to the plan presented by Argpi?
CQ2: Is there any attack from a norm argument to the plan presented by Argpi?
CQ3: What goal arguments might attack the goal presented by Argg?
CQ4: What norm arguments might attack the goal presented byArgg? or What goal arguments
might attack the norm presented by Argn?
CQ5: What norm arguments might attack the norm presented by Argn?
The purpose of CQ1 and CQ2 is to provide ways to challenge a plan argument, CQ3 to chal-
lenge a goal argument, CQ4 to challenge a goal or norm argument, and CQ5 to challenge a
norm argument. The three argument schemes and their associated critical questions will be
formally defined in the next two sections.
Argument Schemes and Argument Construction
In the previous section we mentioned three argument schemes in order to construct a set of
arguments for normative practical reasoning: plan arguments, goal arguments and norm argu-
ments. This section gives the formal account of each scheme.
Plan Arguments This argument scheme results in constructing an argument for each plan
obtained from the implementation of our formal model. The scheme for plans is inspired by
Oren’s scheme [Oren, 2013] for a sequence of actions (AS1 in Figure 2-14, page 50) – “AS1:
In situation S, the sequence of joint actions A1, · · · , An should be executed.” – and Atkinson’s
scheme for plans in BDI agents [Atkinson, 2005, p. 95] – “Given the current situation R, there
is a plan A which if performed will bring about S, realising G which promotes V ”.
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Definition 26 (Plan Argument Argpi). A plan argument is used to claim that the agent should
execute the proposed sequence because the sequence of actions leads to satisfying a set of goals
Gpi, and complying with a set of norms Ncmp(pi), although it violates some norms Nvol(pi).
- In the initial state ∆
- The agent should execute sequence of actions pi = 〈(a0, 0), · · · , (an, tan)〉
- which satisfies a set of goals Gpi, complies with a set of norms Ncmp(pi) and
violates a set of norms Nvol(pi)
Equation 5.1 shows a formalisation of this scheme based on our formal model:
ArgΠ = {Argpi s.t. pi ∈ Π} (5.1)
Goal Arguments This argument scheme results in constructing an argument for each goal
that is feasible. A goal argument is used to explore why a goal is not satisfied in a plan, or
to address the conflict between two goals or a goal and a norm. In Chapter 2 (page 24) we
informally defined what it means for a goal to be feasible, namely being satisfied in at least
one plan. We also discussed that if there is no plan to satisfy a goal, a rational agent should
not adopt that goal or try to justify its adoption since it is not feasible to begin with. Goal
arguments are therefore only constructed for feasible goals. We first recall from Chapter 2
(page 39) Walton’s Established rules scheme [Walton et al., 2008] on which the argument









Figure 5-2: Interaction between Arguments
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- If A is the case, then an evaluation E is justified/ conduct C is required.
- A is the case.
- Therefore, evaluation E is justified/ conduct C is required.
In order to formulate this argument scheme, we first provide a formal account of goal
feasibility.
Definition 27 (Goal Feasibility). A goal is feasible if it is satisfied in at least one plan:
Gfsb = {g ∈ G s.t. ∃pi ∈ Π, pi |= g}
Definition 28 (Goal Argument Argg). A goal argument claims that a feasible goal should be
satisfied:
- Goal g is a feasible goal of the agent
- Therefore, satisfying g is required
Equation 5.2 shows a formalisation of this scheme based on Definition 27.
ArgG = {Argg s.t. g ∈ Gfsb} (5.2)
Norm Arguments This argument scheme results in constructing an argument for each norm
that is activated in the plan proposal. A norm argument is used to explore why a norm is
violated in a plan. It is also used to address the conflict between two norms or a goal and a
norm. Similar to goal arguments, norm arguments are based on the Established rules scheme.
Before formulating this scheme, we repeat that depending on the actions executed in a plan, a
norm is not necessarily activated in all plans. The set of activated norms in plan pi were denoted
as Npi in Chapter 3 (page 65).
Definition 29 (Norm ArgumentArgn). A norm argument claims that an activated norm should
be complied with:
- Norm n is an activated norm imposed on the agent in plan pi
- Therefore, complying with n is required in pi
Equation 5.3 shows a formalisation of this scheme based on Definition 14.
ArgNpi = {Argn s.t. n ∈ Npi} (5.3)
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Critical Questions and Interactions between Arguments
In this section we demonstrate how arguments built using schemes in the previous section
attack each other using critical questions mentioned earlier (page 107). We also mention the
types of attacks caused by each critical question.
Critical Questions Associated with Argument Scheme for Plans
CQ1: Is there any attack from a goal argument to the plan presented by Argpi?
This CQ results in an undercut attack from a goal argument to a plan argument, when
the goal is not satisfied in the plan. Undercut attacks caused by CQ1 are by definition
asymmetric and are formulated as:
∀Argg ∈ ArgG, Argpi ∈ ArgΠ if g 6∈ Gpi then (Argg, Argpi) ∈ Att (5.4)
CQ2: Is there any attack from a norm argument to the plan presented by Argpi?
This CQ results in an undercut attack from a norm argument to a plan argument, when
the norm is violated in the plan. This asymmetric attack is formulated as:
∀Argn ∈ ArgNpi , Argpi ∈ ArgΠ if n ∈ Nvol(pi) then (Argn, Argpi) ∈ Att (5.5)
Critical Questions Associated with Argument Scheme for Goals
CQ3: What goal arguments might attack the goal presented by Argg?
This CQ results in a rebut attack between arguments for conflicting goals. Two goals
are in conflict if satisfying one requires bringing about a state of affairs that is in conflict
with the state of affairs required for satisfying the other (see Chapter 3, page 67). Attacks
caused by CQ3 are by definition symmetric and irreflexive. This can be formulated as:
∀Argg, Argg′ ∈ ArgG if (g, g′) ∈ cf goal then (Argg, Argg′) ∈ Att (5.6)
CQ4: What norm arguments might attack the goal presented by Argg?
The conflict between a norm and a goal was defined in Chapter 3 (page 69) as follows:
an obligation norm and a goal are in conflict, if executing the action that is the subject
of the obligation brings about postconditions that are in conflict with the requirements
of the goal; and a prohibition norm and a goal are in conflict, if the postconditions of the
action that is the subject of prohibition contribute to satisfying the goal, but the action
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execution is prohibited by the norm. Rebut attacks caused by CQ4 are by definition
symmetric and are formulated below.
∀Argg ∈ ArgG, Argn ∈ ArgNpi if (g, n) ∈ cf goalnorm then (Argg, Argn) ∈ Att
(5.7)
Critical Questions Associated with Argument Scheme for Norms
CQ4: Whatgoalarguments might attack the norm presented by Argn?
The previous critical question, is associated with argument schemes for norms as well as
goals, hence the repetition of the number of critical question. As addressed in the previ-
ous critical question, the conflict between a norm and a goal is symmetric. Therefore, if
a goal and a norm are in conflict, the goal argument attacks the norm argument and the
other way around.
∀Argg ∈ ArgG, Argn ∈ ArgNpi if (n, g) ∈ cf goalnorm then (Argn, Argg) ∈ Att
(5.8)
CQ5: What norm arguments might attack the norm presented by Argn?
Conflict between two norms was defined as a contextual conflict that depends upon the
context of the plan in which the norms are activated (See Chapter 3, page 70). Two obli-
gations are in conflict in the context of a plan if the obliged actions have a concurrency
conflict, yet they are required to be executed concurrently. Moreover, an obligation and
a prohibition are in conflict if the prohibition forbids the agent to execute the action that
is the subject of the obligation. Similar to CQ3 and CQ4, rebut attacks caused by CQ5
are symmetric and irreflexive:
∀Argn, Argn′ ∈ ArgNpi if (n, n′) ∈ cf pinorm then (Argn, Argn′) ∈ Att (5.9)
Preference Relation between Arguments
In the previous section we defined five critical questions that address the attack between argu-
ments. We also defined the types of attacks caused by each critical question. Table 5.1 shows
the need for preferences for resolving attacks caused by each critical question. As it is evident,
attacks due to CQ3, CQ4 and CQ5 are rebuttals and therefore need preferences to resolve. In
contrast, attacks caused by CQ1 and CQ2 do not need preferences.
In Chapter 2 (page 24) we made a comparison between quantitative and qualitative repre-
sentation of preference information. We, in particular, referred to reasons enumerated by Doyle
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Critical Question Entities Involved Type of Attack Preference-dependence
CQ1 goal-plan undercut preference-independent
CQ2 norm-plan undercut preference-independent
CQ3 goal-goal rebut preference-dependent
CQ4 goal-norm/norm-goal rebut preference-dependent
CQ5 norm-norm rebut preference-dependent
Table 5.1: Preferences between Arguments
and Thomason [1999]; Fox and Parsons [1998] and Prakken [2006a] to justify why we choose
a qualitative preference ordering to express agent preferences. The impracticality of gener-
ating a set of probabilities and utilities required by quantitative methods and their adequacy
in capturing realistic cases (e.g. generic preferences that are common human expressions),
were among the most important of these justifications. We now describe how the agent prefer-
ences can be formulated and consequently translated to preferences between arguments. Note
that goal-based agents that constantly prefer their goals to norms and norm-based agents that
always prefer their norms to their goals can both be modelled using this definition.
Definition 30 (Preference between Goals and Norms). We define gn as a partial preorder on
G ∪N . The preference relation between α, β ∈ G ∪N is therefore denoted as (α, β) ∈ gn
and reads as satisfying goal α (or complying with norm α) is at least as preferred as satisfying
goal β (or complying with norm β). Symbol gn denotes the strict relation corresponding to
gn: (α, β) ∈ gn iff (α, β) ∈ gn and (β, α) 6∈ gn. (α, β) ∈ ∼gn iff (α, β) ∈ gn and
(β, α) ∈ gn.
Definition 31 summarises the mapping from agent preferences to argument preferences as
the following. Note that since each argument represents a single goal or norm, the mapping,
cannot lead to inconsistencies in the preference ordering for a single argument. In structured
formalisms that arguments are a chain of sub-arguments, additional consideration is required
to ensure the rationality of preferences in a single argument [Brewka and Eiter, 2000].
Definition 31 (Preference Relation between Arguments). The preference relation between ar-
guments is denoted as : (Argα, Argβ) ∈  iff (α, β) ∈ gn; (Argα, Argβ) ∈  iff
(α, β) ∈ gn; (Argα, Argβ) ∈ ∼ iff (α, β) ∈ ∼gn; (Argα, Argβ) ∈  reads as argu-
ment Argα is at least as strong as argument Argβ , while (Argα, Argβ) ∈  reads as Argα is
stronger than argument Argβ .
Having defined the three elements of a PAF for plan proposals (arguments, attacks and
preferences), an instantiated version of the PAF in Definition 23 for a plan proposal is given in
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Definition 32. An argumentation framework for a plan proposal consists of the plan argument
itself, goal arguments, and norm arguments that are activated in this plan. The set of attacks
between arguments is expressed through critical question CQ1–CQ5 and the preference rela-
tion is defined as in Definition 31, where the preferences are used to map attacks to defeats
when possible.
Definition 32 (Plan Proposal Argumentation Framework). A DAFpi = 〈Arg ,Def 〉, where
Arg = Argpi ∪ ArgG ∪ ArgNpi and Att = AttCQ1−5. The defeat relation Def is defined as:
∀Argα,Argβ ∈ Arg , (Argα,Argβ) ∈ Def iff (Argα, Argβ) ∈ Att and (Argβ,Argα) 6∈.
In this section, we built an argumentation framework for a plan proposal with the aim of
checking the justifiability of the plan proposal. In the next section we discuss how (i.e. based
on which semantics) to check the justifiability of plan proposals.
5.1.2 Evaluation of the Argumentation Framework
In Chapter 2 (page 34) we talked about argumentation semantics as means to evaluate argu-
mentation frameworks. In deciding what semantics (i.e. what type of evaluation) one should
use, the purpose of the evaluation plays a key role. Although various semantics have been
introduced since the proposal of Dung’s argumentation framework [Dung, 1995], they have
mainly been defined in terms of mathematical formulation. However, it is argued [Caminada,
2010; Caminada et al., 2014b; Prakken, 2006a] that in order to make these semantics more
accessible, in addition to mathematical formulation, the link between semantics and the type
of reasoning they are associated with should have greater emphasis. In Chapter 2 (page 20)
we distinguished between reasoning about beliefs, namely epistemic reasoning, and reason-
ing about actions, namely practical reasoning. The question we are trying to debate in this
section is Having formed an argumentation framework about practical attitudes of the agent
(i.e. plans, goals, and norms) what semantics should be used for the evaluation of this frame-
work, such that the agent is sure to make justified decisions? To make it more general What
semantic(s) is suitable for practical reasoning?
The most crucial point in answering this question is how conflicts are to be handled. Ar-
guments are defeasible rules and potential conflicts between defeasible conclusions can be
handled differently. The most prominent types of inference to deal with conflicts are credulous
and sceptical reasoning. The former treats arguments in such a conflict as alternatives, yielding
to multiple defeasible conclusions, whereas, the latter discards both of the conclusions because
of their unresolvable conflict. Going back to the question of what semantic is suitable for prac-
tical reasoning, it is necessary to pinpoint whether reasoning about and toward actions has to
be credulous or sceptical.
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With the exception of [Amgoud, 2012], the rest of the works [Broersen et al., 2002; Oren,
2013; Prakken, 2006a; Thomason, 2000] in the field of argumentation-based practical rea-
soning and decision-making are unanimous that reasoning about and toward actions has to be
credulous. An agent can have an inconsistent set of actions, goals or desires [Prakken, 2006a;
Searle, 2001]. If the conflict between goals for example is unresolvable then what we want
is to have choices between them rather than rejecting both of them. The philosophical and
pragmatic foundation of credulous inference for practical reasoning were briefly mentioned
in Chapter 2 (page 46) and are discussed in detail by Caminada [2006] and Prakken [2006a].
The main argument for this claim is that credulous inference preserve choices and produces
multiple alternatives in the case of unresolvable conflict between arguments, whereas sceptical
inference rejects both arguments in an unresolvable conflict. Caminada [2006] explains this
argument in terms of argument labellings. In order to provide a more precise version of his
argument we first define Caminada’s Complete labellings.
Definition 33 (Complete Labellings [Caminada, 2006]). Let 〈Arg,Def 〉 be an argumentation
framework, an AF-labelling is a total function L : Arg → {in, out, undec}. in(L) is defined
as {a ∈ Arg s.t. L(a) = in}, out(L) as {a ∈ Arg s.t. L(a) = out}, and undec(L) as {A ∈
Arg s.t. L(a) = undec}. A non-partial argument labelling is called a complete labelling,
Lcmp, iff for each argument a ∈ Arg it holds that a is labelled in iff each attacker of a is
labelled out and a is labelled out iff there exists an attacker of a that is labelled in.
Complete labellings can be seen as subjective but reasonable point of view that an agent
can take with respect to which arguments are in, out or undec. The set of all possible complete
labellings therefore stands for all possible justified positions that an agent can take. From a la-
belling perspective, an argument is justified under sceptical inference if it is in every reasonable
position and is justified under credulous inference if it is in at least one reasonable position.
Thus, what the agent needs when reasoning about its practical attitudes is to see whether they
are at least in one justified position out of all possible justified positions. Being in at least one
justified position coincides with being labelled in by at least one complete labelling, or being
credulously accepted under complete semantics [Caminada, 2006]. Also it is a known fact that
the credulous preferred semantics coincides with the credulous complete semantics [Caminada,
2006]. Consequently, Broersen et al. [2002]; Oren [2013]; Prakken [2006a]; Thomason [2000]
not only proposed credulous reasoning about and toward actions, but more precisely they pre-
scribe credulous preferred semantics for practical reasoning purposes. We therefore use the
intuition behind credulous preferred semantics to evaluate the argumentation framework built
for each plan proposal. The goal of this evaluation is to determine what plan arguments and
essentially what plans are justified with respect to the context of the plan and the preference
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information at hand. Definition 34 defines preferred semantics in terms of labellings, which
will be used in defining the justified plans (Definition 35).
Definition 34 (Preferred Labellings [Caminada, 2006]). A complete labelling is called a pre-
ferred labelling, Lpr, iff its set of in-labelled arguments is maximal (or equivalently, iff its set
of out-labelled arguments is maximal) with respect to set inclusion.
Definition 35 (Justified Plan). Plan pi is justified ifArgpi is labelled in by at least one preferred
labelling for DAFpi: ∃ Lpr s.t. Argpi ∈ in(Lpr).
Properties of justified plans are investigated in the next section.
5.1.3 Properties of Justified Plans
We know for a fact that every preferred labelling is a complete labelling. An argument is
labelled in by a complete labelling iff all its attackers are labelled out. Therefore, a plan
argument is labelled in by a preferred labelling iff all its attackers are labelled out by that
labelling. The attackers of a plan argument are the arguments for goals that it does not satisfy,
denoted as ArgG\Gpi = {Argg s.t. g ∈ G \Gpi}, and the arguments for norms that it violates,
denoted as ArgNvol(pi) = {Argn s.t. n ∈ Nvol(pi)}. These attacks are caused by CQ1 and CQ2
which are both preference-independent and therefore they will always succeed as a defeat. So
we have:
Property 5.1. Argpi ∈ in(Lpr)⇔ ArgG\Gpi ∪ArgNvol(pi) ⊆ out(Lpr)
The intuition behind the above property is that if a plan is justified, the goals that it does not
satisfy and norms that it violates cannot be justified. In contrast, in property 5.2 we show that
if a plan is justified, the goals and norms that it satisfies and complies with are also justified.
Property 5.2. Argpi ∈ in(Lpr)⇒ ArgGpi ∪ArgNcmp(pi) ⊆ in(Lpr)
Proof. Since Argpi ∈ in(Lpr), from Property 5.1 we know that ArgG\Gpi ∪ ArgNvol(pi) ⊆
out(Lpr). We also know from the definition of a plan that ArgGpi ∪ ArgNcmp(pi) is conflict
free. Since all possible attackers of ArgGpi ∪ArgNcmp(pi) belong to ArgG\Gpi ∪ArgNvol(pi) and
ArgG\Gpi∪ArgNvol(pi) are all labelled out, we conclude thatArgGpi∪ArgNcmp(pi) ⊆ in(Lpr).
Note that from ArgGpi ∪ ArgNcmp(pi) ⊆ in(Lpr) one cannot necessarily conclude that
Argpi ∈ in(Lpr). Figure 5-3 shows a plan that satisfies goal g1. AlthoughArgGpi = {Argg1} ⊆






It is provable that there is either none or exactly one preferred labelling that labels Argpi
in, which means there is (if any) only a single position that the agent can take to justify Argpi,
and therefore, plan pi:
Property 5.3. There is no more than one preferred labelling in which Argpi ∈ in(Lpr) (i.e.
plan pi is justified).
Proof. From Property 5.1 and 5.2 we know that ifArgpi ∈ in(Lpr) thenArgG\Gpi∪ArgNvol(pi)
⊆ out(Lpr) and ArgGpi ∪ ArgNcmp(pi) ⊆ in(Lpr). Since every preferred labelling is a com-
plete labelling and the following property [Caminada and Gabbay, 2009] holds for complete
labellings Lcmp1 and Lcmp2: if out(Lcmp1) = out(Lcmp2) then Lcmp1 = Lcmp2; we conclude
that there is no more than one preferred labelling in which Argpi ∈ in(Lpr)
Property 5.4. If Argpi ∈ in(Lpr), Lpr is a stable labelling.
Proof. In Property 5.1 and 5.2 we showed that ifArgpi ∈ in(Lpr) thenArgG\Gpi∪ArgNvol(pi) ⊆
out(Lpr) andArgGpi ∪ArgNcmp(pi) ⊆ in(Lpr), which makes the undec(Lpr) = ∅. A complete
labelling with undec(L) = ∅ is a stable labelling. Since Lpr is a preferred labelling and every
preferred labelling, is a complete labelling, essentially Lpr is a complete labelling in which
undec = ∅. Therefore, Lpr is a stable labelling.
The above property can be generalised further. In fact all preferred labellings of an argu-
mentation framework for a plan proposal are stable labellings and that is regardless of Argpi
belonging to the preferred labellings. The reason behind this generalisation is that an argu-
mentation framework for a plan proposal cannot contain odd-length cycle of arguments and
therefore it cannot contain any argument labelled as undec under the preferred semantics [Ba-
roni and Giacomin, 2003; Bodanza and Tohme´, 2009; Prakken and Vreeswijk, 2002]. Thus,






Figure 5-4: Odd-length Cycle
A plan argument can never be a part of an odd-length cycle, since it does not attack any
argument. So if there is any odd-length cycle in the framework, it is formed by goal and norm
arguments. The attack within and between goal and norm arguments is symmetric (before
applying preferences). Figure 5-4 (left-hand side) shows a cycle between three goal/norm
arguments. Is it possible to get from the graph on the left-hand side to the odd-length cycle on
the right-hand side? The two-way attack between Argα and Argβ is reduced to a single defeat
from Argα and Argβ if (Argα, Argβ) ∈ , which means that (α, β) ∈ gn. (α, β) ∈ gn
if and only if (α, β) ∈ gn and (β, α) 6∈ gn. The same applies to the two-way attack
between Argβ and Argγ . Thus, we must have had (β, γ) ∈ gn and (γ, β) 6∈ gn. Since
gn is a preorder and hence transitive, from (α, β) ∈ gn and (β, γ) ∈ gn we conclude
that (α, γ) ∈ gn. Now, either (γ, α) ∈ gn, which according to Definition 30 means that
(α, γ) ∈ ∼gn and the symmetric attack between Argα and Argγ cannot be reduced to a single
defeat from Argγ to Argα; or (γ, α) 6∈ gn, which means that he symmetric attack between
Argα and Argγ is reduced to a single defeat from Argα to Argγ . In either case, obtaining the
odd-length cycle on the right-hand side of Figure 5-4 is impossible.
5.2 Best Plans
In the previous sections, we described the process of building an argumentation framework for
a plan proposal to check the justifiability of plans as a step toward identifying the best plan.
We also established that justified plans are defined as credulously accepted under the preferred
semantics. Although all the justified plans are internally coherent and defendable by the agent,
there could be further criteria that makes the agent disagree with one or be in better agreement
with another one. The issue of what plan is the best plan out of a set of justified plans has been
treated differently by different scholars. Some works [Amgoud et al., 2008a] do not distinguish
between justified plans and take them as “as good as” each other. Therefore, all the justified
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plans are essentially the best plans. Simply maximising the number of achieved desires is the
basis of comparison of justified options in Hulstijn and van der Torre [2004]. Rahwan and
Amgoud [2006] use the utility of plans (i.e. the worth of desires and the cost of resources to
achieve them) to find the best plan out of the justified ones. That is of course subject to the
availability of the exact measurement of utility.
In this work, what is available to the agent is a partial preference order over goals and
norms. In the previous section we used preferences for handling attacks and defeats. Recently
Amgoud and Vesic [2014] has explored the role of preferences to refine the evaluation of ar-
guments by using preferences to choose some extensions among a set of extensions under a
specific semantics. Since each extension is essentially a set of arguments, preference-based
set ordering techniques are used to compare extensions. A comprehensive survey of methods
for ranking sets of objects can be found in [Barber et al., 2001]. One of the set ordering prin-
ciples that has received a lot of attention in the argumentation community is the Democratic
set ordering principle. Essentially, democratic ordering ranks set Si above set Sj if any ob-
ject in Sj is weaker than at least one object in set Si. Democratic ordering was first used in
argumentation frameworks by Prakken and Sartor [1997] and more recently in [Amgoud and
Vesic, 2014; Caminada et al., 2014a]. Prakken and Sartor [1997] and Caminada et al. [2014a]
use democratic ordering to compare two arguments made of a set of defeasible rules based on
the preferences between defeasible rules in the two arguments. Amgoud and Vesic [2014],
however, use democratic ordering to discard some extensions of an argumentation framework
under a certain semantics.
We use the democratic ordering for further refinement of justified plans by considering
the combination of goals satisfied and norms violated in justified plans. We have chosen the
democratic principle due to its effectiveness in handling even-length cycles of arguments. Since
the preferences over goals and norms is partial, comparing two plans based on democratic
ordering is not always possible. Therefore, in absence of such preference information, the best
plan is defined as a plan that satisfies most goals while violating the fewest norms. We first
give a formal account of democratic ordering and then define the goal-dominant and norm-
dominant plans, based on which a better than relation between plans is defined. We also give
an example of when democratic ordering can be useful in our framework.
Definition 36 (Democratic Ordering). Let Si and Sj be two sets of objects. According to
democratic ordering (denoted asD) (Si, Sj) ∈ D iff ∀β ∈ Sj\Si,∃α ∈ Si\Sj s.t. (α, β) ∈ .
As usual (Si, Sj) ∈ B iff (Si, Sj) ∈ D and (Si, Sj) 6∈ D.
Democratic ordering is reflexive and transitive4.
4See Amgoud and Vesic [2014] for proof.
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Definition 37 (Goal Dominance: Democratic Ordering). Let Gpii and Gpij be the sets of goals
satisfied in plan pii and pij . According to democratic ordering (Gpii , Gpij ) ∈ DG iff ∀g′ ∈
Gpij \Gpii ,∃g ∈ Gpii \Gpij s.t. (g, g′) ∈ gn.
Let g be the ordering on G induced by gn.
Theorem 5.1. DG is a total preorder on P (G)5 iff g is total.
Proof. Assume that DG is a total preorder on P (G), while g is not a total order on G. The
latter means that ∃g, g′ ∈ G s.t.(g, g′) 6∈g and (g′, g) 6∈g. Since {g} and {g′} both belong
to P (G) and (g, g′) 6∈g and (g′, g) 6∈g, we conclude that DG is not a total preorder which
is contrary to assumption.
Assume that g is a total order on G. In oder to prove that DG is a total preorder, we need
to prove that it is reflexive, transitive, and total. It is easy to see it is reflexive and transitive
(see Definition 36). Below we prove that it is total meaning that ∀Gi, Gj ∈ P (G) either
(Gi, Gj) ∈ DG or (Gj , Gi) ∈ DG. Let g = max((Gi ∪Gj) \ (Gi ∩Gj)):
case 1: g ∈ Gi. Then ∀g′ ∈ Gj ,∃g ∈ Gi s.t. (g, g′) ∈g, which means that (Gi, Gj) ∈ DG.
case 2: g ∈ Gj . Then ∀g′ ∈ Gi,∃g ∈ Gj s.t. (g, g′) ∈g, which means that (Gj , Gi) ∈ DG.
Now let us see when the relation defined in Definition 37 is a total preorder on GΠ =
{Gpi1 , Gpi2 , · · · , Gpin}, where as before, Gpii is the set of goals satisfied in plan i .
Corollary 5.1. DG is a total preorder on GΠ if g is total.
The above corollary follows immediately from Theorem 5.1 because GΠ ⊆ P (G). How-
ever, note that having a total preorder on DG, dose not necessarily mean we need to have a
total order on G. Here is a counter example.
Example 5.1. Let G = {g1, g2, g3} and g= {(g2, g3)}. Also let GΠ = {Gpi1 , Gpi2}, where
Gpi1 = {g1, g2} and Gpi2 = {g1, g3}. It is clear that (Gpi1 , Gpi2) ∈ DG, which essentially
means we have a total preorder on GΠ while g is not a total order on G.
Plan pii goal-dominates plan pij , if for every goal satisfied in pij that is not satisfied in pii,
there is at least one preferred goal satisfied in pii that is not satisfied in pij . If the preference
information is not sufficient to conduct such a comparison, we define goal dominance as satis-
fying a greater number of goals.








Figure 5-5: Argumentation Graphs for Plans pi1 and pi2
Definition 38 (Goal-dominance). Plan pii goal-dominates pij denoted as (pii, pij) ∈ ≥G
1. if DG is a total preorder on GΠ and (Gpii , Gpij ) ∈ DG; Else (i.e. if DG is not a total
preorder on GΠ)
2. if |Gpii | ≥ |Gpij |.
>G is the strict relation associated with ≥G. (pii, pij) ∈ ∼G iff (pij , pii) ∈ ≥G and (pii, pij) ∈
≥G.
It is straight forward to see >G is irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive, while ∼G is
reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
Example 5.2. Assume an agent with four goals g1, g2, g3 and g4, such that {(g1, g2), (g2, g3),
(g3, g4), (g4, g1)} ∈ cf goal. Let pi1 and pi2 be two plans for the the agent such that Gpi1 =
{g1, g3} and Gpi2 = {g2, g4}. Also the agent prefers satisfying g1 to satisfying g2, and g3 to
g4. Figures 5-5 show the argumentation graph associated with these plans. Both plans are
justified, however according to democratic principle (pi1, pi2) ∈ ≥G since (g1, g2) ∈gn and
(g3, g4) ∈gn. Note that if we defined goal-dominance only based on the number of goals that
are satisfied in two plans, both plans would have been equally good, neglecting the preferences
between goals.
In order to define norm dominance we look at the normative quality of the plans. Although
norm compliance mechanisms abstain from regimenting norms since that would eliminate the
possibility of violation, they have used different mechanisms to discourage the agent from
norm violation, such as (i) associating violation to loss of utility; (ii) negatively influencing
the agent reputation; and (iii) hindering the agent’s individual goals. Avoiding violation in
normative practical reasoning and planning is manifested in [Oren, 2013] by expressing that
not violating a norm (i.e. complying or avoiding) is preferred over violating it. Also Oren et al.
[2013] induces preferences over paths obtained from a transition system based on the fact that
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fewer number of violations are always preferred. However, in their system it is possible for
a norm to be activated several times in the same path. Thus, instead of comparing the set of
violated norms in two plans, they compare the number of times that a specific norm is violated
in two paths. Going back to the design choices we made in page 97, Chapter 4, an action cannot
be executed more than once in the same plan. Since, we merely focus on modelling action-
based norms, the constraint on the occurrence of actions also means that the action that is the
activation condition of a norm cannot be executed more than once. Consequently, a norm can at
most be activated once in a plan. As a result, instead of talking about the number of times that
a single norm is violated in a plan, we are interested in the set of norms that are violated in a
plan. Thus, similar to Definition 38, norm dominance is defined based on democratic ordering
and number of violations as: Plan pii norm-dominates plan pij , if for every norm violated in pij
that is not violated in pii, there is at least one preferred norm violated in pii that is not violated
in pij .
Definition 39 (Norm Dominance: Democratic Ordering). Let Nvol(pii) and Nvol(pij) be the sets
of norms violated in plan pii and pij . According to democratic ordering (Nvol(pii), Nvol(pij)) ∈
DN iff ∀n′ ∈ Nvol(pij) \Nvol(pii), ∃n ∈ Nvol(pii) \Nvol(pij) s.t. (n, n′) ∈ gn.
Let g be the ordering on G induced by gn.
Let Nvol(Π) = {Nvol(pi1), Nvol(pi2), · · · , Nvol(pin)}, where as before, Nvol(pii) is the set of
norms violated in plan i .
Definition 40 (Norm-dominance). Plan pii norm-dominates pij denoted as (pii, pij) ∈ ≥N
1. if DN is a total preorder on Nvol(Π) and (Nvol(pii), Nvol(pij)) ∈ DN ; Else (i.e. if DN is
not a total preorder on GΠ)
2. if |Nvol(pii)| ≥ |Nvol(pij)|.
>N is the strict relation associated with ≥N . (pii, pij) ∈ ∼N iff (pij , pii) ∈ ≥N and (pii, pij) ∈
≥N .
It is straight forward to see >N is irreflexive, antisymmetric and transitive, while ∼N is
reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
Goal dominance and norm dominance can be combined in various ways to provide the
basis for plan comparison. Generally we are in favour of plans that are goal-dominant, while
they are not norm-dominant. In what follows we give priority to dominance of goals over
norms. The dominance of norms can be given priority over dominance of goals by swapping
the order of conditions 2 and 3 in the following definition.
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Definition 41 (Plan Comparison). Plan pii is better than pij , denoted (pii, pij) ∈ >pi, iff:
1. pii is justified and pij is not; or
2. pii and pij are both justified and (pii, pij) ∈ >G; or
3. pii and pij are both justified and (pii, pij) ∈ ∼G but (pij , pii) ∈ >N .
Plan pii is as good as pij , denoted (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi, iff (pii, pij) 6∈ >pi and (pij , pii) 6∈ >pi .
Property 5.1. >pi is irreflexive 6.
Property 5.2. >pi is antisymmetric.
Property 5.3. >pi is transitive.
Property 5.4. ∼pi is an equivalence relation on Π.
Definition 42. Given pi ∈ Π, let [pii] denote the equivalence class to which pii belongs.
([pii], [pij ]) ∈ ≥ iff (pii, pij) ∈ >pi or (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi.
Property 5.5. ≥ is a total order on Π.
Definition 43 (Best Plan). Plan pii is the best plan for the agent to execute iff
• pii is justified, and
• 6 ∃pij such that ([pij ], [pii]) ∈ ≥.
Based on this definition, there might be more than one plan identified as a best plan. Es-
sentially, all members of class [pii] are the best plans. In a multi-agent setting this causes
complications, since the agents need additional coordination to agree on a plan out of the best
ones, however in a case of a single agent, any of these plan can be chosen at random. On the
other hand, there is also the issue of not finding a best plan at all. If none of the agent’s plans
are justified, the best plan does not exist. Whether the agent is supposed to do nothing at all
or just pick a plan randomly, is a subjective view. Since each plan at least satisfies a goal, the
agent might as well pick any plan randomly and execute it, but what it executes is not the best
plan and is certainly not justifiable. The next section shows a scenario in which the agent uses
the criterion in the last definition to identify the best plan.
5.3 Example
In this scenario, we are presenting an agent that has few goals to satisfy, while there are norms
imposed on the agent that are triggered based on the actions that it takes to satisfy its goals.
6Proof of the properties in this section are provided in Appendix B.
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The triggered norms can be complied with or violated, however, the agent has to see the impact
of each of these options in a bigger picture (e.g. complying with or violating a norm might
prevent satisfying a goal or complying with another norm). We first give an account of the
agent’s goals and norms imposed on it, and also explain the conflicts between these entities
that the agent needs to consider in order to construct conflict-free plans. We then show how the
agent identifies the best plan by considering the justifiability of plans, the goals satisfied and
norms complied with and violated in each plan.
Let us assume the agent has three goals as presented in Figure 5-6. To satisfy goal strike,
the agent has to become a union member, not go to the office and not attend any meeting on
behalf of the company outside the office. Goal submission is satisfied if the agent goes to
the office and finalise a report that is due. Evidently, the agent cannot submit the report while
on strike. In addition, the agent also wants to satisfy goal certificate, which shows that the
agent has undertaken certain training. This goal is satisfied if the agent pays the fee for the
training course, takes part in a theory test and attends an interview. If the agent takes the theory
test norm n4 (see Figure 5-7) obliges the agent to attend the interview within two weeks of
taking the theory test. But the agent does not have enough saving to pay for the course fee
to begin with! The agent, however, can use company’s funding to pay the fee for the course
she wants to join, but that subject her to norm n1 (see Figure 5-7). This norm obliges the
agent to attend a meeting on behalf of the company within two weeks of receiving such a
funding. But then again, if the agent is on strike, she cannot attend any meeting on behalf of
the company! In addition to all of these complications, the agent is contemplating going on an
extended maternity leave for six weeks. If she goes on maternity leave, she is forbidden to go
to the office (norm n2) or attend any meeting on behalf the company (norm n3) for the period
of 6 weeks. Not going to the office and not attending any meeting although are aligned with
satisfying goal strike, they risk satisfying goal submission for which the agent has to go to
the office and complying with norm n1, for which the agent has to attend a meeting on behalf
of the company.
The actions available to the agent are provided in Figure 5-8. Given the goals and norms
discussed above (Figure 5-6 and 5-7), and the following preferencesgn= {(submission, n2),
(n4, n1)}, the agents wants to know what courses of actions are available with respect to con-
flicts within and between goals and norms and what is the best course of actions to execute.
Let us first identify the conflict:
• Conflicting goals: According to Definitions 15 (page 67), we know: cf goal = {(strike,
submission)} because they require the agent to be and not to be at office .
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strike = {union member,¬at office,¬meeting attended}
submission = {at office, report finalised}
certificate = {course fee paid, theory test done, interviewed}
Figure 5-6: Agent Goals
n1 = 〈o, get company funding , attend meeting, 2〉
n2 = 〈f, take maternity leave, go to office, 6〉
n3 = 〈f, take maternity leave, attend meeting, 6〉
n4 = 〈o, take theory test, attend interview, 2〉
Figure 5-7: Agent Norms
• Conflicting goals and norms: According to Definition 18 (page 69) cf goalnorm = {(strike
, n1), (submission, n2)}.
– (strike, n1): norm n1 obliges the agent to attend a meeting on behalf of the com-
pany, whereas if the agent want to go on strike, it should not attend any meeting.
– (submission, n2): satisfying goal submission requires the agent to go to office,
however this is forbidden by norm n2.
• Conflicting norms: According to Definition 19 due to the concurrency conflict between
attend meeting and attend interview, and depending on the way actions are se-
quenced, it is possible that in some plan pi, (n1, n4) ∈ cf pinorm. Also according to
Definitions 20, it is possible that in some plan pi, (n1, n3) ∈ cf pinorm, because n1 obliges
the agent to execute attend meeting, while n3 prohibits the agent from doing so.
In what follows we look at four plans7 for the agent: pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4 ∈ Π. In the pre-
vious section (page 120) we provided an example of identifying goal- and norm-dominance
according to preferences. In this example we highlight identifying goal- and norm-dominance
when the preference information is not sufficient to recognise these features. Instead, goal- and
norm-dominance are identified based on the number of goals satisfied and norms violated in
each plan.
pi1 = 〈(get company funding , 0), (go to meeting venue, 1), (attend meeting, 2),
(go to office, 7), (finish report, 8)〉


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































pi2 = 〈(go to office, 0), (get company funding , 1), (finish report, 2),
(take theory test, 4), (go to interview venue, 5), (attend interview, 6)〉
pi3 = 〈take maternity leave, 0), (get company funding , 1),
(go to office, 2), (finish report, 3), (take theory test, 5),
(go to interview venue, 6), (attend interview, 7)〉
pi4 = 〈(get company funding , 0), (take maternity leave, 1),
(take theory test, 2), (go to interview venue, 3),
(attend interview, 4), (join union, 5)〉
Table 5.2 shows the goals satisfied in each plan as well as norms complied with and vio-
lated. In order to identify the best plan, we first need to identify the justified plans which were
defined as credulously accepted under the preferred semantics in Definition 35. Figures 5-9,
5-10, 5-11 and 5-12 display the DAF 8 associated with each plan. Note that the set of activated
norms differs from one plan to another plan, hence different set of arguments in each graph.
For example norm n4 was never activated in plan pi1, because action take theory test was not
executed in this plan. Therefore, Argn4 does not exist in Figure 5-9, whereas, it does exist in
Figures 5-10, 5-11 and 5-12. Also note how Argn4 attacks Argn1 in the context of plan pi2 and
pi4, while that is not the case in the context of plan pi3. This shows how the conflict between
norms is contextual and differs from one plan to another one.
Having computed the preferred extensions 9 of DAFpi1 , DAFpi2 , DAFpi3 , and DAFpi4 ,
it turns out that Argpi1 is not credulously accepted, whereas Argpi2 , Argpi3and Argpi4 all are.
Thus, plan pi1 is not justified, whereas pi2, pi3 and pi4 are. Based on Definition 41 we have:
(pi2, pi1), (pi3, pi1), (pi4, pi1) ∈ >. Also, since (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼G, while (pi3, pi2) ∈ >N , it fol-
lows that (pi2, pi3) ∈ >. Moreover, (pi2, pi4) ∈ ∼G and (pi2, pi4) ∈ ∼N , which makes them
(pi2, pi4) ∈ ∼. According to Definition 43, plan pi2 and pi4 are both identified as the best plans
for the agent to execute.
8st, sub and cer in these figures stand for strike, submission and certificate respectively.
9Online argumentation tool such as ASPARTIX (http://rull.dbai.tuwien.ac.at:8080/ASPARTIX/index.faces) can
compute the preferred extensions of these graphs in less than 5 seconds.
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Gpii Ncmp(pii) Nvol(pii)
pi1 {submission} {n1} {}
pi2 {submission, certificate} {n4} {n1}
pi3 {submission, certificate} {n3, n4} {n1, n2}
pi4 {certificate, strike} {n2, n3, n4} {n1}


























Figure 5-12: Argumentation Framework for plan pi4
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5.4 Discussion
In this section, we revisit and discuss four choices made in this chapter with regards to the
structure of arguments, the use of preferences, the justifiability of plans, and the decision cri-
terion to compare plans.
Argument structure: We use argument schemes to represent the structure of arguments as
opposed to structure-based approaches such as ABA [Dung et al., 2009] and ASPIC+
[Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]. We explain the rationale behind this choice in Sec-
tion 5.1.1. Very recently a new version of ASPIC+, called ASPIC+D, with purely defeasi-
ble rules is proposed by Li and Parsons [2015]. A mapping of our framework to ASPIC+D,
where arguments are represented using the defeasible structured-based approach, should
be easily obtainable. Although, it is interesting from a representation perspective, this
mapping would not affect the output of the framework. In fact using ASPIC+D, any
scheme-based argumentation framework should be mappable to a structure-based one.
Preferences: The role of preferences in distinguishing between attacks and defeats is not sub-
jective. It is always the case the attack from an argument to another one is identified as a
defeat if the latter argument is not preferred over the former. However, the role of pref-
erences in refinement of the evaluation of arguments is a subjective matter. We used the
democratic principle to further compare justified plans due to its effectiveness in dealing
with argumentation framework with even cycles of arguments. However, depending on
the properties of the argumentation framework a variety of set ordering techniques can
be used to refine the evaluation of arguments. A survey of methods to lift the prefer-
ences between objects to preferences over sets that include those objects can be found
[Barber et al., 2001]. Using different principles, many different decision criterions for
comparing plans can be created that deal with different situations (e.g. when a set has
the least favourable object in comparison with another set, or when a set has the most
favourable object in comparison with another set). What we wanted to show in com-
parison of plans was how the quality (i.e. preferences) and quantity of objects in sets
(i.e. goals and norms satisfied, violated and complied with in different plans) can be
combined to provide a ranking over the agent’s plans.
Another point worth mentioning is that preferences in our work are expressed between
individual goals and norms. Fan et al. [2013] use partial preferences defined over indi-
vidual goals and also sets of goals for decision-making with preferences in a medical
domain. Their notion of preferences over sets of goals can, in our work, be extended
to preferences over a combination of goal and norm sets, which will be used to identify
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the best plan out of the justified set of plans. However, such an extension requires us-
ing a Dung-style argumentation framework instead of preference-based. We show the
importance of this point in the following example.
Assume that the agent has three goals g1, g2, g3 with the following preferences ({g2, g3}
 {g1}  {g2}  {g3}). There are two plans, pi1 and pi2, available to agent, such that the
former plan satisfies g1 and the latter satisfies g2 and g3. Goal g1 is in conflict with both
g2 and g3, which means that (Argg1 , Argg2), (Argg2 , Argg1), (Argg1 , Argg3), (Argg3 ,
Argg1) ∈ Att. Since g1  g2 and g1  g3 the following attacks are identified as defeats
(Argg1 , Argg2), (Argg1 , Argg3) ∈ Def which makesArgg1 the only justified argument.
Consequently, plan pi1 that satisfies g1 is justified whereas, plan pi2 that satisfies g2 and
g3 is not. By definition all justified plans are better than non-justified ones, which means
that pi1 is better than pi2. Thus the following preference {g2, g3}  {g1} is never used.
Now let us eliminate using preferences to distinguish between attacks and defeats. We
get two sets of justified arguments: {Argg1} and {Argg2 , Argg3} and because {g2, g3} 
{g1} plan pi2 is better than pi1.
Justifiability: We check the justifiability of plans in a distributed manner. There is an argu-
mentation framework associated with each plan proposal that gets evaluated based on the
preferred semantics and consequently results in identifying the justified plans. Since the
set of activated norms differs from one plan to another one, the set of norm arguments
also differs from one framework to another one. In addition, the attack between norm
arguments varies from one framework to another one. It is therefore, impossible to check
the justifiability of plans all in the same framework.
Multi-criteria decision-making: In the decision criterion defined in Definition 41, we com-
pare the justified plans based on the set of goals they satisfy and if they are equally good
from that perspective, we look at the set of norms that they violate. The order can eas-
ily be reversed, meaning that justified plans can first be compared based on the set of
norms they violate and if they are equal from that viewpoint, they can then be compared
based on the set of goals they satisfy. The method of comparing plans can be seen as a
type of argumentation-based multi-criteria decision-making. In multi-criteria decision-
making theory, a set of candidate decisions are evaluated from the perspective of a set of
criteria. In the argumentation-based version of this theory [Amgoud and Prade, 2009],
arguments are built in favour and against a decision from each criteria perspective. The
satisfaction and dissatisfaction of a criteria count as pros and cons respectively and ulti-
mately the decisions are ranked depending on the strength or number of pros and cons
130
and the importance of the criteria. In our case, it could be assumed that the plans are
the decisions and the agent goals and norms are the criteria to compare the decisions.
Satisfying goals counts as a pro and violating a norm counts as a con. Depending on the
order on considering goal- or norm-dominance, a plan that has the most (in number of
strength) pros is better than another plan with fewer pros. If plans cannot be compared
based on their pros, they will be compared based on their cons, such that a plan with the
fewer (in number of strength) cons is a better plan.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we built on recent work in argumentation theory to reason about justifiabil-
ity of plans as a step toward identifying the best plan. The arguments are structured based
on argumentation schemes for plans, goals and norms. The critical questions associated with
these schemes provide the ways in which arguments can attack each other. The arguments
and their relationships constitute the main elements of an argumentation framework for plan
proposals. Furthermore, we discussed the need for taking the agent preferences into account
in the constructed argumentation framework, hence the use of preference-based argumenta-
tion framework. We also made the case for the use of the preferred semantics to evaluate this
framework, with the aim of identifying the justified plans. Justified plans were further com-
pared based on the fact that a plan that satisfies more important goals or more goals, while it
violates fewer important norms or fewer norms, in comparison with another plan, is the better
plan of the two.
In Chapter 3 we defined the agent’s plans, followed by generating them in Chapter 4.
This chapter focused on identifying the best plan using argumentation. In the next chapter we
discuss the processes for generating an explanation in natural language for the best plan.
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Chapter 6
Explaining The Best Plan via Dialogue
In the previous chapter we proposed an argumentation-based approach for identifying the best
plan. More precisely, we used the preferred semantics to examine the justifiability of a plan
and used the goals satisfied and norms violated in each plan to compare justified plans in search
of the best plan. In essence, Chapter 5 provided an answer for how should an agent act in a
normative environment when it has conflicting goals and norms? Existing frameworks, other
than the argumentation-based ones, that deal with this question [Broersen et al., 2001; Criado et
al., 2010; Kollingbaum and Norman, 2003] have not paid any attention to explaining the agent’s
reasoning and decision-making. It is therefore, quite challenging for humans to understand
and ultimately trust these frameworks and their outcomes. To address this shortcoming, in
the previous chapter, we promoted the use of argumentation as a reasoning tool, while in this
chapter we use the dialogical aspect of argumentation to generate explanation for the reasoning
and its outcomes. Thus, in this chapter we deal with the question of how can the agent explain
in natural language why it acted in a certain way?
Assuming that the agent acted on the best plan, in order to answer why it acted that way, the
agent has to explain why the executed plan is the best plan. Explaining the best plan involves
generating an explanation for why the plan is justified and why none of the other justified plans
are a better option. The justifiability of a plan can be explained by simply acknowledging the
membership of the argument for that plan in a specific set (i.e. a preferred extension). But
such an acknowledgement on its own does not provide a concrete explanation that is under-
standable to a human. Although many scholars [Amgoud, 2012; Kakas and Moraitis, 2003;
Oren, 2013; Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006] promote argumentation-based approaches to practi-
cal reasoning and decision-making due to its explanatory power and its alignment with human
decision-making, they have rarely used argumentation to generate explanation that is accessi-
ble to human users. That is with the exception of two recent works by Zhong et al. [2014] and
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Caminada et al. [2014c], where the authors use argumentation-based dialogues coupled with
natural language generation to provide an explanation that is accessible for non-expert users
as well as expert ones. In the former the authors translate the admissible dispute trees devel-
oped for assumption-based argumentation [Dung et al., 2009] to natural language for decision-
making in a legal scenario. In Caminada et al. [2014c], a dialogical proof procedure based on
the grounded semantics dialogue game [Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012b] is created to jus-
tify the actions executed in a plan. The justification is mainly focused on the preconditions and
effects of actions with regards to the goal state. The reasons behind the choice of the grounded
semantics are not clear.
In this chapter, we use argumentation-based dialogue for the preferred semantics translated
into natural language to explain the justifiability of the best plan. The contribution of this
chapter is in applying a newly developed dialogue game, called Socratic Discussion [Caminada
et al., 2014b], to a normative practical reasoning problem, where the agent uses the dialogue as
an internal dialogue to bring transparency to the procedure of its decision-making about what
plans are justified with respect to the agent’s goals, norms, their conflicts and preferences. To
the best of our knowledge this work is the first application of standard dialogue games for the
preferred semantics in general and Socratic discussion in particular.
In order to provide a full explanation for the best plan, in addition to explaining the justi-
fiability of the plan, the agent has to explain why none of the other justified plans are a better
option to execute. We use simple algorithms in the spirit of Zhong et al. [2014] to explain
such a comparison. The algorithm in Zhong et al. [2014], however, is specific to a particular
legal domain, and it checks the justifiability under admissible semantics in assumption-based
argumentation. Therefore, we develop algorithms based on the preferred semantics and the
definitions of goal- and norm-dominance that can be used by any normative practical reason-
ing agent to explain its best plan.
This chapter is organised as follows. In the next section we give a brief survey of existing
dialogue games for the preferred semantics. Section 6.1.1 focuses on a particular dialogue
game for the preferred semantics known as Socratic discussion. This discussion will be used
in Section 6.1.2 to explain the justifiability of the best plan. The full explanation of the best
plan in natural language is provided in Section 6.2 followed by a discussion section in 6.3. The
summary of the chapter can be found in Section 6.4.
6.1 Dialogue Game for the Preferred Semantics
In Chapter 2 (page 45) we explained that argumentation semantics specify what arguments
are justified in a framework, without indicating the procedure for construction of such a set
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of justified arguments [Fan and Toni, 2015; Jakobovits and Vermeir, 1999]. Therefore, many
(e.g. [Caminada, 2004; Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012b; Jakobovits and Vermeir, 1999;
Modgil and Caminada, 2009; Prakken, 2006a] ) believe that the study of semantics in terms of
dialogues can decrease the gap between intuitive and formal accounts of argumentation. Such
dialogue games also known as argument games, dialectical proof theories or dispute trees aim
at testing membership of an argument in an extension under certain semantics [Jakobovits and
Vermeir, 1999; Prakken and Sartor, 1997; Vreeswijk and Prakken, 2000].
The question of whether an argument is credulously accepted under the preferred seman-
tics1 (i.e. it is a member of at least one preferred extension) has been addressed few times
after the preferred semantics were introduced by Dung [1995]. That is despite the pessimistic
results on computational complexity of proof theories for the preferred semantics, that were
presented in Dimopoulos and Torres [1996]. Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000], however argue
why it is nevertheless important to motivate a proof theory for the preferred semantics. A
detailed account of their reasons can be found in Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000]. Their main
arguments are (i) the pessimistic results only concern worst-case scenarios and it is not the case
all the time; and (ii) the dialogues corresponding to logics for defeasible argumentation can be
interrupted at any time while the intermediate outcome is still meaningful (sic). In addition, the
obtained results in Dimopoulos and Torres [1996] reports that the credulous reasoning under
the admissible and preferred and stable semantics has the same complexity. However, sceptical
reasoning under the preferred semantics has a higher complexity than under the stable and ad-
missible semantics. Thus, the pessimistic results solely concerns the sceptical reasoning under
the preferred semantics.
In the remainder of this section we briefly survey the developed dialogues for the preferred
semantics. All these dialogue games use the same line of reasoning: by definition (page 34
Chapter 2) a preferred extension is a maximal admissible set with respect to set inclusion.
Therefore, an argument that is in at least one preferred extension is in at least one admissible
extension. As a result, deciding if an argument is in at least one preferred extension amounts
to deciding if it is at least in one admissible extension.
Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000] presented one of the first dialogue games for the preferred
semantics. Two parties in this dialogue are PRO and CON , standing for proponent and
opponent. A move is an argument that is put forward first in the dialogue, or an argument
attacking the previous argument of the previous player. Both players are allowed to backtrack,
however an eo ipso is a move using a previous non-backtracked argument of the other player.
A block is another type of move that puts the other player in a position, where the player cannot
1In the rest of this chapter, unless it is specified otherwise, for simplicity, we use the preferred semantics to refer
to the credulous type of the preferred semantics.
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make any move. A TPI-dispute (two-party immediate response dispute) is a dispute in which
both players are allowed to repeat PRO; PRO is not allowed to repeat CON ; and CON is
allowed to repeat CON . The winner of the dialogue is CON , if it uses move eo ipso or blocks
PRO. Otherwise, PRO is the winner of the dialogue. The initial argument in the dialogue
is defended if PRO wins the dispute. It is proved that an argument is accepted under the
preferred semantics iff it can be defended in every TPI-dispute.
Another proof theory for the preferred semantics was proposed by Cayrol et al. [2001]. It
is claimed that this proof theory improves on Vreeswijk and Prakken [2000] by providing a
shorter proof for a given argument. The reason for the shortness is that Cayrol et al. [2001]
prevent proponent (PRO) and opponent (OPP ) from moving with arguments that are the suc-
cessors of arguments advanced by PRO during the dialogue. These arguments are forbidden
for PRO, because we want the set of arguments advanced by PRO to remain conflict-free.
They are also forbidden by OPP because they are rejected from any admissible set containing
arguments advanced by PRO, so there is no point for OPP to advance these arguments.
Modgil and Caminada [2009] specify argument games for the preferred semantics based on
Caminada’s labellings [Caminada, 2006]. Similar to the above games, these argument games
test if an argument put forward by a proponent is labelled in by at least one admissible la-
belling. Admissible labellings are formally defined in the next section.
Caminada et al. [2014b], and Caminada [2010] believe that the dialogue games for the
preferred semantics are merely technical and mathematical, making it difficult to grasp the
reasoning concept behind the semantics. In order to bridge the gap between the mathemati-
cal formulation and the philosophical intuition behind the semantics, they make a connection
between the preferred semantics and Socratic discussion. In Socrates’s form of reasoning, as
documented by Plato, the first party (referred to as proponent and denoted as M that stands for
Menexenus) puts forward a claim and tries to defend it by avoiding being lead to a contradic-
tion by a second party (referred to as opponent and denoted as S that stands for Socrates). The
proponent committing itself to a contradiction shows that its arguments cannot hold together,
which ultimately shows the absurdity of its original claim. The connection made between
the preferred semantics and Socratic discussion is formulated in the form of a dialogue game
that like other dialogues checks the acceptability of an argument under the preferred seman-
tics by checking the membership of the argument in at least one admissible extension. Since
the formulation of the preferred semantics in terms of Socratic discussion is the most intuitive
available dialogue game for this semantics, we use this dialogue to explain the justifiability of
best plan. In the next section we give a formal account of Socratic discussion.
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6.1.1 Preferred Semantics as Socratic Discussion
As established in the previous section, deciding if an argument is in at least one preferred
extension amounts to deciding if it is at least in one admissible extension. Translating this
statement in terms of Caminada’s labellings, it follows that an argument is in at least one
admissible set iff it is labelled in by at least one admissible labelling [Caminada and Gabbay,
2009]. Consequently, an argument is in at least one preferred extension if it is labelled in by at
least one admissible labelling. Definition 44 describes admissible labellings.
Definition 44 (Admissible Labellings [Caminada and Gabbay, 2009]). Let 〈Arg ,Def 〉 be an
argumentation framework, a labelling is an admissible labelling iff for every a ∈ Arg it holds
that: if a is labelled in then all attackers of a are labelled out; and if a is labelled out then a
has at least one attacker that is labelled in.
Socratic discussion is a discussion based on admissible labellings. If playerM puts forward
an argument a as labelled in and wins the discussion, then a is in at least one admissible
extension. Since an argument is in at least one admissible extension iff it is in at least one
preferred extension, we conclude that if play M wins the Socratic discussion, the original
argument put forward is accepted under the preferred semantics.
Definition 45 (Socratic Discussion [Caminada et al., 2014b]). Let AF = 〈Arg,Def 〉 be an
argumentation framework. The sequence of moves [∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆n] (n ≥ 1) is a Socratic
discussion iff:
• each odd move (called M-move): ∆i (1 ≤ i ≤ n, i ∈ 2Z+ + 1) is an argument labelled
in: in(a), a ∈ Arg;
• each even move (called S-move): ∆i (2 ≤ i ≤ n, i ∈ 2Z+) is an argument labelled out:
out(a), a ∈ Arg;
• each argument moved by S attacks by an argument moved by M : ∀∆i = out(a), (2 ≤
i ≤ n, i ∈ 2Z+),∃∆j = in(b), (j < i, j ∈ 2Z+ + 1) s.t. (a, b) ∈ Def ;
• each argument moved by M attacks an argument moved by S in the previous step:
∀∆i = in(a), (3 ≤ i ≤ n, i ∈ 2Z+ + 1), ∃∆i−1 = out(b) s.t. (a, b) ∈ Def ; and
• S-moves cannot be repeated: 6 ∃∆i,∆j s.t. i 6= j and ∆i = ∆j
There are two conditions for discussion [∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆n] to be considered as finished (i) there
exists no move ∆n+1 such that [∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆n,∆n+1] is a discussion, or there exists an M-
move and an S-move containing the same argument; and (ii) no subsequence [∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆m]
(m < n) is finished. Player S wins the discussion if there exists an M-move and an S-move
containing the same argument. Otherwise, the winner of the discussion is the player that makes
the last move.
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Figure 6-1 shows examples of Socratic discussion that are won by the opponent (S) (top
figure) and the proponent M (bottom figure), respectively. In the next section we show how
we use this discussion to check the membership of arguments for plan proposals in a preferred
extension.
6.1.2 Socratic Discussion for Explaining the Justified Plans
From the definition of the best plan in the previous chapter (page 122) we know that the best
plan is justified, meaning that it is accepted under the preferred semantics. As established in
the previous section, since the best plan (e.g. pi) is accepted under the preferred semantics,
given DAFpi, player M is guaranteed at least one winning strategy in a Socratic discussion
with ∆1 = in(Argpi). According to Property 5.1 (Chapter 5, page 115) Argpi is labelled in iff
all the arguments for the goals that it does not satisfy and the norms that it violates are labelled
out. Therefore, the winning strategy for Argpi is composed of the agent justifying why it did
not satisfy a goal or why it violated a norm. In doing so, the agent is dialectically pointing
out the reasons for not satisfying a goal or violating a norm, while the reasons are satisfying
or complying with a more preferred goal or norm. It could also happen that there were no
preferences expressed over a goal or a norm, in which case the agent expresses the reason for
satisfying one as opposed to another one by stating that due to their conflict only one of them
had to be satisfied or complied with.
Let DAFpi = 〈Arg,Def 〉 be an argumentation framework for plan pi that happens to be
the best plan. Also let the sequence of moves ∆ = [∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆n] (n ≥ 1) be a Socratic
discussion for plan pi. Algorithm 1 provides a translation of the Socratic discussion for this plan
in natural language. Note that this algorithm uses Property 5.1 and 5.2 (Chapter 5, page 115)
to translate (i) the arguments that are labelled in as the goals and norms satisfied and complied
with in the plan; (ii) the arguments that are labelled out as the goals and norms not satisfied
and violated in the plan.
6.2 Explaining the Best Plan
In this section we show a simple algorithm (Algorithm 2) that explains why plan pi is the plan
for the agent to execute. The algorithm takes the following as input: the best plan pi, the set
of justified plans ΠJust, the set of satisfied goals in each plan GΠ = [Gpi1 , Gpi2 , · · · , Gpin ],
the set of violated norms in each plan Nvol(Π) = [Nvol(pi1), Nvol(pi2), · · · , Nvol(pin)] and set
of preferences over goals and norms gn. The output of the algorithm is (i) the explanation
of the justifiability of the best plan using the Justified function in Algorithm 1; and (ii) the
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Algorithm 1: Explanation the Justifiability of the Best Plan in Natural Language
function: Justified(pi, DAFpi, ∆)
output : Plan pi is justified.
for all ∆i = out(Argx) do
if Argx ∈ ArgG then
output : Why the plan does not satisfy goal x?
Let ∆i+1 = in(Argy)
if Argy ∈ ArgG then
if (Argx, Argy) ∈ Def then
output : because goal y and goal x are in conflict and there is no
preference expressed between them, so the plan satisfies goal
y instead of x.
else
output : because goal y and goal x are in conflict and goal y is
preferred to goal x, so the plan satisfies goal y instead of x.
else
if (Argx, Argy) ∈ Def then
output : because norm y and goal x are in conflict and there is no
preference expressed between them, so the plan complies with
norm y instead of satisfying goal x.
else
output : because norm y and goal x are in conflict and goal x is
preferred to norm y, so the plan complies with norm y instead
of satisfying goal x.
else
output : Why the plan violates norm x?
Let ∆i+1 = in(Argy)
if Argy ∈ ArgG then
if (Argx, Argy) ∈ Def then
output : because goal y and norm x are in conflict and there is no
preference expressed between them, so the plan satisfies goal
y instead of complying with norm x.
else
output : because goal y and norm x are in conflict and goal y is
preferred to norm x, so the plan satisfies goal y instead of
complying with norm x.
else
if (Argx, Argy) ∈ Def then
output : because norm y and norm x are in conflict and there is no
preference expressed between them, so the plan complies with
norm y instead of complying with norm x.
else
output : because norm y and norm x are in conflict and norm y is
preferred to norm x, so the plan complies with norm y instead




“Argument c is justified and therefore labelled
in.”
S: out(a)
“If you claim c is justified then its attacker a
must be labelled out.
M: in(b)
“a is labelled out because b is labelled in and b
attacks a.”
S: out(b)
“But from your original claim that c is labelled
in, it holds that b that is the attacker of c should
be labelled out. However that contradicts the
claim that you just made that b is labelled in.





“Argument c is justified and therefore labelled
in.”
S: out(a)
“If you claim c is justified then its attacker a
must be labelled out. Why is that? ”
M: in(d)
“a is labelled out because d is labelled in and d
attacks a.”
S: out(b)
“But b also attacks c, So if you claim c is justi-
fied then its attacker b must be labelled out too.”
M: in(d)
“b is labelled out because d is labelled in and d
attacks a.”
Figure 6-1: Example of Socratic discussion
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Algorithm 2: Explanation the Best Plan in Natural Language
function : Bestplan(pi,ΠJust, GΠ, Nvol(Π),gn)
Justified(pi, DAFpi , ∆)
for all pi′ ∈ ΠJust \ pi do
output : Why plan pi′ is not better than plan pi?
if (pi, pi′) ∈ >G then
output : Because plan pi goal-dominates plan pi′
if (Gpi, Gpi′) ∈ DG then
output : since for every goal satisfied in pi′ that is not satisfied in pi, there is at least
one preferred goal satisfied in pi that is not satisfied in pi′.
else
output : since the number of goals satisfied in plan pi is more than the number of
goals satisfied in plan pi′.
else
if (pi, pi′) ∈ ∼G and (pi′, pi) ∈ >N then
output : Because plan pi and pi′ satisfy the same set/number of goals but pi′
norm-dominates plan pi
if (Nvol(pi′), Nvol(pi)) ∈ DN then
output : since for every norm violated in plan pi that is not violated in plan pi′,
there is at least one preferred norm violated in plan pi′ that is not
violated in pi.
else
output : since the number of norms violated in plan pi′ is more than the number
of norms violated in plan pi.
else
output : Because plan pi and pi′ are equally good, since they satisfy the same
set/number of goals and violate the same set/number of norms.
explanation of why this plan is better than other justified plans using the definitions of goal-
dominance (Definition 38, Page 120), norm-dominance (Definition 40, Page 121) and plan
comparison (Definition 41, Page 122), in the previous chapter.
To give an example, we recall the scenario discussed in the previous chapter (page 122).
The agent in the scenario has four plans pi1, pi2, pi3, pi4. Plan pi1 is not justified, whereas pi2, pi3
and pi4 are. Based on Definition 41 we have: (pi2, pi1), (pi3, pi1), (pi4, pi1) ∈ >. Also, since
(pi2, pi3) ∈∼G, while (pi3, pi2) ∈>N , it follows that (pi2, pi3) ∈ >. Moreover, (pi2, pi4) ∈∼G
and (pi2, pi4) ∈∼N , which makes them (pi2, pi4) ∈∼. According to Definition 43, plan pi2 and
pi4 are both identified as the best plans for the agent to execute. In figure 6-2, we provide the
explanation of plan pi4 that is identified as one of the best, as an example of how a best plan is
explained in natural language using Algorithm 1 and 2. Since plan pi2 is also one of the best
plans, the same explanation can be provided for plan pi2.
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- Plan pi4 is justified.
- Why the plan does not satisfy goal submission?
- Because goal submission and goal strike are in conflict and there is no preference
expressed between them, so the plan satisfies goal strike instead of goal submission.
- Why does the plan violate norm n1?
- Because norm n1 and norm n4 are in conflict in this plan and norm n4 is preferred to
norm n1, so the plan complies with n4, instead of complying with norm n1.2
- Why plan pi2 is not better than plan pi4?
- Because plan pi2 and pi4 are equally good, since they satisfy the same number of goals
and violate the same set of norms.
- Why plan pi3 is not better than plan pi4?
- Because plan pi3 and pi4 satisfy the same set of goals but plan pi3 norm-dominates pi4,
since the number of norms violated in pi3 is more than the number of norms violated in
plan pi4.
Figure 6-2: Explanation of plan pi4 in Natural Language
6.3 Discussion
In Section 6.1 we surveyed several dialogues for the preferred semantics. Despite the impor-
tance of the preferred semantics and the development of different dialogues for these seman-
tics [Caminada et al., 2014b; Cayrol et al., 2001; Modgil and Caminada, 2009; Vreeswijk and
Prakken, 2000], there is not yet any application that uses any of them. In structured argumenta-
tion formalism (e.g. ASPIC-style [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007; Modgil and Prakken, 2013])
that is mainly due to the fact that the preferred semantics require the concept of restricted
rebut to yield consistent outcome. In these formalisms arguments are a chain of defeasible
and strict rules. Restricted and unrestricted rebut [Caminada and Amgoud, 2007] differ in
that with restricted rebut, only a conclusion that is the consequent of a defeasible rule can be
rebut-attacked, whereas with unrestricted rebut, any conclusion that has at least one defeasible
rule involved in its derivation can be rebut-attacked. As a result when using restricted rebut
two arguments with contradictory conclusions do not necessarily attack one another, which is
not intuitive at all. For example, if argument A and B are as follows3: A = (a ⇒ b) → c,
B = (d → e) ⇒ ¬c, argument A restrictedly rebut-attacks B, but B does not restrictedly
rebut-attack A, however they both attack each other unrestrictedly. Following unrestricted re-
but can yield consistent result only under the grounded semantics. For other semantics includ-
2Another potential explanation for why the plan violates n1, is because norm n1 and norm n3 are in conflict in
this plan and there is no preference expressed between them, so the plan complies with norm n3 instead of n1.
3⇒ and→ denote defeasible and strict inference, respectively.
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ing the preferred, the application of restricted rebut is required to obtain consistent outcome
[Caminada and Amgoud, 2007]. However, the unintuitive nature of restricted rebut in the pre-
ferred semantics goes against the motivation behind using dialogue games for this semantics
in an agent-to-agent or human-to-agent setting.
Given that we use argumentation schemes to express the internal structure of arguments
(Chapter 5, page 107) and these schemes are defeasible by nature, restricted rebut and unre-
stricted rebut coincide and there is no need to define unrestricted rebut. Hence all the developed
dialogues for the preferred semantics, without loss of intuitiveness, are available to the agent
to use as a mechanism to explain why a plan is justified.
Another point of discussion is the evaluation pathways for the explanation that is presented
to the user. Depending on the level of abstractions different hypothesis can be empirically
evaluated by the users of the system. At the very basic level would be to verify that such an
explanation is indeed useful. This hypothesis has been evaluated in the context of explanation
in expert systems [Moore and Swartout, 1988; Teach and Shortliffe, 1981; Wick, 1992; Ye,
1995], where the results has verified the usefulness of explanation facilities. In terms of the
current system this hypothesis can be formally formulated as: “H1: Explanation makes an
agent’s decisions on course of actions more acceptable to the user.”
In a different level, the type of explanation provided can be empirically evaluated. Moulin
et al. [2002] categorise the explanation generated in the knowledge-based systems into two
broad types. In the firs type, referred to as cooperative or proactive, the system’s outcome is
always accompanied with an explanation. Whereas, in the second type, referred to as interac-
tive or reactive, the system provides explanation to user’s questions rather than generating an
overall explanation of the outcome automatically. The first type puts the burden on the system
to take into account all the questions that a user might raise and to incorporate a comprehensive
answer to the questions in the generated explanation [Southwick, 1991]. In the second type,
however, the system has to bear the burden of interpreting the user’s questions in the context
of ongoing interaction and have multiple strategies to provide responses that satisfy different
users [Swartout and Moore, 1993]. In the system we have designed the type of explanation
provided is cooperative or proactive. Therefore, another area of evaluation would be testing
whether the users might prefer reactive explanation in practical reasoning domain. Hypothesis
such as “H2: Users will perceive reactive explanation to be more useful than proactive expla-
nation.” or the other way around “H3: Users will perceive proactive explanation to be more
useful than reactive explanation.” can be tested. How to generate reactive explanation in the
first place is a topic we discuss as a part of future work (page 150).
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6.4 Summary
In Chapter 2 (page 47), we argued in favour of argumentation-based approaches to practi-
cal reasoning and decision-making by stating arguments from literature about inadequacy of
decision-theoretic models in certain cases and also by pointing out the explainability and jus-
tifiability of argumentation-based approaches. The latter being crucial in facilitating human
understanding of a computational system has underpinned utilising argumentation in many
areas such as practical reasoning, decision-making and planning [Amgoud and Prade, 2009;
Gasque, 2013; Oren, 2013; Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006; Toniolo et al., 2011; Zhong et al.,
2014]. Pursuing the same intention, in the previous chapter we proposed an approach to con-
ducting normative practical reasoning using argumentation. However, in contrast to existing
approaches to practical reasoning, in this chapter we exploited both aspects of argumentation
for agent reasoning and agent dialogue, thereby providing a clear explanation of normative
practical reasoning in natural language. In doing so, we used Caminada’s dialogue for the pre-
ferred semantics in terms of a Socratic discussion. We showed that the plan arguments that are
a member of a preferred extension can survive this type of discussion and therefore be justified
dialectically, which make this work the first application of the preferred dialogues.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
In this research, we have developed an effective approach that enables an autonomous agent
to reason about its practical attitudes (i.e. actions, goals, norms) in search of the best course
of actions to execute. Reasoning about what to do when the agent has multiple goals is a
challenging task, particularly when these goals are conflicting. Moreover, social agents are
often subject to norms imposed on them from the environment they operate in. The role of
these norm is to regulate the autonomous agents behaviour in accordance with what is expected
of them from the society’s perspective. However, these norms may not be aligned with the
agent’s goals. The norms themselves can also be inconsistent. In such a complex environment
the agent is not likely to be able to satisfy all its goals, while complying with all the norms
imposed on it. What is required of a rational agent is to be able to reason about what to do
with respect to its individual goals, the social norms and their conflicts, before committing to
any course of actions. The sophistication of such reasoning mechanism, however, makes it
very difficult to explain the reasoning process and its outcomes to a human user. In general,
while intelligent agents can outperform humans computationally, the systems using them are
not seen as transparent and hence trustworthy.
Argumentation has proven to be a promising paradigm for modelling common-sense and
human-like reasoning [Bench-Capon and Dunne, 2007; Besnard and Hunter, 2008; Chesn˜evar
et al., 2012]. It has also been expressed as a process of generating explanation in different
domains [Caminada et al., 2014c; Fan and Toni, 2015; Garcı´a et al., 2013; Schulz and Toni,
2014]. Therefore, as a paradigm, argumentation makes an attractive choice for handling the
opacity arising from sophisticated operations in intelligent systems, including practical rea-
soning systems. Previous work on argumentation-based practical reasoning has focused on
argumentation as a reasoning tool to determine the consistency of some plans [Ferrando et al.,
2011; Hulstijn and van der Torre, 2004; Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006; Tang and Parsons, 2005;
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Toniolo, 2013] or discuss and compare a set of pre-generated plans to identify the best plan
[Belesiotis et al., 2009; Gasque, 2013; Oren, 2013]. The dialogical aspect of argumentation
in a multi-agent setting has been used either in order to conduct a dialogue that facilitates
constructing a consistent plan, or to conduct a dialogue that facilitates reaching an agreement
about what plan to execute. However, the role that argumentation-based dialogues can play in
generating explanation for practical reasoning in complex domains is not explored to date.
The main objective of the research presented in this thesis was to set out an end-to-end
solution to practical reasoning that takes an agent’s actions as input and equips the agent with
the ability to act in the presence of conflicting goals and norms, while also allowing the agent
to explain why it acted as it did. The explanatory ability of argumentation has been used in
some domains [Caminada et al., 2014c; Fan and Toni, 2015; Schulz and Toni, 2014] in the past,
however it has not been used in practical reasoning. In order to address this objective, we have
proposed a solution that integrates and extends several existing techniques in argumentation
theory to offer an end-to-end process in which the following two questions are answered in a
unified manner: (i) how should an agent act in a normative environment while it has conflicting
goals and norms, and (ii) how can the agent explain to a human user why it acted in a certain
way? In consequence, we:
• propose a formal model that formulates different types of conflicts and defines plans for
the agent with respect to these conflicts;
• implement the model to obtain conflict-free plans;
• use argumentation frameworks to reason about the plans and their justifiability;
• propose a decision criterion to identify the best plan out of the set of justified plans that
takes the preferences between goals and norms into account;
• use argumentation-based dialogues to explain the justifiability of plans in natural lan-
guage.
The contributions of this work are explained further in the next section. Section 7.2 dis-
cusses the limitations of work presented alongside proposed solutions to tackle them. Some
interesting further developments are discussed as future work in Section 7.3.
7.1 Contributions
This research proposes a framework for integrating practical and normative reasoning. The
focus of many existing approaches to normative practical reasoning [Broersen et al., 2001;
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Criado et al., 2010; Kollingbaum and Norman, 2003] has been answering the question of
how should an agent act in a normative environment while it has conflicting goals and norms.
We extend these approaches by answering this question using argumentation, such that the
reasoning toward what to do is transparent and also explicable in a natural way.
While argumentation-based approaches to practical reasoning have been proposed in the
past [Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007b; Hulstijn and van der Torre, 2004; Rahwan and Am-
goud, 2006], there has not been much attention paid to the normative and explanation aspect of
an agent conducting practical reasoning in these frameworks. We extend these approaches by:
Putting norms at the heart of practical reasoning. In doing so, we have, for the first time,
defined norm compliance and violation in the presence of durative actions. In addi-
tion, we have defined the conflict between norms in a novel way that takes the temporal
essence of conflict between norms into account. Existing approaches, with the excep-
tion of a very recent work [Criado et al., 2015], treat conflict between norms statically
by using a predefined preference order that determines which norm should be followed
in case two norms are inconsistent. However, in dynamic environments, it can be quite
challenging to specify all inconsistencies that may occur. In addition, as it is in this
work, considering the temporal aspect of conflict, the inconsistency between norms can
differ from one plan to another one. Two norms that are in conflict in the context of plan
pi do not necessarily have to be in conflict in the context of pi′. In other words, it is the
sequence of actions in the plan that clarifies whether two activated norms are in conflict
in the plan. This type of inconsistency is impossible to predict prior to plan generation,
and hence the inadequacy of existing approaches that pre-detect the conflicts between
norms.
Considering planning as an inevitable part of practical reasoning. Plans defined by our for-
mal model give a full temporal account of what actions should be executed, and in what
order (e.g. concurrently, sequentially). Although planning is an inevitable part of prac-
tical reasoning, it has been abstracted away in several examples of existing literature
[Amgoud et al., 2008a; Hulstijn and van der Torre, 2004; Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006].
The main focus of these works is on identifying a subset of consistent desires and their
plans. However, it is not clear how, i.e. when and in which orders, the agent should exe-
cute those plans. More importantly and as it is discussed by Bench-Capon and Atkinson
[2009], it is difficult to distinguish between states and actions in these approaches, which
in the end does not leave the agent with a clear choice of actions. However, practical
reasoning is about what to do, rather than what to pursue. In contrast, the approaches
[Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007b; Oren, 2013] that use AATS [Wooldridge and Hoek,
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2006] for representing the agents actions, clearly distinguish between actions and states,
but to the best of our knowledge, AATSs are merely used for knowledge representation
purposes and have not been implemented. We extend the former category [Amgoud et
al., 2008a; Hulstijn and van der Torre, 2004; Rahwan and Amgoud, 2006] of practical
reasoning frameworks by giving a clear account of actions and states obtained from the
execution of actions. The latter category [Atkinson and Bench-Capon, 2007b; Oren,
2013] are extended by providing an implementation of the model in ASP that automates
the plan generation. The formulation of the model and the computational translation are
very similar, thus there are no conceptual gaps to bridge.
Developing argumentation schemes for justifiability. The argument schemes in this work
are developed in the spirit of Atkinson and Bench-Capon [2007b]. However, those
schemes focus on actions rather than plans. So also the scheme in Toniolo [2013]. The
schemes proposed in our work focus on plans and are mainly aimed at checking the jus-
tifiability of a plan with respect to agent’s goals, norms, their preferences and conflicts.
Hence, the accessibility of arguments in the dialogue for verifying the justifiability of
a plan. Oren [2013] and Gasque [2013] also define argumentation schemes for plans,
however the justifiability of plans with respect to a certain semantics is not addressed in
any of them. The focus of the schemes in Oren [2013] is on defining preferences over
paths or plans, whereas Gasque [2013] concentrates on the possibility of the plan with
respect to an initial state and the values plans promote.
Using a novel decision criterion for identifying the best plan. The decision criterion iden-
tifies the best sequence of actions both in presence and absence of preference informa-
tion over goals and norms. Preferences explicitly influence the justifiability of a plan by
identifying certain attacks as defeat. Since all the justified plans are better than those not
justified, the decision criterion is guaranteed to respect the preference information avail-
able. In addition, the preferences can be used to determine the norm- or goal-dominance
of one plan over another one. However, the preferences over goals and norms are par-
tial and there might be situations such that plans cannot be compared merely based on
preferences. In such cases we use the number of goals satisfied and norms violated to
compare justified plans. Depending on agent choice, a higher number of goals can take
priority over a lower number of violations or the other way around.
Generating explanation for the best plan in natural language. The idea of using a dialogue
to explain the agent’s decision on the courses of actions is mentioned as a part of future
work by Rahwan and Amgoud [2006] and Oren [2013]. This idea is fulfilled in this
147
thesis. The explanation for comparison of justified plans is generated using a basic algo-
rithm, in which the explanation of justifiability of the best plan is generated by translat-
ing a dialogue game for the preferred semantics. This is the first application of dialogue
games for the preferred semantics in general, and Socratic discussion in particular. As
discussed in Chapter 6 (page 141), due to the impracticality of the concept of restricted
rebut, and despite the popularity of the preferred semantics, the dialogues developed for
them are not yet used in practice.
7.2 Limitations
We plan to address some limitations of our current work in the future.
Enriching the conflict detection In Chapter 3 we explained three categories of conflicts, namely
(i) conflict between goals, (ii) conflict between goals and norms, and (iii) conflict be-
tween norms. We also observed that the first two categories of conflict are static, while
the last one is dynamic (i.e. contextual) and depends on the sequence of actions in which
the norms are activated. Just like norms, in real scenarios, goals often have temporal
properties, in terms of a deadline before which they should be satisfied, or a period
over which they should stay satisfied (i.e. maintenance goals [Hindriks and Riemsdijk,
2007]). Temporally extended goals [Hindriks et al., 2009] are discussed in detail in agent
programming languages such as GOAL [Boer et al., 2007], however they are not com-
monly used in practical reasoning frameworks, despite the importance of goals in these
frameworks. Using temporally extended goals in the formal model instead of achieve-
ment goals, not only increases the expressiveness of the model, it also has considerable
implications for conflict within goals and between goals and norms. It allows defining
conflict within goals and between goals and norms contextually and thus enriching the
concept of conflict in the model further. For instance, two temporal goals are defined as
inconsistent if their requirements are inconsistent and the period over which they should
be satisfied or stay satisfied overlaps. The conflict between goals and norms can also be
defined in the same manner. An obligation and a goal are in conflict if the postcondi-
tions of the obliged action are inconsistent with the goal requirements and they have to
be brought about over the same period of time. Similarly, a prohibition and a goal are in
conflict if the postconditions of the prohibited action contribute to the goal requirements,
however the norm forbids bringing them about over the same period over which the goal
has to be satisfied or stay satisfied.
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Enriching normative reasoning In the current model norms are all action-based and spec-
ified in terms of obligations and prohibitions. The normative reasoning capability of
the agent can be enhanced by allowing state-based and permission norms. State-based
norms would permit the expression of obligations and prohibitions in terms of achieving
or avoiding some state before some deadline. A combination of action and state based
norms (e.g. [De Vos et al., 2013]) enriches the norm representation as well as normative
reasoning.
In addition permission norms are useful to model permitted violation of an obligation
or a prohibition [Oren, 2013; Oren et al., 2010; Pacheco, 2012]. A temporal permission
would permit the violation of an obligation or a prohibition over a certain period of
time. The violations occurring in a period rather than the one covered by a permission
norm, therefore remain undesirable. For example, off-street parking is often forbidden
in central part of some cities apart from 7pm to 6am. In other words, 7pm to 6am is a
period over which the prohibition of parking can be violated in the light of a permission
norm.
Implementation Another area for improvement is to integrate the implementation of the nor-
mative practical reasoning model in ASP with the ASP implementation of ASPARTIX1.
ASPARTIX is one of the most well-known implementations for computing various ex-
tensions of an abstract argumentation framework. The goal of such an integration would
be improving the efficiency of the system in comparison with the current version, in
which the argumentation frameworks for plans has to be queried about whether they
entail a plan argument in at least one preferred extension.
To make such an integration, we propose using one of the newest developments in the
world of ASP solvers: multi-shot solving [Gebser et al., 2015] with clingo 4. Multi-
shot solving allows running and solving multiple models concurrently. In fact, one can
solve more than one answer set program concurrently by creating and calling different
instances of the solver. It is also possible to run answer set programs sequentially, when
the answers of the first program need to be extracted and re-inserted to the second one
for further processing.
Assuming the implementation of the planning problem in Chapter 4 is the first answer set
program, and ASPARTIX code for computing the preferred extensions of an argumenta-
tion framework is the second answer set program, it seems plausible to extract arguments
for plans, goals and norms from the first and insert it into the second, hence computing if
1Accessible at: http://www.dbai.tuwien.ac.at/proj/argumentation/systempage/ .
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a plan is credulously accepted under the preferred semantics through a unified process.
7.3 Future Work
With respect to future work, we see several promising avenues to extend the work presented in
this thesis:
Institutionally situated practical reasoning agent Norms in this work are regulations im-
posed on the agent externally, however the normative frameworks that enforce these
norms are not modelled. Institutions provide an effective mechanism to govern agent’s
behaviour by specifying a set of norms that fulfil certain normative objectives [Cliffe,
2007; Va´zquez-Salceda, 2003]. Norms imposed on the agent might be from several in-
stitutions and hence there might be conflict between them. In a bigger picture, a practical
reasoning agent’s actions are affected by institutions that the agent subscribes and each
institution imposes a certain set of norms on the agent that the agent might comply with
or violate. The benefit of reasoning about norms in the context of institutions is in detect-
ing the normative conflict in a more systematic manner and at the institution level rather
than instantiated norm level. There is a large body of work available on conflict-free
institutions that can be used by agents to try to subscribe to institutions that are likely
to cause less conflict where possible. Fortunately, reasoning about institutions, includ-
ing checking their interactions and merging outcome is formulated in ASP [Lee et al.,
2013; Li, 2014; Li et al., 2013] which should make it easier to integrate with our current
implementation of a practical reasoning agent in ASP.
Another potential of making such an extension is to consider the legitimacy of a plan
from a specific institution’s perspective. In this case the institutions can be seen as
audiences and plans are evaluated from the perspective of various audiences. A plan
might not violate any norm of a particular institution, while it violates several norms of
another. This ultimately makes the plan legitimate from perspective of the former insti-
tution, while the latter might question the legitimacy of the plan. As a result, a practical
reasoning agent can view and compare its plans from its audiences’ point of view.
Human-agent interaction The normative practical reasoning agent in this work is able to
explain its decision about the best plan to a human user using algorithms that translate
to natural language the justifiability of the best plan and its superiority to other plans.
The explanation is presented to the user so that the user can scrutinise and understand
the system and its outcome. However, the user does not interact with the system. Ideally
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the user should be able to query the agent about why a plan is justified or not. Also the
queries about why a plan does not satisfy a goal or violates a norm can be put forward
by the user.
The justifiability of a plan is explained using a dialogue for the preferred semantics. Cur-
rently, there is no implementation of human-agent dialogue for the preferred semantics.
An implementation of a user-computer dialogue for the grounded semantics is proposed
in [Caminada and Podlaszewski, 2012a] 2. The dialogue is based on argument labellings
and although is not linked to natural language generation, it is intuitive enough to be
used in a user-computer setting. Caminada et al. [2014c] have recently developed an-
other demonstrator that uses dialogical proof procedure based on the grounded seman-
tics, with the purpose of allowing a user to identify the reasons behind a claim being
accepted under the grounded semantics. Unlike Caminada and Podlaszewski [2012a],
Caminada et al. [2014c] uses a natural language generation unit that makes the dialogue
accessible to non-technical users. An interesting line of future work would be to imple-
ment a similar demonstrator for the preferred semantics that is used by a human user to
query the agent about why a plan is justified.
Applications in collaborative planning Norms are a well understood approach for declara-
tively specifying desirable behaviour in multi-agent systems, and are often used to drive
cooperation and coordination [Governatori et al., 2011; Jonker et al., 2007; Oren et al.,
2011; Pacheco, 2012]. They have therefore been used extensively in collaborative plan-
ning in multi-agent systems [Balke et al., 2013; Oh et al., 2011; Vasconcelos et al., 2009].
Argumentation-based approaches to collaborative planning [Black and Atkinson, 2009;
Black and Bentley, 2011; Ferrando et al., 2011; Gasque, 2013; Toniolo et al., 2012] have
successfully established to enhance the collaboration manner and reaching agreement
between a team of agents by exchanging arguments. However, these approaches, with
the exception of Toniolo [2013] do not consider norm-driven plans. The consideration of
norms in Toniolo [2013] itself is limited to a simple notion in situation calculus. Further-
more, there is no evidence of reasoning about norms, as it is understood in the normative
literature, in terms of norm compliance or violation; the agents have to comply with
norms imposed on them, without possibility of violating them, which practically is norm
regimentation. The approach we presented in this thesis clearly gives the choice of norm
violation or compliance to the agent, however it is developed for a single-agent setting.
Given the proven power of norms in collaborative planning and the benefit of argumen-
tation in this area, another line of future work would be to extend the approach presented
2See https://code.google.com/p/pyafl/downloads/list for implementation.
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for normative practical reasoning presented in this work, to multi-agent norm-driven
collaborative planning.
Applications in decision support systems In recent years, there has been an increasing num-
ber of applications of intelligent agents in decision support systems [Atkinson et al.,
2004, 2006; Bench-Capon et al., 2012; Glasspool et al., 2006]. Agents are capable of
outperforming humans in many complicated activities including decision-making. Cog-
nitive limitations of human decision-makers (e.g. ignoring probabilities, preferences and
irrelevant generalisations) are often recognised as the main source of irrational decision-
making [Axelrod, 1976; Nisbett and Ross, 1980]. While decision support systems are
free from these difficulties, they have proven to be difficult for decision-makers to trust
[Introne and Iandoli, 2014; Lawrence et al., 2002]. There is experimental evidence that
argumentation-based decision support systems increase the trustworthiness of intelli-
gent agents decision-makers [Introne and Iandoli, 2014; Paul A., 2003; Scheuer et al.,
2010]. Familiarity of most people with argumentation as a skill and also the availability
of graphical representation of arguments and argumentation-based decision-making are
identified as the main reasons for this evidence [Mercier and Sperber, 2011; Toth et al.,
2002].
The argumentation-based normative practical reasoning agent modelled in this thesis
can be used to support the decision-making process for various users with different pref-
erences over goals and norms and different priorities over goal- and norm-dominance.
Currently the agent identifies the best plan based on a pre-defined set of preferences
over goals and norms. The decision criterion that identifies the best decision is also
pre-defined. However, in a human-to-agent settings, these elements should be defined
dynamically by the users. Similarly, the users should be capable of querying the agent
about the best decision based on different decision criterions. One user might define
the best decision as a decision with most pros, while another user might define it as a
decision with least cons. The agent on the other hand, should be able to present the
pros and cons of each decision in terms of arguments, making it easy for the user to
understand the advantages and disadvantages of each decision with respect to different
decision citerions.
Empirical evaluation of the explanation generation In the previous chapter (page 142) we
discussed the difference between proactive and reactive explanation generation. An in-
teresting area of future work would be to empirically verify which type of explanation
generation is more useful in practical reasoning domain. This is of course subject to the
implementation of reactive explanation generation in the first place, which itself is a part
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of future work discussed earlier in this section. Moreover, the empirical evaluation can
consider novice as well as expert users and test if different types of explanations might
be more useful to different types of users with various level of expertise. A study of such
nature was conducted by Ye [1995], however, in this study novice and expert users are
tested to verify whether they differ in valuing alternative explanations being provided
in terms of (i) the trace of inference rules used to reach a certain conclusion; (ii) the
justification of a reached conclusion; (iii) the overall strategy of the system to reach a
conclusion. But this study can nevertheless be useful to outline a study in which different
types of explanation in terms of one-way (proactive explanation generation) two-ways













9 holdsat(X,S2) :- holdsat(X,S1), not terminated(X,S1), state(S1;S2),
10 S2=S1+1.
11
12 %Actions with their pre and postcoditions
13 action(join_union,1).
14 pre(join_union,S) :- not holdsat(union_member,S),state(S).
15 holdsat(union_member,S2) :- executed(join_union,S1),
16 action(join_union,1), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
17
18 action(finish_report,3).
19 pre(finish_report,S) :- holdsat(at_office,S),state(S).
20 holdsat(report_finalised,S2) :- executed(finish_report,S1),
21 action(finish_report,3), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+3.
22
23 action(go_to_office,1).
24 pre(go_to_office,S) :- not holdsat(office,S),state(S).
25 holdsat(at_office,S2) :- executed(go_to_office,S1),
26 action(go_to_office,1), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
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28 action(attend_interview,4).
29 pre(attend_interview,S) :- holdsat(theory_test_done,S),
30 holdsat(at_interview_venue,S),not holdsat(at_office,S),
31 not holdsat(at_meeting_venue,S),state(S).
32 holdsat(interviewed,S2) :- executed(attend_interview,S1),
33 action(attend_interview,4), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+4.
34 terminated(at_interview_venue,S2) :- executed(attend_interview,S1),
35 action(attend_interview,4), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+3.
36
37 action(take_theory_test,1).
38 pre(take_theory_test,S) :- holdsat(course_fee_paid,S),state(S).
39 holdsat(theory_test_done,S2) :- executed(take_theory_test,S1),
40 action(take_theory_test,1), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
41
42 action(get_company_funding,2).
43 pre(get_company_funding,S) :- holdsat(employee,S), state(S).
44 holdsat(course_fee_paid,S2) :- executed(get_company_funding,S1),
45 action(get_company_funding,2), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+2.
46
47 action(attend_meeting,5).
48 pre(attend_meeting,S) :- holdsat(course_fee_paid,S),
49 holdsat(at_meeting_venue,S), not holdsat(at_interview_venue,S),
50 not holdsat(at_office,S),state(S).
51 holdsat(meeting_attended,S2) :- executed(attend_meeting,S1),
52 action(attend_meeting,5), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+5.
53 holdsat(summary_documented,S2) :- executed(attend_meeting,S1),
54 action(attend_meeting,5), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+5.
55 terminated(at_meeting_venue,S2) :- executed(attend_meeting,S1),
56 action(attend_meeting,5), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+4.
57
58 action(go_to_interview_venue,1).




63 action(go_to_interview_venue,1), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
64 terminated(at_office,S) :- executed(go_to_interview_venue,S),
65 action(go_to_interview_venue,1), state(S).








73 action(go_to_meeting_venue,1), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
74 terminated(at_office,S) :- executed(go_to_meeting_venue,S),
75 action(go_to_meeting_venue,1), state(S).




80 pre(take_maternity_leave,S) :- holdsat(given_birth,S),state(S).
81 holdsat(on_maternity_leave,S2) :- executed(take_maternity_leave,S1),
82 action(take_maternity_leave,2), state(S1;S2), S2=S1+2.
83
84 %Action execution
85 {executed(A,S)} :- action(A,D), state(S).
86
87 %Inprogress actions
88 inprog(A,S2) :- executed(A,S1), action(A,D), state(S1;S2),
89 S1 <= S2, S2< S1+D.
90
91 %Preserving preconditions during action execution
92 :- inprog(A,S), action(A,D), not pre(A,S), state(S).
93
94 %Preventing the execution of two actions in the same state
















110 holdsat(o(n1,attend_meeting,DL),S), DL=S, state(S).







118 action(take_maternity_leave,2), S2=S1+2, state(S1;S2).
119 cmp(f(n2,go_to_office,DL),S) :- holdsat(f(n2,go_to_office,DL),S),
120 action(go_to_office,1), DL=S, state(S).
121 complied(n2) :- cmp(f(n2,go_to_office,DL),S),state(S).
122 terminated(f(n2,go_to_office,DL),S) :-
123 cmp(f(n2,go_to_office,DL),S), state(S).
124 vol(f(n2,go_to_office,DL),S) :- holdsat(f(n2,go_to_office,DL),S),
125 executed(go_to_office,S), state(S), S!=DL.







133 action(take_maternity_leave,2), S2=S1+2, state(S1;S2).
134 cmp(f(n3,attend_meeting,DL),S) :-
135 holdsat(f(n3,attend_meeting,DL),S),
136 action(attend_meeting,5), DL=S, state(S).





142 executed(attend_meeting,S), state(S), S!=DL.
















158 holdsat(o(n4,attend_interview,DL),S), DL=S, state(S).





164 satisfied(strike,S) :- not holdsat(at_office,S),
165 not holdsat(meeting_attended,S),
166 holdsat(union_member,S), state(S).
167 satisfied(strike) :- satisfied(strike,S), state(S).
168
169 satisfied(submission,S) :- holdsat(at_office,S),
170 holdsat(report_finalised,S), state(S).
171 satisfied(submission) :- satisfied(submission,S), state(S).
172
173 satisfied(certificate,S) :- holdsat(course_fee_paid,S),
174 sholdsat(theory_test_done,S), holdsat(interviewed,S),state(S).
175 satisfied(certificate) :- satisfied(certificate,S), state(S).
176
177 %Preventing sequence that do not satisfy any of the goals




182 :- satisfied(strike), satisfied(submission).
183
184 %Conflicting actions
185 :- inprog(finish_report,S), inprog(go_to_office,S),
186 action(finish_report,3), action(go_to_office,1), state(S).
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187 :- inprog(finish_report,S), inprog(attend_interview,S),
188 action(finish_report,3), action(attend_interview,4), state(S).
189 :- inprog(finish_report,S), inprog(attend_meeting,S),
190 action(finish_report,3), action(attend_meeting,5), state(S).
191 :- inprog(finish_report,S), inprog(go_to_interview_venue,S),
192 action(finish_report,3), action(go_to_interview_venue,1), state(S).
193 :- inprog(finish_report,S), inprog(go_to_meeting_venue,S),
194 action(finish_report,3), action(go_to_meeting_venue,1), state(S).
195 :- inprog(go_to_office,S), inprog(attend_interview,S),
196 action(go_to_office,1), action(attend_interview,4), state(S).
197 :- inprog(go_to_office,S), inprog(attend_meeting,S),
198 action(go_to_office,1), action(attend_meeting,5), state(S).
199 :- inprog(go_to_office,S), inprog(go_to_interview_venue,S),
200 action(go_to_office,1), action(go_to_interview_venue,1), state(S).
201 :- inprog(go_to_office,S), inprog(go_to_meeting_venue,S),
202 action(go_to_office,1), action(go_to_meeting_venue,1), state(S).
203 :- inprog(attend_interview,S), inprog(attend_meeting,S),
204 action(attend_interview,4), action(attend_meeting,5), state(S).
205 :- inprog(attend_interview,S), inprog(go_to_interview_venue,S),
206 action(attend_interview,4),
207 action(go_to_interview_venue,1), state(S).
208 :- inprog(attend_interview,S), inprog(go_to_meeting_venue,S),
209 action(attend_interview,4),
210 action(go_to_meeting_venue,1), state(S).
211 :- inprog(attend_meeting,S), inprog(go_to_interview_venue,S),
212 action(attend_meeting,5),
213 action(go_to_interview_venue,1), state(S).
214 :- inprog(attend_meeting,S), inprog(go_to_meeting_venue,S),
215 action(attend_meeting,5),
216 action(go_to_meeting_venue,1), state(S).




221 %Conflicting goals and norms
222 :- satisfied(strike), complied(n1).




226 %Preventing the execution of an action more than once
227 :- executed(A,S1),executed(A,S2), S1!=S2, state(S1;S2), action(A,D).
228
229 %Detecting the final state
230 flag(S2) :- satisfied(strike,S2), not satisfied(strike,S1),
231 state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
232 flag(S2) :- satisfied(submission,S2), not satisfied(submission,S1),
233 state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
234 flag(S2) :- satisfied(certificate,S2),not satisfied(certificate,S1),
235 state(S1;S2), S2=S1+1.
236 final(F) :- F= #max[flag(S)=S].
237
238 %No idle state before the final state
239 alpha(S) :- inprog(A,S), action(A,D), state(S).
240 :- final(S2), not alpha(S1), state(S1;S2), S1<S2.
241
242 %No action in progress after the final state
243 :- final(S1), alpha(S2), state(S1;S2), S2 >= S1.
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Appendix B
Proof of Properties in Chapter 5
Proof of Property 5.1. We need to show: ∀pi ∈ Π, (pi, pi) 6∈ >pi .
pi cannot be justified and unjustified at the same time. Also, both >G and >N are irreflexive so
(pi, pi) 6∈ >G, and (pi, pi) 6∈ >N . Thus, (pi, pi) 6∈ >pi.
Proof of Property 5.2. We need to show: ∀pi1, pi2 ∈ Π, if pi1 6= pi2 and (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi then
(pi2, pi1) 6∈ >pi.
Assume that pi1 6= pi2 and (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi while (pi2, pi1) ∈ >pi.
case 1: (pi2, pi1) ∈ >pi because pi2 is justified and pi1 is not. This means that (pi1, pi2) 6∈ >pi
which is contrary to assumption.
case 2: (pi2, pi1) ∈ >pi because pi2 and pi1 are both justified and (pi2, pi1) ∈ >G. Since >G
is antisymmetric (pi1, pi2) 6∈ >G, which means that (pi1, pi2) 6∈ >pi that is contrary to
assumption.
case 3: (pi2, pi1) ∈ >pi because pi2 and pi1 are both justified and (pi2, pi1) ∈ ∼G but (pi1, pi2) ∈
>N . Since ∼G is symmetric, (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼G and since >N is antisymmetric (pi2, pi1) 6∈
>N , which means that (pi1, pi2) 6∈ >pi that is contrary to assumption.
Proof of Property 5.3. We need to show: ∀pi1, pi2, pi3 ∈ Π, if (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi and (pi2, pi3) ∈
>pi, then (pi1, pi3) ∈ >pi.
case 1: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 is justified but pi2 is not. On the other hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ >pi
because pi2 is justified but pi3 is not.
This cannot be the case since pi2 cannot be justified and unjustified at the same time.
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case 2: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 is justified but pi2 is not. On the other hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ >pi
because pi2 and pi3 are both justified but (pi2, pi3) ∈ >G.
This cannot be the case since pi2 cannot be justified and unjustified at the same time.
case 3: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 is justified but pi2 is not. On the other hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ >pi
because pi2 and pi3 are both justified and (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼G, while (pi3, pi2) ∈ >N .
This cannot be the case since pi2 cannot be justified and unjustified at the same time.
case 4: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 and pi2 are both justified but (pi1, pi2) ∈ >G. On the other
hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ >pi because pi2 is justified but pi3 is not.
Since pi1 is justified and pi3 is not, (pi1, pi3) ∈ >pi.
case 5: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 and pi2 are both justified but (pi1, pi2) ∈ >G. On the other
hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ >pi because pi2 and pi3 are both justified but (pi2, pi3) ∈ >G.
Since >G is transitive, from (pi1, pi2) ∈ >G and (pi2, pi3) ∈ >G we conclude that
(pi1, pi3) ∈ >G. Thus, (pi1, pi3) ∈ >pi.
case 6: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 and pi2 are both justified but (pi1, pi2) ∈ >G. On the other
hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ >pi because pi2 and pi3 are both justified and (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼G and but
(pi3, pi2) ∈ >N .
Since >G and ∼G are both transitive, from (pi1, pi2) ∈ >G and (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼G we
conclude that (pi1, pi3) ∈ >G. Thus, (pi1, pi3) ∈ >pi.
case 7: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 and pi2 are both justified and (pi2, pi1) ∈ ∼G but (pi1, pi2) ∈
>N . On the other hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ >pi because pi2 is justified but pi3 is not.
Since pi1 is justified and pi3 is not, (pi1, pi3) ∈ >pi.
case 8: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 and pi2 are both justified and and (pi2, pi1) ∈ ∼G but
(pi1, pi2) ∈ >N . On the other hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ >pi because pi2 and pi3 are both justi-
fied but (pi2, pi3) ∈ >G.
Since >G and ∼G are both transitive, from (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼G and (pi2, pi3) ∈ >G we con-
clude that (pi1, pi3) ∈ >G. Thus, (pi1, pi3) ∈ >pi.
case 9: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi1 and pi2 are both justified and (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼G but (pi2, pi1) ∈
>N . On the other hand, (pi3, pi2) ∈ >pi because pi2 and pi3 are both justified and and
(pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼G and but (pi3, pi2) ∈ >N .
Since ∼G is transitive, from (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼G and (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼G we conclude that
(pi1, pi3) ∈ ∼G. Also since Since >N is transitive, from (pi3, pi2) ∈ >N and (pi2, pi1) ∈
>N we conclude that (pi3, pi1) ∈ >N . Thus, (pi1, pi3) ∈ >pi.
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Proof of Property 5.4. We need to show that ∼pi is reflexive, symmetric and transitive.
Reflexive: Assume that ∃pi ∈ Π s.t. (pi, pi) 6∈ ∼pi. If (pi, pi) 6∈ ∼pi then (pi, pi) ∈ >pi, which
cannot be the case since >pi is not reflexive.
Symmetric: Assume that (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼pi but (pi2, pi1) 6∈ ∼pi. If (pi2, pi1) 6∈ ∼pi then either
case 1: (pi1, pi2) ∈ >pi, which means that (pi1, pi2) 6∈ ∼pi. This is contrary to assumption
(pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼pi. Therefore, (pi2, pi1) ∈ ∼pi.
case 2: (pi2, pi1) ∈ >pi, which means that (pi1, pi2) 6∈ ∼pi. This is contrary to assumption
(pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼pi. Therefore, (pi2, pi1) ∈ ∼pi.
Transitive: We need to show that if (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼pi and (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼pi, then (pi1, pi3) ∈ ∼pi.
case 1: (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼pi because they are both not justified. Also (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼pi be-
cause they are both not justified. Therefore, neither of pi1 and pi3 are justified, so
(pi1, pi3) ∈ ∼pi.
case 2: (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼pi because they are both not justified. On the other hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈
∼pi because they are both justified and (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼G and (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼N . But pi2
cannot be both justified and not justified at the same time.
case 3: (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼pi because they are both justified and (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼G and (pi1, pi2) ∈
∼N . On the other hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼pi because neither of them is justified. But pi2
cannot be both justified and not justified at the same time.
case 4: (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼pi because they are both justified and (pi1, pi2) ∈ ∼G and (pi1, pi2) ∈
∼N . On the other hand, (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼pi because they are both justified and (pi2, pi3)
∈ ∼G and (pi2, pi3) ∈ ∼N . Since ∼G and ∼N are both transitive, it follows that pi1
and pi3 are both justified and (pi1, pi3) ∈ ∼G and (pi1, pi3) ∈ ∼N . Thus, (pi1, pi3) ∈
∼pi.
Proof of Property 5.5. ≥ is a total order on Π iff it is antisymmetric, transitive and total.
• antisymmetric: We need to prove that if ([pii], [pij ]) ∈ ≥ and ([pij ], [pii]) ∈ ≥ then
[pii] = [pij ]. If ([pii], [pij ]) ∈ ≥ , then (pii, pij) ∈ >pi or (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi. If (pii, pij) ∈ >pi,
then (pij , pii) 6∈>pi. Because ([pij ], [pii]) ∈ ≥, we have to have (pij , pii) ∈ ∼pi, which
leads to [pij ] = [pii].
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• transitive: We need to show that if ([pii], [pij ]) ∈ ≥ and ([pij ], [pii]) ∈ ≥, then ([pii], [pik])
∈ ≥. If ([pii], [pij ]) ∈ ≥ then (pii, pij) ∈ >pi or (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi. Similarly, if ([pij ], [pik]) ∈
≥ then (pij , pik) ∈ >pi or (pij , pik) ∈ ∼pi. Since >pi are ∼pi are both transitive, in either
of the following four cases we conclude that ([pii], [pik]) ≥:
case 1: (pii, pij) ∈ >pi, and (pij , pik) ∈ >pi implies (pii, pik) ∈ >pi and therefore
([pii], [pik)] ∈ ≥.
case 2: (pii, pij) ∈ >pi, and (pij , pik) ∈ ∼pi implies (pii, pik) ∈ >pi and therefore
([pii], [pik)] ∈ ≥.
case 3: (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi, and (pij , pik) ∈ >pi implies (pii, pik) ∈ >pi and therefore
([pii], [pik)] ∈ ≥.
case 4: (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi, and (pij , pik) ∈ ∼pi implies (pii, pik) ∈ ∼pi and therefore
([pii], [pik)] ∈ ≥.
• total: If ≥ is not total, then ∃[pii], [pij ] s.t. ([pii], [pij ]) 6∈ ≥ and ([pij ], [pii]) 6∈ ≥. If
([pii], [pij ]) 6∈ ≥, then (pii, pij) 6∈ >pi and (pii, pij) 6∈ ∼pi. On the other hand, if ([pij ], [pii]) 6∈
≥, then (pij , pii) 6∈ >pi and (pij , pii) 6∈ ∼pi. From (pii, pij) 6∈ >pi and (pij , pii) 6∈ >pi we
conclude that (pii, pij) ∈ ∼pi, which is contradictory to (pii, pij) 6∈ ∼pi and (pij , pii) 6∈ ∼pi.
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